Indira Gandhi National Open University
School of Interdisciplinary and
Trans-disciplinary Studies

MPYE – 014

Philosophy of Mind

Block 1

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

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BLOCK INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of mind is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of human mind or, in other words, what it is that makes us conscious beings. The philosophy of mind is concerned with the problems associated with the functioning of the mind or brain. It tries to study the properties of the mind and its relationship with body. The central question in the field is whether the mind is material or immaterial: Are we merely physical beings, or something more? Do we have immaterial souls that animate our bodies, or are we merely electrical activity in an organic brain? Is the mind separate from the brain, or a by-product of it? Is there such a thing as a permanent self or soul? What is consciousness? Is artificial intelligence possible? A human being is a conscious, experiencing subject and a possessor of a variety of mental states like hearing, seeing, feeling an ache or pain, remembering, thinking and wondering. Even animals, birds, fish, insects and possibly even molluscs also have mental lives, however underdeveloped and rudimentary some of these minds might be. This characterization is called mental phenomena. At the same time, a human person possesses another phenomenon which is called physical. He or she possesses human nature, behaviour of physical bodies, processes and events. The block differentiates also human person with animals and computers.

Unit 1 introduces the philosophy of mind as the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of human mind or, in other words, what it is that makes us conscious beings. The basic notions, core themes, questions, problems and issues associated with the functioning of the mind or brain are elaborated along with a study of the properties of the mind and its relationship with body.

Unit 2 familiarizes students with some key terms and notions of general philosophy which are useful to philosophy of mind. It would make them realize the multi-disciplinary nature of philosophy of mind. Since mental processes are intimately related to bodily processes, the descriptions that the natural sciences furnish of human beings play an important role in the philosophy of mind. The list of such sciences includes: Psychology, biology, computer science, cognitive science, cybernetics, linguistics, medicine, pharmacology.

Unit 3 gives a brief understanding of pre-behaviorist philosophical understanding of the issue of animal mind, the behaviorist turn in the scientific world, the ethical implications of affirming or denying of animal consciousness, and the arguments for and against animal consciousness. In order to facilitate such a utilitarian approach we needed a theory where the animals did not have thinking capacity nor felt pain. In this unit, we will look at different approaches to mind and animals: what do we mean by mind; do animals seem to think; and what do we mean when the animals do not have a mind.

Unit 4 analyses human mind in comparison with computers. The machine functional state of the mind is like a computational state of a computer. The machine functionalists argue that mental states are like the 'information processing' states of a computer. According to the computer functionalism or artificial intelligence, the brain is a computer, and the mind is a computer program implemented in the brain.

COURSE INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies "the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain." Many of the philosophers of mind are materialists. But today there are many other philosophers of mind, who are not materialists in the crude form. According to them we can very well have a non-dualistic philosophy of the mind, that does not reduce everything to its physical or material aspects. The philosophy of mind is the equivalent of philosophical anthropology in the continental tradition. Thus the scope of Philosophy of Mind may be regarded as that of Philosophical Anthropology itself. Philosophy of mind, though separate from and related to philosophical anthropology, gives new terms and categories to philosopher to analyse the problems and offer solutions. It gives more precise definitions to philosophical anthropology and is based on current scientific findings. Thus Philosophy of Mind can truly help us realize our own uniqueness thus serve us in making our lives better. The radical aspect of the problem concerns the existence of minds in other people at all. This skeptical problem argues that not only is it impossible to know what another person is thinking/feeling, but also that they actually think and feel. What do we base our knowledge of other people on? On what basis do we interpret their actions? How can we claim knowledge of what others think and feel?

Block 1 introduces the discipline, philosophy of mind as a branch of philosophy distinguished for its specific treatment on the nature and function of the human mind. The relationship of philosophy of mind with several other disciplines reveal that the study of human mind is not an isolated affair but mutually enriching and complementing. The second part of the block deal with comparing the human mind with the animal behaviour and with the mechanical function of the computer. Clarity is sought in understanding the specificity and specialty of human mind.

Block 2 is a survey of the understanding of human mind by various philosophers of the West and India. In both the traditions, understanding of human mind began with the speculative and philosophical probe until the scientific revolution brought in fresh and renewed scope of dealing with human mind. While the ancient thinkers dealt with human mind as a part of psychological and merely mental categories, the medieval Western thinkers treated it along with spiritual entity, called soul. Recent developments in the neurological and physiological studies approached human mind entirely differently. Modern psychological analysis too added much to the development of contemporary philosophy of mind.

Block 3 deals with certain concrete expressions of human mind and brain, as understood and upheld in both Western and Indian traditions. Perception is one of the means of valid knowledge in the world and consists in an inseparable relation of the perceptive consciousness with its content. Dreams are the pictures of the unconscious mind. Emotions are expressions of the mind and brain. Language is well related to thought process in the mind. The block deals elaborately on all these expressions.

Block 4 extensively discusses about the operations of the mind such as remembering, understanding and willing. Remembering is about memory. Understanding, Wittgenstein holds, is not a state or process. The logic (grammar) of understanding and that of mental states,

experiences and processes is totally different. Willing is the act of volition. Volition is the power or act of making decisions about an agent's own actions.

UNIT 1 DEFINITION, SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE

Contents

1.0 OBJECTIVES

- To introduce the students to the basic notions of philosophy of the mind.
- To set the stage with the basic notions of this discipline so that the students can gain further information on philosophy of the mind.
- To take up some core themes and issues of philosophy of the mind..

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of mind is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of human mind or, in other words, what it is that makes us conscious beings. The central question in the field is whether the mind is material or immaterial: Are we merely physical beings, or something more? Do we have immaterial souls that animate our bodies, or are we merely electrical activity in an organic brain?

1.2 BASIC ISSUES

The philosophy of mind is concerned with the problems associated with the functioning of the mind or brain. It tries to study the properties of the mind and its relationship with body. Such problems can take on many different aspects, for instance:

• Is the mind separate from the brain, or a by-product of it?
• Is there such a thing as a permanent self or soul?
• What is consciousness?
• Is artificial intelligence possible?

As an introduction, we can say that Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies "the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain." The mind-body problem, i.e., the

relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as the central issue in philosophy of mind. At the same time there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body that is studied in this course (PoM 2011).

1.3 THEORIES OF THE MIND AND BODY

In this section, we take up the issue of mind and body and give some introductory concepts that are crucial for our further reflection. In fact, Dualism and monism are the two major schools of thought that attempt to study the relationship between mind and body, which we will briefly treat here. We will also study some other related theories too.

Dualism

Dualism can be traced back to Plato, Aristotle and the Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy, but it was most precisely formulated by René Descartes in the 17th century. Dualism may be further classified into Substance Dualism and Property Dualism. Substance Dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, whereas Property Dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance (PoM 2011). The dualist viewpoint divides the human being into two basic or primary substances: matter and mind. This view is, perhaps, the most natural one.

The main reasons for this are:

• It is suggested by our day-to-day experiences. It is quite common to distinguish between "my body" and "my self", and our bodies may become injured or ill whilst our minds are active and alert. Our mental experience is also private, reinforcing the feeling that it is somehow separate.

• Strong traditional backing or the long history for such a position. Views that spring from folklore, native belief and religion can all influence our views of our self. This is sometimes done consciously – as in the religious doctrine of immortality – or subtly, through language and the way in which we refer to ourselves.

In general dualism may be further divided into two: Substance dualism and Property dualism. Substance dualism is well-established among non-philosophers and holds the view that there are two fundamentally different types of substance--physical and non-physical--and that human beings are made up of two components: physical bodies and non-physical minds. This theory has many attractions, but is now seen by many, rightly or wrongly, as old-fashioned and naïve. Property Dualism is in fact substance monist; it agrees with materialism that there are only physical substances. However, it concedes to the dualist that these substances have both physical and non-physical properties, and that the non-physical properties cannot be fully explained in purely physical terms. Although this position is intended to capture the best elements of both positions, it arguably ends up with the liabilities of both as well (PoM 2011).

As we can imagine, dualism - although, some would argue, the most common sense view - gives rise to all sorts of problems. If mind and body are separate substances, how do they interact? If mental stuff is immaterial - and therefore without quantity, weight, size, etc. - how do we know it exists? As a response to these problems, certain philosophers have argued that dualist account of

mind is unnecessarily complicated and that the problems it presents can be solved by adopting other views.

Monism

As opposed to Dualism, Monism is the position that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kinds of entities. This view was first advocated in Western philosophy by Parmenides in the 5th century BC and was later explored by the 17th century rationalist Baruch Spinoza. Monists may be further classified as follows (PoM 2011):

Physicalists argue that only the entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that the mind will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues to evolve. Idealists, unlike the physicalists, maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. Neutral monists adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. In opposition to substance dualism there is substance monism. It is the view that there is no distinction between the mental and physical realms, that everything is fundamentally the same. Although it is possible to argue that everything is mental, as idealism does, it is much more common to hold that everything is physical, to endorse “physicalism” or “materialism” (PoM 2011).

Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the body These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology and the various neurosciences. Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states. Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the brain is all there is to the mind, the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science. Continued neuro-scientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues. However, they are far from having been resolved, and modern philosophy of mind continues to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality (aboutness) of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms (PoM 2011).

Other philosophers, however, adopt a non-physicalist position which challenges the notion that the mind is a purely physical construct. Besides the two general schools discussed above, there are also other related ones as given below.

Behaviourism

The philosophical theory of behaviourism - or, to give its full title, logical behaviourism - holds that being in a mental state (such as being happy) is the same as being in a physical state. In other words, since all that we can know about another person's state of mind is through their behaviour, there is nothing else. Logical behaviourists believe that any statement about the internal or private world of individuals may be translated into a statement about publicly observable actions. For instance, if I say, "I am happy", this may be translated into a description of my physical state - increased heart rate, smiling, etc. If none of these things were present - the behaviourist would argue - then the person is not really happy. Obviously, emotions are not

always accompanied by extravagant outward signs, but even quieter forms of emotional or mental state must be translatable into some form of physical condition.

Functionalism

It is currently the most popular theory of mind. This is mostly due to the influence of computers on modern society - both in scientific terms and in the popular imagination through films, books, etc. As a result, most people presented with the functionalist perspective - though they would probably not know it by that term - would accept it common sense (PO 2011).

But what exactly is the functionalist perspective? Functionalism tries to move beyond Behaviourism. Functionalism is generally taken to be a materialist theory with the following characteristics:

1. Brain states are not mental states. Identity Theory supposes that brain states are identical to mental states. However, there are problems with this. If I say, "I am in pain" it is not the same as saying, "The C-fibres in my brain are firing". But, if mental states and brain states are identical, shouldn't these two statements mean the same thing? If not, and certain types of neurological process cannot be matched up with certain types of mental state, then something over and above simple physical processes must be taking place.
2. Behaviourism cannot account for mental states. Behaviourism attempts to account for the mind in terms of actual or possibly observable behaviour. However, the problem with this view is that:

a) Different behaviours can result from the same stimulus. Imagine that you hear the doorbell - how do you react? Perhaps you run to answer it because you are expecting an important visitor; perhaps you ignore it; etc. In other words, there is no one response that can be linked to the same stimulus. So, if this is the case, what causes us to behave differently? The non-behaviourist would answer that it is our beliefs. However, this is a problem for the behaviourist in that it presupposes something that cannot be explained simply in terms of actual or possible behaviour (PO 2011).

b) Different stimuli can produce the same response. As with the previous example, it is also difficult to say that there is a definite relationship between a certain type of stimulus and a certain response. For example, someone might laugh at someone falling over, seeing a photograph or from hearing a story - whilst someone else might not laugh at any of those things. In other words, there is no certain, one-to-one relationship between a stimulus and a response. If this is so, must we again say that beliefs are responsible for this?

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What is philosophy of mind?

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2) Give your comments on property dualism.

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1.4 SOME SIGNIFICANT THEMES

After having briefly seen the relationship between mind and body as expressed through various theories, we shall take up some of the main issues in Philosophy of Mind. They necessarily form part of any serious philosophical discussion on mind and knowledge of them will initiate us better into philosophy of mind.

Personal Identity

Theories of personal identity attempt to explain what makes a person the same person over time. What is it that ensures that I am the same person now as I was many years ago? The two main approaches to personal identity propose criteria based on bodily continuity and on psychological continuity respectively. What makes a person the same person over time is thus taken to be the fact their body, or their mind, persists through time (PMInfo 2011). An alternative view, however, denies that there is a self that exists over time. Bundle theory holds that we are nothing more than a collection of mental states example, that there is no self over and above these mental states that possesses them.

Bodily Continuity

What makes my pen the same pen as it was yesterday? There are other, qualitatively identical pen, that are not my pen, so it cannot be anything to do with the qualities that it possesses. Plausibly, what makes my pen my pen is that it is possible to trace a line through space following its location from one time to the other, that there is no discontinuity in its physical location (PMInfo 2011). The bodily continuity criterion for personal identity suggests that we apply this approach to personal identity. What makes me the same person as I was ten years ago, then, on this approach, is that it is possible to trace a line through space following the location of my body.

Mind-Body Interaction

The problem of mind-body interaction is a problem faced by adherents of substance dualism. If, as dualists claim, the mind and the body are two distinct substances, then the question arises as to how the two interact. Answering this difficult question is the problem. It appears both that mental events cause physical events and that physical events cause mental events. My beliefs and desires, for example, which are mental states, cause me to act in certain ways. Similarly, what happens to my physical body often has an effect on how I think and feel. This common sense view is called interactionism.

Problems with interactionism have led some to resort to epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism holds that mind-body interaction only occurs in one direction: from the physical to the mental. According to epiphenomenalists, physical events give rise to mental events, but not the other way around (Crane & Patterson 2000) Epiphenomenalism may avoid some of the problems of dualism, but it does not avoid all of them. To avoid all of the problems, it seems, one must take a further step and endorse parallelism, denying that the mind and the body interact at all. The cost of parallelism, though, is arguably too high for the benefits that it offers. Interactionism, despite its difficulties, is the most plausible theory of mind-body interaction available to the dualist (PMInfo 2011).

The Problem of Other Minds

Why should other minds be a problem? Well, though the problem has many aspects it mainly concerns the difficulties that arise when we consider the experiences of other people. I may say that I know my own mind better than anyone else – or at least I am in the best position to. I have what is philosophically called "privileged access". All this means it that I have a unique relationship to the contents of my own mind and mental experience, a form of access that no one else can have (unless, possibly, they are telepathic…). This is fine, so far. But the problem arises when I try to imagine what it is like to be someone else. The recent film, Being John Malkovich (PMInfo 2011), imagined that it was possible to enter the mind of another person, to see through their eyes, feel their emotions, etc. However, in real life, it is not possible to do this, so how can we really know that other people experience the world in the same way?

Another, more radical aspect of the problem concerns the existence of minds in other people at all. This sceptical problem argues that not only is it impossible to know what another person is thinking/feeling, but also that they actually think and feel. Although few people actually intend this argument to be taken seriously – along the lines of a Hollywood horror film – it does raise important points: what do we base our knowledge of other people on? On what basis do we interpret their actions? How can we claim knowledge of what others think and feel? (Gertler &Shapiro 2007).

1.5 THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY: MATERIALISM?

The theory of choice for many scientists of philosophy of mind is materialism, which denies the existence of strange, non-physical substances and insists that we are entirely physical beings. Materialist theories attempt to reduce mentality to physicality, analysing mental states in terms of physical states.

In the simplest terms, materialism is the theory that a man consists solely of organized matter- there is nothing nonmaterial constituting a part of him. Stated in these terms, behaviorism is a form of materialism, for the behaviorist thinks that a man is just a body which operates- in a very sophisticated manner. However, the behaviorist does not hold to what would generally be described as a materialist theory of mind. He does not, that is, think that minds are physical objects, for he does not think that they are objects at all (Robinson 1976).

This is the point that Gilbert Ryle emphasised in his *The Concept of Mind.* He thinks that regarding mind as a substance is a category mistake. The behaviorist does not regard minds as objects; for him, to say that something has a mind is simply to say that it behaves in a certain way. Those who hold a materialist theory of mind agree with the dualistic position against Ryle that the mind is an object, but they think it is a physical object-usually part of the central nervous system. Materialism can be stated in terms of substances or in terms of properties. It might be said that man is no more than a physical objector it might be said that he possesses only physical properties, where "physical property" is taken as including what would be so called according to common sense and those properties that figure in the basic nature sciences-that is, physics and chemistry. In saying this we do not exclude emergent laws or concepts which describe the overall properties of the aggregate (Robinson 1976).

Today there are many other philosophers of mind, who are not materialists in the crude form. According to them we can very well have a non-dualistic philosophy of the mind, that does not reduce everything to its physical or material aspects.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What is the problem of Other Minds?

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2) Is materialism a pre-requisite for philosophy of mind?

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1.6 IMPORTANCE AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Within philosophy, the philosophy of mind is easily the most active sub-discipline today. It is virtually impossible to pick up any mainstream philosophy journal without finding one or more article on some topic in philosophy of mind. Its importance can be seen from the fact that it is not just one of the youngest of the new disciplines in philosophy, but is the most scientifically advanced and multi-disciplinary.

Scientific basis

This discipline takes into account the latest findings of recent scientific disciplines like neuroscience, artificial intelligence, anthropology, sociobiology, etc. (See the next unit for more information). It is therefore constantly evolving in pace with the latest scientific findings.

Multi-disciplinary approach

The discipline of philosophy of mind is truly a multi-disciplinary one. Taking data from various other fields of science, philosophers reflect on the significance of mind and its unique role in shaping human life and destiny.

Philosophical Anthropology and Philosophy of Mind

We may agree with the philosopher Paul Ricoeur that "every understanding is self-understanding." He was referring to human quest for knowledge and understanding. Every time a human person acquires more knowledge and understands something deeper, one is also improving one's own self-understanding. In this sense understanding others (persons and things) add to one's own self-understanding. Seen thus, everything we study, particularly in philosophy, contributes to my self-understanding. Seen from this perspective, the whole philosophy is an attempt to answer the basic philosophical question: "Who am I"? In this sense we can claim that philosophy is basically anthropology. And philosophy of mind is the equivalent of philosophical anthropology in the continental traditions. Thus the scope of Philosophy of Mind may be regarded as that of Philosophical Anthropology itself.

Significance of Philosophy to solve our problems

Considering philosophy — for some the "royal discipline" per se — we can claim that she has forcefully regarded the problems that humanity has been facing. But, she has given her resources first and foremost to ethical considerations. Because of this an ethics has — admittedly not undisputed — developed as a new special ethics. But philosophy has a larger role to play in solving humanity's problems, than ethics (Lowe 2000).

One has to agree that today, unfortunately, philosophical anthropology has lost much of her charisma, especially in the analytical philosophy or in the Anglo-Saxon world. It is particularly this deficient situation we need to consider. Then we can see the role of philosophical anthropology in particular and philosophy in general, in dealing with the many problems we face. For this philosophical anthropology has to give up her trait as an indifferent observer by concentrating on her own qualities and, above all, by trying to prepare the ground for a meaningful, critical and creative anthropology (as one of other anthropological special disciplines) who could work closely together with a philosophy of technique. Of course, it is not simple to achieve this. The first significant condition is that philosophical anthropology has to defend herself against the accusation of being an accomplice of "anthropocentrism" because the last named can be unanimously regarded as one of the responsibles for environmental disasters. The second is that she has to demonstrate her inherent capacity on enlightening reflections and interpretations on the problems faced by humanity. We need to move away from "anthropocentrism" that was characterise of earlier thinking and embrace a "cosmocentrism" keeping in mind the needs of our present world. That is why philosopher Hans Jonas speaks of a principle of responsibility in dealing with our contemporary situation (Jonas, Böhler, & Hoppe 1994). He adds: "We existentially need the threat by such a concept of man that will frighten and by being frightened we must find out the true concept of man".

In this process, our self- understanding or our " concept of man" is crucial in dealing with the threats humanity faces today. So we need to evolve constructive concepts of man in order to help ourselves. Philosophy of mind, though separate from and related to philosophical anthropology,

gives new terms and categories to philosopher to analyse the problems and offer solutions. It gives more precise definitions to philosophical anthropology and is based on current scientific findings. Thus Philosophy of Mind can truly help us realise our own uniqueness thus serve us in making our lives better.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) How is the philosophy of mind related to philosophical anthropology of continental tradition?

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2) How can Philosophy of mind help us in solving our problems?

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1.7 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we saw the basic introduction to the philosophy of mind. We first took up some basic issues like dualism and monism that describes mind's relation to the body. Then we took up some significant themes. Then we concluded with the importance and scope of philosophy of mind.

1.8 KEYWORDS

Epiphenomenalism: It holds that mind-body interaction only occurs in one direction: from the physical to the mental. According to epiphenomenalists, physical events give rise to mental events, but not the other way around.

Anthropocentrism: It is the philosophical mistake of regarding humans as the central element of the universe.

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UNIT 2 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND OTHER DISCIPLINES

Contents

2.0 OBJECTIVES

- To enable the students to see the relationship between philosophy of mind and other philosophical and scientific disciplines.
- To familiarize with some key terms and notions of General Philosophy which are useful to philosophy of mind.
- To realize the multi-disciplinary nature of philosophy of mind.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Humans are corporeal beings and, as such, they are subject to examination and description by the natural sciences. Since mental processes are intimately related to bodily processes, the descriptions that the natural sciences furnish of human beings play an important role in the philosophy of mind. There are many scientific disciplines that study processes related to the mental. The list of such sciences includes: Psychology, biology, computer science, cognitive science, cybernetics, linguistics, medicine, pharmacology (Leudar 2009). So in this unit we first deal with some other disciplines that are directly connected to philosophy of mind. Then we take up some crucial notions from General Philosophy that are central to philosophy of mind.

2.2 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND OTHER SCIENCES

Here we will focus on few sciences that directly affect Philosophy of Mind.

Psychology

Psychology is the science that investigates mental states directly. It uses generally empirical methods to investigate concrete mental states like joy, fear or obsessions. Psychology investigates the laws that bind these mental states to each other or with inputs and outputs to the human organism (Christensen & Turner 1993).

An example of this is the psychology of perception. Scientists working in this field have discovered general principles of the perception of forms. A law of the psychology of forms says that objects that move in the same direction are perceived as related to each other. This law

describes a relation between visual input and mental perceptual states. However, it does not suggest anything about the nature of perceptual states. The laws discovered by psychology are compatible with all the answers to the mind-body problem already described (PoM 2011).

Behaviorism

Behaviorism dominated philosophy of mind for much of the 20th century, especially the first half. In psychology, behaviorism developed as a reaction to those who speak about the inner workings of the human spirit. Their inner reports on one's own interior mental life are not subject to careful examination for accuracy and cannot be used to form predictive generalizations. Without generalizability and the possibility of third-person examination, the behaviorists argued, psychology cannot be scientific. The way out, therefore, was to eliminate the idea of an interior mental life (and hence an ontologically independent mind) altogether and focus instead on the description of observable behavior. (PoM 2011).

Parallel to these developments in psychology, a philosophical behaviorism was developed. This is characterized by a strong verificationism, which generally considers unverifiable statements about interior mental life senseless. For the behaviorist, mental states are not interior states on which one can make introspective reports. They are just descriptions of behavior or dispositions to behave in certain ways, made by third parties to explain and predict others' behavior.

Philosophical behaviorism, of Ludwig Wittgenstein, has fallen out of favor since the latter half of the 20th century, coinciding with the rise of cognitivism. Cognitivists reject behaviorism due to several perceived problems. For example, behaviorism could be said to be counter-intuitive when it maintains that someone is talking about behavior in the event that a person is experiencing a painful headache.

Neurobiology

Philosophy of mind draws heavily from neurobiology. The theoretical background of neurobiology, as is the case with modern natural sciences in general, is fundamentally materialistic. The objects of study are, in the first place, physical processes, which are considered to be the foundations of mental activity and behavior. The increasing success of biology in the explanation of mental phenomena can be seen by the absence of any empirical refutation of its fundamental presupposition: "there can be no change in the mental states of a person without a change in brain states."(PoM 2011).

Within the field of neurobiology, there are many sub disciplines which are concerned with the relations between mental and physical states and processes: Sensory neurophysiology investigates the relation between the processes of perception and stimulation. Cognitive neuroscience studies the correlations between mental processes and neural processes. Neuropsychology describes the dependence of mental faculties on specific anatomical regions of the brain. Lastly, evolutionary biology studies the origins and development of the human nervous system and, in as much as this is the basis of the mind, also describes the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of mental phenomena beginning from their most primitive stages.

The methodological breakthroughs of the neurosciences, in particular the introduction of high-tech neuroimaging procedures, has propelled scientists toward the elaboration of increasingly

ambitious research programs: one of the main goals is to describe and comprehend the neural processes which correspond to mental functions .Since the 1980s, sophisticated neuroimaging procedures, such as fMRI have furnished increasing knowledge about the workings of the human brain, shedding light on many ancient philosophical problems (PoM 2011).

Several groups are inspired by these advances. New approaches to this question are being pursued to advance these issues. Some philosophers of mind once thought that the best answer to the question "What is the mind?" is simply "The mind is the nervous system". In defending this claim, these philosophers sometimes make an analogy between prescientific attempts to answer the question "What is lightning?" and the question of "What is the mind?" Long ago, our ancestors answered the lightning question by saying it was a manifestation of a god's wrath or something. Modern science tells us, however, that lightning is some kind of electrical discharge. And our ancestors used to answer the question "What is the mind" by saying that the mind was the soul, or some thinking substance detached from the body and brain. So in the same way the identity theorists want to claim that, just as with lightning, the modern scientific answer to the question "What is the mind?" is simply "the nervous system". What else could it be? (Williams 2011)

One response to this argument is the idea that the mind is not identical with the nervous system, but rather, with the functioning of the nervous system. This response is designed to answer questions of biological chauvinism e.g. If some entity does not have a human nervous system yet demonstrates intelligent behavior are we to say that it does not have a mind simply because it doesn't have a nervous system like ours? Thus, the identity thesis seems too restricting.

But does identifying the mind with the function of the nervous system also exclude too much? What if we were to say that the mind is identical to the function of the entire body + brain and not just the nervous system alone? After all, it seems like the "internal milieu" of the body might play a functional role of such importance that it would be problematic to simply identify the mind with the nervous system and not the total system of brain + body e.g. the diffusion of hormones in the blood system seems to play a functional role in mental processes. On this view, the nervous system is simply too entangled with the body for there to be a clear-cut psychological distinction of brain and body. To acknowledge the role of the body in cognition and "what it is like" to be a human animal would be to emphasize an "embodied" perspective. So it seems we have recourse for saying that the mind is not identical to the nervous system, and that it might actually supervene on the total brain-body system given that importance of the bodily milieu for determining what it is like to be human (Williams 2011).

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What is the fundamental presupposition of neurobiology?

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2) What is mental state for a behaviorist?

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Computer Science

Computer science concerns itself with the automatic processing of information (or at least with physical systems of symbols to which information is assigned) by means of such things as computers. From the beginning, computer programmers have been able to develop programs which permit computers to carry out tasks for which organic beings need a mind. A simple example is multiplication. But it is clear that computers do not use a mind to multiply. Could they, someday, come to have what we call a mind? This question has been propelled into the forefront of much philosophical debate because of investigations in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) (PoM 2011).

Within AI, it is common to distinguish between a modest research program and a more ambitious one: this distinction was coined by John Searle in terms of a weak AI and strong AI. The exclusive objective of "weak AI", according to Searle, is the successful simulation of mental states, with no attempt to make computers become conscious or aware, etc. The objective of strong AI, on the contrary, is a computer with consciousness similar to that of human beings. The program of strong AI goes back to one of the pioneers of computation Alan Turing. As an answer to the question "Can computers think?", he formulated the famous Turing te Turing believed that a computer could be said to "think" when, if placed in a room by itself next to another room which contained a human being and with the same questions being asked of both the computer and the human being by a third party human being, the computer's responses turned out to be indistinguishable from those of the human. Essentially, Turing's view of machine intelligence followed the behaviourist model of the mind—intelligence is as intelligence does. The Turing test has received many criticisms, among which the most famous is probably the Chinese room thought experiment formulated by Searle (PoM 2011).

The question about the possible sensitivity (qualia) of computers or robots still remains open. Some computer scientists believe that the specialty of AI can still make new contributions to the resolution of the "mind body problem". They suggest that based on the reciprocal influences between software and hardware that takes place in all computers, it is possible that someday theories can be discovered that help us to understand the reciprocal influences between the human mind and the brain.

Cognitive Science

Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary scientific study of minds as information processors. It includes research on how information is processed (in faculties such as perception, language, reasoning, and emotion), represented, and transformed in a (human or other animal) nervous system or machine (e.g., computer). Cognitive science consists of multiple research disciplines, including psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, neuroscience, linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and education. It spans many levels of analysis, from low-level learning and decision mechanisms to high-level logic and planning; from neural circuitry to modular brain organization. Its intellectual origins are in the mid-1950s when researchers in several fields began to develop theories of mind based on complex representations and computational procedures

The term cognitive science was coined by Christopher Longuet-Higgins in 1973. It incorporates the interdisciplinary study of mind and intelligence, embracing philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence.

2.3 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND THE CONTINENTAL TRADITION

Most of the discussion in this article has focused on one style or tradition of philosophy in modern Western culture, usually called analytic philosophy (sometimes described as Anglo-American philosophy). Many other schools of thought exist, however, which are sometimes subsumed under the broad label of continental philosophy. In any case, though topics and methods here are numerous, in relation to the philosophy of mind the various schools that fall under this label (phenomenology, existentialism, etc.) can globally be seen to differ from the analytic school in that they focus less on language and logical analysis alone but also take in other forms of understanding human existence and experience. With reference specifically to the discussion of the mind, this tends to translate into attempts to grasp the concepts of thought and perceptual experience in some sense that does not merely involve the analysis of linguistic forms (Gertler 2007).

In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel discusses three distinct types of mind: the 'subjective mind', the mind of an individual; the 'objective mind', the mind of society and of the State; and the 'Absolute mind', a unity of all concepts. In modern times, the two main schools that have developed in response or opposition to this Hegelian tradition are phenomenology and existentialism. Phenomenology, founded by Edmund Husserl, focuses on the contents of the human mind and how phenomenological processes shape our experiences. Existentialism, a school of thought founded upon the work of Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, focuses on the content of experiences and how the mind deals with such experiences (PoM 2011).

2.4 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND BUDDHISM

"If one were to ask, 'Which aging & death? And whose is this aging & death?' and if one were to ask, 'Is aging & death one thing, and is this the aging & death of someone/something else?' both of them would have the same meaning, even though their words would differ. When there is the view that the *jiva* is the same as the body, there isn't the leading of the holy life. And when there is the view that the *jiva* is one thing and the body another, there isn't the leading of the holy life. Avoiding these two extremes, the *Tathagata* points out the *Dhamma* as the in between: From birth as a requisite condition comes aging & death."

In fact, Buddhism does not hold to the dualistic mind/body model but do assert that the mind and body are separate entities. Buddhism does not hold to the notion of an independent and eternal soul, or atman. Some forms of Buddhism assert that a very subtle level of mind leaves the body at the time of death and goes to a new life. According to Buddhist scholar Dharmakirti, the definition of mind is that which is clarity and cognizes. In this definition, 'clarity' refers to the nature of mind, and 'cognizes' to the function of mind. Mind is clarity because it always lacks form and because it possesses the actual power to perceive objects. Mind cognizes because its

function is to know or perceive objects. In Ornament of the Seven Sets, Buddhist scholar Khedrubje holds that thought, awareness, mind and cognizer are synonyms.

In fact, Buddha explained that although mind lacks form, it can nevertheless be related to form. Thus, our mind is related to our body and is "located" at different places throughout the body. This is to be understood in the context of how the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness are generated. There are many different types of mind—sense awarenesses, mental awarenesses, gross minds, subtle minds, and very subtle minds—and they are all formless (lacking shape, color, sound, smell, taste or tactile properties) and they all function to cognize or know. There is no such thing as a mind without an object known by that mind. Even though none of these minds is form, they can be related to form (PoM 2011).

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What is cognitive science?

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2) Does Buddhism hold a dualistic understanding of body and mind?

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2.5 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND GENERAL PHILOSOPHY

After seeing the relationship of philosophy of mind to other disciplines, we want to situate it in General Philosophy itself. Various useful notions from general philosophy have been related to philosophy of mind. In this section, we note some such theoretical notions that help us to understand philosophy of mind better.

Intentionality

The rich concept of intentionality, taken from phenomenology, is the capacity of mental states to be directed towards (about) or be in relation with something in the external world. This property of mental states entails that they have contents and semantic referents and can therefore be assigned truth values. When one tries to reduce these states to natural processes there arises a problem: natural processes are not true or false, they simply happen. It would not make any sense to say that a natural process is true or false. But mental ideas or judgments are true or false, so how then can mental states (ideas or judgments) be natural processes? The possibility of assigning semantic value to ideas must mean that such ideas are about facts. Thus, for example, the idea that Herodotus was a historian refers to Herodotus and to the fact that he was an historian. If the fact is true, then the idea is true; otherwise, it is false. But where does this relation come from? In the brain, there are only electrochemical processes and these seem not to have anything to do with Herodotus (PoM 2011).

Functionalism

Functionalism is another concept from general philosophy that has been reformulated by Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor and used in philosophy of mind. Putnam and Fodor saw mental states in terms of an empirical computational theory of the mind. At about the same time or slightly after, D.M. Armstrong and David Kellogg Lewis formulated a version of functionalism which analyzed the mental concepts of folk psychology in terms of functional roles. Finally, Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use led to a version of functionalism as a theory of meaning, further developed by Wilfrid Sellars and Gilbert Harman. Another one, psychofunctionalism, is an approach adopted by naturalistic Philosophy of Mind associated with Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn.

What all these different varieties of functionalism share in common is the thesis that mental states are characterized by their causal relations with other mental states and with sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. That is, functionalism abstracts away from the details of the physical implementation of a mental state by characterizing it in terms of non-mental functional properties. For example, a kidney is characterized scientifically by its functional role in filtering blood and maintaining certain chemical balances. From this point of view, it does not really matter whether the kidney be made up of organic tissue, plastic nanotubes or silicon chips: it is the role that it plays and its relations to other organs that define it as a kidney.

Emergentism

Emergentism is a form of "nonreductive physicalism" that involves a layered view of nature, with the layers arranged in terms of increasing complexity and each corresponding to its own special science. Some philosophers hold that emergent properties causally interact with more fundamental levels, while others maintain that higher-order properties simply supervene over lower levels without direct causal interaction. The latter group therefore holds a less strict, or "weaker", definition of emergentism, which can be rigorously stated as follows: a property P of composite object O is emergent if it is metaphysically impossible for another object to lack property P if that object is composed of parts with intrinsic properties identical to those in O and has those parts in an identical configuration.

Sometimes emergentists use the example of water having a new property when Hydrogen H and Oxygen O combine to form H2O (water). In this example there "emerges" a new property of a transparent liquid that would not have been predicted by understanding hydrogen and oxygen as a gas. This is analogous to physical properties of the brain giving rise to a mental state. Emergentists try to solve the notorious mind-body gap this way. One problem for emergentism is the idea of "causal closure" in the world that does not allow for a mind-to-body causation (PoM 2011).

Expressional Philosophy states that there are no dualisms, only that which is expressed, as Water is to the dualistic H20 in the above example. Mind emerges from processes of Matter and the Energies these processes bring about. Al Engleman proposes in "Expressions: A Philosophy of Mind", a finality to William Blake's "I am My Mind", by stating that all Matter and Energy is Mind, what he calls Proto-Mind, and from this Proto-Mind's processes, a threshold barrier is overcome, and Life emerges as Self-Working Energy (Mind). This is called Expressional

Emergence, in much the same way Genetic Biologists understand the Genotype-Phenotype Expression.

Eliminative materialism

If one is a materialist and believes that all aspects of our common sense psychology (or "folk-psychology") will find reduction to a mature cognitive-neuroscience, and that non-reductive materialism is mistaken, then one can adopt a final, more radical position: eliminative materialism.

Also called eliminativism, it is a materialist position. Its primary claim is that people's common-sense understanding of the mind (or "folk psychology") is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exi Some eliminativists argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of behaviour and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level.[1] Other versions entail the non-existence of conscious mental states such as pain and visual perceptions (EM 2011).

There are several varieties of eliminative materialism, but all maintain that our common-sense "folk psychology" badly misrepresents the nature of some aspect of cognition. Eliminativists regard folk psychology as a falsifiable theory, and one likely to be falsified by future cognitive-neuroscientific research. Should better theories of the mental come along they argue, we might need to discard certain basic common-sense mental notions that we have always taken for granted, such as belief, consciousness, emotion, qualia, or propositional attitudes(PoM 2011).

Externalism and Internalism

Where is the mind located? If the mind is a physical phenomenon of some kind, it has to be located somewhere. There are two possible options: either the mind is internal to the body (internalism) or the mind is external to it (externalism). More generally, either the mind depends only on events and properties taking place inside the subject's body or it depends also on factors external to it. Proponents of internalism are committed to the view that neural activity is sufficient to produce the mind. Proponents of externalism maintain that the surrounding world is in some sense constitutive of the mind.

Externalism differentiates into several versions. The main ones are semantic externalism, cognitive externalism, phenomenal externalism. Each of these versions of externalism can further be divided whether they refer only to the content or to the vehicles of mind. Semantic externalism holds that the semantic content of the mind is totally or partially defined by state of affairs external to the body of the subject. Hilary Putnam's Twin earth thought experiment is a good example (PoM 2011).

Cognitive externalism is a very broad collections of views that suggests the role of the environment, of tools, of development, and of the body in fleshing out cognition. Embodied cognition, The extended mind, enactivism are good examples. Phenomenal externalism suggests that the phenomenal aspects of the mind are external to the body.

Qualia and Physicalism

The thesis of physicalism is that the mind is part of the material (or physical) world. Such a position faces the problem that the mind has certain properties that no other material thing seems to possess. Physicalism must therefore explain how it is possible that these properties can nonetheless emerge from a material thing. The project of providing such an explanation is often referred to as the "naturalization of the mental." Some of the crucial problems that this project attempts to resolve include the existence of qualia (PoM 2011).

Many mental states seem to be experienced subjectively in different ways by different individuals. And it is characteristic of a mental state that it has some experiential quality, e.g. of pain, that it hurts. However, the sensation of pain between two individuals may not be identical, since no one has a perfect way to measure how much something hurts or of describing exactly how it feels to hurt. Philosophers and scientists therefore ask where these experiences come from. The existence of cerebral events, in and of themselves, cannot explain why they are accompanied by these corresponding qualitative experiences. The puzzle of why many cerebral processes occur with an accompanying experiential aspect in consciousness seems impossible to explain.

Yet it also seems to many that science will eventually have to explain such experiences. This follows from an assumption about the possibility of reductive explanations. According to this view, if an attempt can be successfully made to explain a phenomenon reductively (e.g., water), then it can be explained why the phenomenon has all of its properties (e.g., fluidity transparency). In the case of mental states, this means that there needs to be an explanation of why they have the property of being experienced in a certain way.

The 20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger criticized the ontological assumptions underpinning such a reductive model, and claimed that it was impossible to make sense of experience in these terms. This is because, according to Heidegger, the nature of our subjective experience and its qualities is impossible to understand in terms of Cartesian "substances" that bear "properties." Another way to put this is that the very concept of qualitative experience is incoherent in terms of – or is semantically incommensurable with the concept of – substances that bear properties (Cooney 2000).

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What is emergentism?

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2) What is the primary claim of eliminative materialism?

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2.6 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we saw how philosophy of mind is truly an inter-disciplinary search. It borrows from many other disciplines and works as a sub-discipline of general philosophy. We saw how it is related to the continental tradition and Buddhism.

2.7 KEYWORDS

Behaviourism: It is an approach to psychology that emphasizes observable measurable behaviour. It denies any independent significance for intentions and assumes that behaviour is determined by the environment.

Emergentism: Emergentism (or theory of emergence) is a theory concerning the nature of the material world. In contrast to reductionistic materialism, which asserts that only the tiniest components of matter have unique properties, emergentism maintains that along with complexity, and especially with structure and function, go properties that are unique and that are not to be found in the tiniest components of matter. These properties of more complex systems are therefore not reducible to those of their constituent elements, though they could not exist without them. While many of the fundamental properties of matter, such as mass, are held to be merely quantitative and additive, emergent properties are said to be qualitative and novel or non-predictable.

Qualia: A quality or property as perceived or experienced by a person. Such a property, such as whiteness, considered independently from things having the property.

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UNIT 3 MIND AND ANIMALS

Contents

3.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit the students are expected to have a brief understanding of pre-behaviorist philosophical understanding of the issue of animal mind, the behaviorist turn in the scientific world, the ethical implications of affirming or denying of animal consciousness, and the arguments for and against animal consciousness.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Considering the sense of continuum in the overarching theory of evolution by Charles Darwin, it is impossible to consider that the animals are without any trace of mind. Though the twentieth century thinkers seem to think in the lines that the animals do not have mind, many of their philosophical ancestors did not seem to think so. This kind of a thought must have evolved mainly due to the impact of behaviorism and scientific evolution. Animals were objects to be made use of in the labs and in other sectors, than to be loved and cared for. In order to facilitate such a utilitarian approach we needed a theory where the animals did not have thinking capacity nor felt pain. In this unit, we will look at different approaches to mind and animals: what do we mean by mind; do animals seem to think; and what do we mean when the animals do not have a mind.

3.2 MIND AND ANIMALS: PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

It is important to ask if other animals other than humans have a genetic endowment and social environment that allows them to acquire a theory of mind just as the human children do. This is a debatable issue as it involves the problem of inferring the existence of thinking from animal behavior. Knowing anything of the development of the theory of mind in animals and the environmental pressures that they face is difficult as we lack significant number of natural observations.

Non-human research is especially useful in illuminating which nonverbal behaviors signify components of theory of mind, and in pointing to possible stepping points in the evolution of what many claim to be a uniquely human aspect of social cognition. While it is difficult to study human-like theory of mind and mental states in species which we do not yet describe as 'minded' at all, and about whose potential mental states we have an incomplete understanding, researchers can focus on simpler components of more complex capabilities. Yet another difficulty is in the interpretation of the result of the scientific researches. There have been controversies over the interpretation of evidence purporting to show theory of mind ability—or inability—in animals. We will come back to the approach of science towards the theory of minds in the animals later in the unit and now we will look at how the issue was approached by some of the modern philosophers.

Though the later empiricists almost decided upon the hypothesis that animals did not have minds, their predecessors seem to have never doubted the possibility of animals having a mind, be it in a lesser degree or of functionally inferior. Critiquing the Cartesian claim that the animals were only machines, John Locke made clear statements about his beliefs in their mental states. He claims that perception is indubitably in all animals (Locke, 117) and hence they have some ideas. If they possessed some ideas, then they could not be termed mere machines as would some Cartesians. Locke makes it clear that the animals can reason but without the ability to abstract.

"It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain instances reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they received them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction" (Locke, 127). He also mocks those who would claim that "that dogs or elephants do not think, when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do so" (Locke, 87). Here the differentiating issue seems to be that of not being able to tell that they do. We will look at it in a latter section.

David Hume, worth the title of the greatest skeptic of all time, while denying the ultimate knowability of everything that was thinkable to us, doubtlessly establishes the case of animal mind. In the *Treatise*, "of the Reason of Animals" (sec.XIV), he wonders if there was anything more clear than the existence of animal mind. "Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to defend it; and no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endowed with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are in this case so obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant" (Hume, 176). It is very likely that what Hume had in mind, when affirming that animal mind is obvious to all but the most benighted, was animal users' understanding of their animals' physical and mental states, an understanding presuppositional to working with them.

Now this line of thought ran through the subsequent empiricist British philosophy. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill drew moral consequences from animals' ability to feel pain and thus of the necessity of them being included in the scope of utilitarian moral concern. Bentham famously declared that neither the texture of the skin nor the ability to speak nor the ability to worship were not sufficient reasons to inflict torture on the animals as we know today that the color of the human skin is no reason to make any discrimination. He believed that humanity may one day come to include them into the fold of beings that require rights for the very reason that they are sensitive (Bentham, 310–311). Mill also affirmed that the reason for legal interventions in favour of children apply in no way less to the case of those unfortunate slaves – the animals.

Thus we see strong claims of animal mentation in empiricism, from Hume's claim of animal reason to Bentham's and Mill's affirmation of animals' ability to feel pain. But this line of thinking got a scientific touch only in the works of Charles Darwin. Darwinian science gave new vitality to ordinary commonsense notions that attributed mental states to animals, though it had been assaulted by Catholics and Cartesians. Darwin believed in continuity as a prime principle in psychology and in his 1872 work, *The Expressions of Emotions in Man and Animals* he mocked the Cartesian notion and in the *decent of man* in the previous year, specifically affirmed that "there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher animals in their mental faculties" and that "the lower animals, like man manifestly feel pleasure and pain, happiness and misery". In the same work, he attributed the entire range of subjective experiences to animals. Evolutionary theory demands that psychology, like anatomy, be comparative, for life is incremental, and mind did not arise de novo in man.

Darwin, it seems, handed over much of his material data on animal mentation to his trusted spokesman George John Romanes, who in his preface to *Animal Intelligence* acknowledges his indebtedness to Darwin. His famous book is *Mental Evolution in Animals.* Both these books highly evidence phylogenetic continuity of mentation. While Romanes' work mainly focused on cognitive ability throughout the phylogenetic scale, he also addresses emotions and other aspects of mental life. Other than claims or suppositions, Darwinian claims were well rooted in experiments. Darwin spent good amount of his life learning about animal behaviour and to trace if the animals acted from pure impulse or instinct or they possessed some sort o intelligence. In his work, *The formation of vegetable Mould through the action of worms with observations on their habits (1886),* he observed and experimented on the behavior of the earthworms and concluded that the worms possessed rudimentary intelligence, in that they showed plasticity in their behavior, some rudimentary "notion" of shape and the ability to learn from experience.

3.3 THE BEHAVIORIST TURN

Now considering the voluminous work of Charles Darwin, it may be assumed that a strong foundation of science was formed for the later scientists and theorists to learn a great deal about animal mentation. But what happened later on seems to be unfortunate. The overarching influence of behaviourism and mechanistic interpretation of the entire scientific agenda overturned what was already building up. To decide against a scientific proposition, an assumption has to be either empirically disconfirmed or proved conceptually flawed. But in the case of animal minds, neither of the two happened. There was no empirical disconfirmation of animal consciousness nor was there any conceptual or logical flaw found in its postulation. But what really happened was that the knowability of animal consciousness was disproved.

The knowability of animal consciousness was disproved, disvalued and banished by a valuational revolution on its approach towards an objective psychology. In deciding what a real science should be and how could psychology be a 'real' science, dubious or difficult to prove topics such as animal consciousness was dismantled. But the entire assumption of animal mentation was not disproved. In man's pursuit of making science wholly empirical, other animals in particular must have lost their chance of proving that they were not so different from the human species. The picture rather well fits into man's scheme of things to have animals those

never thought nor felt any pain. It seems that the view that animals have subjective experiences and that these could be studied was given up not because it did not generate fruitful research programmes. It is not the fact. In people like Darwin and Romanes, it surely did. Nor it was given up as it did not explain to us or allow us to predict the animal behavior. Neither was there any inconsistency or incoherence shown in the assumption. But the project was abandoned due to major valuational concerns. Psychology became something that dealt mainly with ‘‘stimulus and response, habit formations, habit integrations and the like”.

The impact of such an approach, different from other preceding approaches including that of Darwin, should reflect on the understanding of the human nature as well. It should reject consciousness in humans as well or at least its knowability. But this behaviorist approach was well received by the public. To a people with its contempt for the genetic bases of behavior, a prospect of a science that would give birth to a technology – the ability to control and shape behavior gave new hope. The whole of behaviourist approach thus played well to the general public with the hope that it provided in rehabilitating the criminals, educating the children properly and producing a better society. It gave a new optimism about social engineering and the ability to modify human behavior just as we gained control over the frontiers and reshaped nature. The denial of mind to animals was inimical to the basic tenets of ordinary common sense. Human common sense never denied mind to the animals. Man would have been surprised by the stance that science had taken but then the common mind was never concerned about what science said and believed unless it had direct implications to his belief systems. But this kind of a scientific approach was without serious implications. Denying mind to the animals had great influence in forming our attitude towards the animals and how we treat them. Our ethical values were reframed.

3.4 THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DENYING MIND TO THE ANIMALS

The moral implications of denying mentation or felt pain to animals have come heavily on the unfortunate animals as we happen to see today. Numerous initiatives for the care and well being of the animals at the international and domestic level point to the fact the treatments that are meted out to the animals are not that fare, and that they do not deserve that. How far the philosophical and scientific stand on the issue of animals and mind has caused this kind of a treatment is worth having a look at.

The moral implications of denying animal mind or even felt pain became apparent in the second half of the 20th century when social concerns for animals started surfacing as the nature of animal usage in agriculture and research itself changed. Here the animal wellbeing was severely compromised and the increased usage of animals wherever human beings could not be used was due to, to a great degree, the apparent denial of thinking capacity to animals. Around the mid 20th century, animal usage became severe and extreme than that had ever occurred since the domestication of animals. They were used as objects of human enjoyment. Animals were used in huge numbers in agriculture. Previously there was a concerned relation with the animals while they were being used in agricultural setups. They were cared and provided for as was required by their nature, be it food, water, medication, security etc. Here both man and animals benefitted from each other’s company, from what is called the ‘ancient contract’. Animal husbandry became ingrained as an ethical and prudential imperative; proper care was essential to success,

for the physical and psychological well being of the animals were essential for the success of the agriculture enterprise.

The ethical formula that pervaded animal use during this period was avoiding deliberate, unnecessary, sadistic cruelty or outrageous neglect of animals such as not feeding and watering them. This ethical approach is seen clearly stated in the sacred texts of major religions. Hurting animals was considered equal to that of hurting humans. And this is well presented in the criminal laws of every civilized society since the 1800s.

But this ancient contract and practice could not survive the emergence of modern science based technology. By the mid 20th century, agriculture had become industrialized and the academic departments of animal husbandry were transmuted into departments of animal science. This animal science has been defined as the ‘‘application of industrial methods to the production of animals.’’ Industry supplanted husbandry and agriculture became exploitative rather than symbiotic. Animal welfare was severed from productivity and profit. And with the industrial model came the irrelevance of animal thoughts and feeling, yielding what is aptly called ‘‘animal machines’’

Another development that happened in the mid-20th century was the increased use of the animals in research. Unlike the scenario of mutual benefit in the agricultural set up, the massive amounts of animal testing and research was highly aimed at human benefit. The animals did not gain much from these efforts other than being inflicted with diseases, fractures, wounds, burns, lesions with no offsetting benefit. And thus another major animal use emerged violating the ancient contract. It has reached its pinnacle of exploitation when animals are being used in large numbers for cosmetic testing. Injuries and burns are infected irrationally on neither hapless animals for something that neither benefits man nor animals largely. It is appreciable that the international community is becoming aware of this fact and sincere efforts are being made to ban such practices.

Cartesian model of animals as non-conscious, biological machines must have given an impetus to the most extreme and morally relevant fact of denying ideologically and completely disregarding felt pain in animals. The denial of felt pain is important as it leads to further moral concerns. As far as Bentham and Mill are concerned, they made it the sine qua non for moral status. Because once pain is denied, the denial of more abstract morally relevant mental states such as suffering automatically follows. If one denies simple pain consciousness in an animal, one is logically bound to deny more complex mental states which require greater sophistication of consciousness. May be, we need to redefine pain as something that needs language as a necessary precondition for the ability to feel. The animals might feel pain though they may not have a concept that they have pain. The phenomenal aspect cannot be denied and it must be the same with the case of having mental states. We know there cannot be a quality difference when it comes to the animal and human mind. But we know they differ in some way. In the next section, we will look at what really differentiates between mind in humans and animals.

3.5 ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS

There are many reasons for philosophical interest in nonhuman animal consciousness. First, if philosophy often begins with questions about the place of humans in nature, one way humans have attempted to locate themselves is by comparison and contrast with those things in nature most similar to themselves, i.e., other animals. Second, the problem of determining whether animals are conscious stretches the limits of knowledge and scientific methodology (beyond breaking point, according to some). Third, the question of whether animals are conscious beings or "mere automata", as Cartesians would have it is of considerable moral significance given the dependence of modern societies on mass farming and the use of animals for biomedical research. Fourth, while theories of consciousness are frequently developed without special regard to questions about animal consciousness, the plausibility of such theories has sometimes been assessed against the results of their application to animal consciousness.

Questions about animal consciousness are just one corner of a more general set of questions about animal cognition and mind. The so-called "cognitive revolution" that took place during the latter half of the 20th century has led to many innovative experiments by comparative psychologists and ethnologists probing the cognitive capacities of animals. The topic of consciousness per se in animals has remained controversial, even taboo, among scientists, even while it remains a matter of common sense to most people that many other animals do have conscious experiences.

It is not easy for us to conclude if the non-human species are conscious. All that we know is that they may not be conscious the way humans are. We know chimps and dolphins show awareness, but going down in the grade of animal life – we feel many other functions as unconscious mechanisms. The tiny brains in many simple animals are good enough to do just controlling basic bodily functions. It may not be due to any sort of species chauvinism in our thinking. "Below a certain threshold, it's quite possible there's no subjective experience," says cognitive psychologist Dedre Gentner of Northwestern University. "I don't know that you need to ascribe anything more to the behavior of a cockroach than a set of local reflexes that make it run away from bad things and toward good things." In many of the lower organisms, we see such kind of stimuli - reaction process without much thinking being involved. But coming up in the hierarchy, the higher animals may have better ways of understanding and responding to the environment wherever they are.

Certain skills are considered key signs of higher mental abilities: good memory, a grasp of grammar and symbols, self-awareness, understanding others' motives, imitating others, and being creative. Bit by bit, in ingenious experiments, researchers have documented these talents in other species, gradually chipping away at what we thought made human beings distinctive, while offering a glimpse of where our own abilities came from. Scrub jays know that other jays are thieves and that stashed food can spoil; sheep can recognize faces; chimpanzees use a variety of tools to probe termite mounds and even use weapons to hunt small mammals; dolphins can imitate human postures; the archerfish, which stuns insects with a sudden blast of water, can learn how to aim its squirt simply by watching an experienced fish perform the task.

Most scientists today believe that awareness is probably controlled by a sort of cognitive rheostat, with conscious awareness burning brightest in humans and other high animals and fading to a flicker – and finally blackness in very low ones. Many of the cognitive psychologists

do not just deny animal consciousness. “It would be perverse to deny consciousness to mammals,” says Steven Pinker, a Harvard psychologist and the author of *The Stuff of Thought*. “Birds and other vertebrates are almost certainly conscious too. When it gets down to oysters and spiders, we're on shakier ground.”

There are certainly differences among different animal species when it comes to the question of thinking and intellect. The question now may be what causes these differences. The fall of intellect on a sliding scale among the animals that are aware of their existence is often attributed to the brain size. But this may not be a fact. Comparing with the size of the brains of dolphin (1,700 g or 3.75 lb.) or the killer whale (5,600-g or 12.3 lb.), we possess a relatively smaller one (about 1,400 g or 3 lb). But we of course know that intellect does not fit into the same scale. If we take on to the point that in comparison to the body size we end up having the biggest brain, the fact remains something different. The brain of the Etruscan shrew weighs just 0.1 g (0.0035 oz.), yet relative to its tiny body, its brain is bigger than ours. It clearly shows that the brain size is not going to give us an explanation for the difference between man and the other animal species. But, if we look with more of an evolutionary approach, the structure of the brain might have something to tell us.

More than the size of the brain, its structure seems to be more important. More of those regular, automatic and unconscious activities of the body are controlled by the evolutionarily older parts of the brain and thinking and other higher faculties take place in the cortex, something that is relatively new in the evolutionary chain. It is the most evolved part of the brain and many of the animals lack it. Among the mammals, who are members of the cortex club, the intelligence of the animal is determined by the size and the complexity of that brain region. But even this assumption is not conclusive. While man is a master of tool usage, we find other animals like apes and otters using tools too. Though the ways are primitive, yet they count as signs of thinking and creativity.

We have had many biases against the animal species. Though we are not conclusive as to where to draw the lines, many of them are getting dissolved. Once we believed that the animals do not use tools, but now we know that the apes and birds do so. Then we thought that that humans alone were empathetic and generous. But monkeys practice charity and the elephants mourn their dead. We also believed that humans alone experienced joy and a knowledge about the future. But a recent UK study Showed that pigs raised in comfortable environments exhibit optimism, moving expectantly toward a new sound instead of retreating warily from it. There are animals who understands language and communicate, though not with that expertise and ease as humans.

As far as a theory of mind is concerned, it seems that we need to be more open and inquisitive while dealing with animal consciousness. studying the brains alone may not suffice, we may need to learn more about how they mind their world – how they respond to their environment. Blue jays, another corvid, cache food for later retrieval and are very mindful of whether other animals are around to witness where they've hidden a stash. If the jays have indeed been watched, they'll wait until the other animal leaves and then move the food. They not only understand that another creature has a mind; they also manipulate what's inside it. So out rightly denying mind to animals may not be the right way to approach the question.

The glimpse of consciousness in non-human animals is further proved while looking at how far the other animals have a sense of self. The standard method of demonstrating an understanding of the self and other distinction is the mirror test. It is to see if the animals recognize themselves in a mirror reflection. Though most of the time animals take the reflection for some other animals, higher animals like the elephants, apes and dolphins really succeed in understanding their reflection in the mirror. All three respond appropriately when they look in a mirror after a spot of paint is applied to their forehead or another part of their body. Apes and elephants will reach up to touch the mark with finger or trunk rather than reach out to touch the reflection. Dolphins will position themselves so they can see the reflection of the mark better. “If you put a bracelet on an orangutan and put it in front of a mirror, it doesn't just look at the bracelet,” says Bhagavan Antle, Director of the Institute of Greatly Endangered and Rare Species in Myrtle Beach, S.C. “It puts the bracelet up to its face and shakes it. It interacts with its reflection.”

Ultimately, the same biological knob that adjusts animal consciousness up or down ought to govern how we value the way those species experience their lives. A mere ape in our world may be a scholar in its own, and the low life of any beast may be a source of deep satisfaction for the beast itself.

3.6 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The most common reason for people to believe in animal consciousness is that the animals are similar to us in many ways. When asked, why people think familiar animals such as their pets are conscious, they would point to similarities between the behavior of those animals and human behavior. Similarity arguments for animal consciousness thus have roots in common sense observations. But they may also be bolstered by scientific investigations of behavior and neurology as well as considerations of evolutionary continuity (homology) between species. Nagel's own confidence in the existence of phenomenally conscious bat experiences is based on nothing more than this kind of reliance on shared mammalian traits. Neurological similarities between humans and other animals have also been taken to suggest commonality of conscious experience. All mammals share the same basic brain anatomy, and much is shared with vertebrates more generally. Even structurally different brains may be neurodynamically similar in ways that enable inferences about animal consciousness to be drawn.

This form of inference would be strengthened by a good understanding of the biological function or functions of consciousness. If consciousness is understood as something that is evolved for the purpose of better adjusting with the environment, then there may not be a problem in understanding consciousness as something that is progressing from other primates to the humans.

There are more recent philosophers of the mind like Dennett or Jamieson arguing that our understanding of the mental states of animals has more in common with perception and interpretation rather than inference. Though the interpretivist theory may lack the scientific vigor to face demands for justification in the legal and ethical contexts, it is true that familiarity with a dog makes one a more sensitive interpreter of its emotional and cognitive states than other observers. Nevertheless, even among scientists who are sympathetic to the idea of themselves as sensitive observers of animals with rich mental lives, there is the recognition that the larger

scientific context requires them to provide a particular kind of empirical justification of mental state attributions.

One of the reasons placed against animal consciousness is that the animals do not use language conversationally or reason generally. Based on the alleged failure of animals to display certain intellectual capacities, it is argued that the animals and humans are different and the animals therefore lack consciousness. but the absence of evidence for anything cannot be counted as an evidence of absence. Again based on the similarities of human and animal behaviour, a comparison is made between the animal behaviour and the routine and unconscious behaviour of the humans. All of the animal behaviour here is equaled to unconscious human 'automata' behaviours like driving unconsciously or the case of blind sight. But the view is based only on unsystematic observation of animal behavior. There are grounds for thinking that careful investigation would reveal that there is not a very close analogy between animal behavior and human behaviors associated with these putative cases of unconscious experience. Nevertheless, there are empirical grounds for concern that behavior suggesting consciousness in animals may be the product of unconscious processes.

Peter Carruthers, placing stock in the argument based on the higher order thought theory of consciousness, argue that the animals lack a theory of mind and therefore, consciousness. According to the higher order thought theory, to be conscious, to have phenomenal consciousness, one requires the capacity to think about, and therefore conceptualize, one's own thoughts. Such conceptualization requires a theory of mind. And as he maintains, there is little basis for thinking that any nonhuman animals have a theory of mind, with the possible exception of chimpanzees. Self-consciousness, having been taken as a scale to measure consciousness, deny animals of this faculty. But researches done with the help of mirror tests have been successfully cleared by many animals during different studies to show that some animals do have sense of self and can recognize themselves in a mirror. But the results of these studies and interpretations of the same are debatable.

3.7 LET US SUM UP

It seems that we may never know what the other animals feel like, as made famous by the Nagel's article, "what it is like to be a bat". To say if animals do have mind or consciousness, we may need more careful and intensified observations and studies. But what could be done is a more concerned approach towards the whole issue. Human way of understanding mind and intelligence may be different. But that does not entitle us to any better rights to exploit. One sure thought would be that we are a continuation of what the animals are. It may all be a matter of degree and approach. Different studies have eliminated our rather primitive biases about animal kingdoms and have started proving to us that animals are not those unconscious mechanistic objects without intelligence, thoughts or feelings. It is appreciable that there is an international conscience rising about the need for the concerned treatment of the animals.

3.8 KEY WORDS

Ancient Contract: Domestication of animals is based on an ancient contract between man and other domesticated animals, which guarantees benefits on both sides.

Behaviorism: the behaviorist school of thought maintains that behaviors as such can be described scientifically without recourse either to internal physiological events or to hypothetical constructs such as the mind.

***Sine qua non*:** an indispensable condition, element, or factor; something essential

Cognitive Rheostat: It is a hypothesis about the functioning of consciousness. According to this, the act of becoming conscious of phenomena in any given modality involves the adjustment of that modality's 'rheostat'.

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UNIT 4 MIND AND COMPUTERS

Contents

4.0 OBJECTIVES

The basic objective of unit is to show that the computational model of mind is that the brain is just a digital computer and that the mind is a software program. The machine functionalist program has been strongly influenced by analogies drawn from strong-AI and computer science in general, both in its general outlook and in several of its specific applications to problems about the nature of mind. The machine functional state of the mind is like a computational state of a computer. A computer program can be described as a functional organization of the hardware. The machine functionalists argue that mental states are like the 'information processing' states of a computer. According to the computer functionalism or artificial intelligence, the brain is a computer, and the mind is a computer program implemented in the brain.

4.1 INRODUCTION

Machine functionalism may be defined as a theory that explains mental phenomena in terms of the external input and the observable output. It explains the mind as a complicated machine. In contemporary philosophy of mind, functionalism plays a vital role. Machine functionalism offers a perspective on the mind that offers a solution to a host of long-standing philosophical puzzles about minds and their relation to material bodies. Machine functionalism arose as a result of the meteoric rise of interest in computing machines and artificial intelligence. The machine functionalists say that mental processes are computational processes realized in a machine.

4.2 MACHINE FUNCTIONALISM

The central idea that holds Machine functionalism is the computational view of mind. In functionalism, the mind is a device capable of performing particular sorts of operation. A state of mind resembles a computational state and is at least, to some extent, sharable in principle by any number of material systems. If we understand computation at a fairly general level, we can see that the idea that mental processing is computation is a serious empirical hypothesis rather than a metaphor. Thus, to talk about minds and mental operations is to talk about machines and their states.

The point is that minds bear a relation to their material embodiments analogous to the relation computer programmes bear to the device on which they run. Perhaps every program is 'embodied' in some material device or the other. One might characterize a computer's dynamic behaviour as a causally connected sequence of physical-state descriptions, with transitions subsumed under various physical laws. According to Pylyshyn, very few of the physically discriminable properties of the machine are relevant to its computational function. For example, its colour, temperature, and mass, as well as its very slow or very fast electrical fluctuations, and so on. The very fact that any variations in physical properties of distinct components, other than those few properties to which other designated components are meant to relate in particular ways, can be said to be irrelevant to the machine's operations as a computer. But by mapping from physical to computation states, such a function provides a way of interpreting a sequence of nomologically governed physical states. In the same vein, we might suppose that every mind has some material embodiment, although minds may have very different kinds of material embodiment. In case of human beings, our brains constitute the hardware on which our mental software runs. And one of the important similarity between cognition and computation is that the explanation of how a computation proceeds must make reference to what is represented by the various states of the mind.

Machine functionalism is also committed to a distinction of ontological levels. For functionalism, a given computational operation can be realised in a variety of distinct material devices. It can be realized in vacuum tubes and wires, in a device consisting of silicon and transistors, even in a hydraulic device consisting of water filled tubes and valves. Brains and many biological systems seem capable of performing computations. But if this is so, then performing a computation cannot be a material process.

According to machine functionalists, a mental state may be realized in a variety of systems not only in the human system, but also any other system resembling it. In claiming that mental properties are not material properties, a machine functionalist is not suggesting that mental properties are immaterial properties, properties of non-material substance. The machine functionalist's point is that a higher-level property such as being in pain or computing the sum of 7 and 5 is not to be identified with or 'reduced to' or mistaken for the system that realizes it. According to Heil, functionalism is a univocal view. Machine functionalists began with a shared set of insight and convictions. Earlier, we saw that machine functionalism blossomed with the advent of computing machines. We distinguish programs and computations from the hardware that is said to realize these. We can think of minds as devices that run software on complex chunks of hardware.

Machine functionalism considers states of mind and mental properties to be functional states and properties. A state is a functional state of a particular sort only if it answers to a particular job description, that is in case it answers to a particular sort of causal role in the system to which it belongs. A property is a functional property when its possession by an object turns on that object's satisfying a particular casual role.

According to Churchland, the essential or defining feature of any type of mental state is the set of causal relations it bears to environmental effects on the body, other types of mental state and bodily behaviour. For example, pain characteristically results from bodily damage; it causes distress, annoyance and practical reasoning aimed at relief, and it causes pain blanching, and nursing of the traumatized area. It has to be made clear that a state is not a property, nor a property a state. Nevertheless, in discussing machine functionalism, it is convenient at times to

speak of properties and sometimes of states. However, D. M. Armstrong and David Lewis take mental properties to be machine functional properties, but identify these with what other functionalists would regard as their realisation. A mental state, as per Armstrong-Lewis theory, is the occupant of a particular causal role. They identify state of mind with the roles, not their occupants.

Machine functionalists have regarded identity theorists as narrow-minded reductionists, philosophers who aim at reducing the mental to the physical. The identity theorists hold that thoughts, feelings, wishes, and the like, are identical with physical states. Not 'identical' in the sense that mentalistic terms are synonymous in meaning with physicalistic terms but 'identical' in the sense that the actual event picked out by mentalistic term is one and the same event as those picked out by physicalistic term. Identity theorists as narrow-minded reductionist because identity theorists aim at reducing the mental to the physical. But, functionalism is against reductionism because functionalism is committed to a conception of the world as containing distinct and irreducible levels of properties. The higher levels are thought to be 'autonomous' with respect to lower levels. The higher levels are not reducible to, identifiable with lower levels because higher levels are supervenient on lower levels. But functionalism is anti-reductionist and so it rejects the identity theory.

Machine functionalists also reject behaviorism. According to behaviourists, to be in a particular state of mind is to respond to stimuli in a particular way. J. B. Watson is regarded as the founder of behaviourism. He says that a thought is nothing but an incipient movement of the larynx and an emotion is nothing but an internal pattern of bodily adjustment. To be in pain is to respond to certain sorts of stimuli in familiar ways or at least to be disposed to respond. Functionalism rejects the very notion of causal stimuli. It interprets mental states as functional states of the human organic system. Thus functionalists embrace this observation regarding states of mind as functional states, states characterisable by their place in complex causal stimuli. For example, pains may be characterized by reference to typical causes, their relations to other states of mind, and behaviour outputs.

4.3 MACHINE INTELLIGENCE, COMPETENCY & CREATIVITY

As already discussed, machine intelligence or artificial intelligence is a physical symbol system, which has the necessary and sufficient means for general action. The above statement shows that machine intelligence has the capacity of competence and creativity. However, the system that exhibits general intelligence will prove upon analysis to be a physical symbol system. Further the physical symbol system of sufficient size can be organized further to exhibit general intelligence. The general intelligent action indicates the same scope of intelligence as we have seen in human action. The symbol system hypothesis implies that intelligence will be realized by a universal computer. It also asserts that the intelligent machine is a symbol system. When machines acquired enough memory to make it practicable to locate actual symbol system with the help of programs produce intelligent behaviour and solve many problems.

Moreover, many machine intelligence scientists use computers as tools, to help them create things they could not have created. For example, many scientists use sounds which no orchestra could produce. A visual artist may get ideas from computer graphics. We are concerned with those programs which produce aesthetically interesting creations. There are a number of

programs which explore artistically interesting spaces, and a few which produce aesthetically acceptable results.

Boden has given the example of a famous painter, Harold Cohen. Cohen has written a series of programs which produce pleasing, and unpredictable line drawings. Cohen's programs explore a certain style of line drawing and a certain subject matter. As human artists have to know about the things they are depicting, so each of Cohen's programs needs an internal model of its subject matter. This model is not a physical object. It is a set of abstract rules, which specify not only the anatomy of the human body, but also how the various body-parts appear from various points of view.

AI or Machine intelligence programs that write stories are woefully inadequate compared with human storyteller. But the best of them get what strength they possess from their internal models of very general aspects of motivation. For example, a program is asked to write a story with the moral 'Never trust flatterers.' In this story, there are two characters, the Fox and Crow. The story as follows "Once upon a time, there was a dishonest Fox, named, Henry who lived in a cave, and a vain and trusting Crow named Joe who lived in an elm-tree. Joe had gotten a piece of cheese and was holding it in his mouth. One day, Henry walked from his cave, across the meadow to the elm-tree. He saw Joe Crow and the cheese and became hungry. He decide that he might get the cheese if Joe Crow spoke, so he told Joe that he liked his singing very much and wanted to hear him sing. Joe was very pleased with Henry and began to sing. The cheese fell out of his mouth, down to the ground. Henry picked up the cheese and told Joe Crow that he was stupid. Joe was angry, and did not trust Henry any more. Henry returned to his cave. The end (Boden 1994)."

This program can construct hierarchical plans, ascribing them to the individual characters; according to the sorts of motivation one would expect them to have. It can give one character a role in another's plan. But these roles need not be allocated randomly, but can depend on background interpersonal relations. And it can represent different sorts of communication between the characters, which constrain what follows in different ways. All these matters are represented as abstract schemata, which are used to produce the story-structure. Thus the above programs shows that machines have the capacity to produce creativity. Now the question may be raised as; whether programs have scientific discovery? According to Langley, programs designed can find a simple mathematical and classificatory relation as 'rediscovered' with the help of physical and chemical laws.

NET talk is another famous and important example of machine creativity and competence. As we know, this model's goal is successfully to negotiate the problem domain of text-to-speech transformation. NET talk took seven letter segments of text as input and mapped the target window of that input onto an output which coded for phonemes. A connectionists system is not trained but programmed. Let us raise a question: What does NET talk know? According to Clark, the Net talk does not in any sense understand what it is saying. But this is not the point. Likewise, I might learn roughly how to pronounce Chinese sequences without understanding them. Nonetheless, NET talk has gone from babble to an output which is lawfully disciplined with respect to its input. That strongly suggests that it has learnt something. The question, what?

According to Lenat, automatic mathematician is a system that does not produce proofs, nor solve mathematical problems. Rather, it generates and explains mathematical ideas. Artificial machine starts with 100 very primitive mathematical concepts drawn from set theory, including sets, lists, equality and operations. These concepts are so basic that they do not even include the ideas of eliminating arithmetic. To begin with, the program does not know what an integer is, still less addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.

Artificial machine hunches, like human hunches, are sometimes wrong. Nevertheless, it has come up with some extremely powerful notions. It produced many arithmetical concepts, including integer, square root, addition, and multiplication. It generates the fundamental theorem of number theory, though did not prove. And it suggested the interesting idea that every even number greater than two is the sum of two different primes. It has originated one major theorem which no one had ever thought of before. Here, artificial machine appears to be P-creative. According to Boden, there are two senses of creativity. One is psychological creativity (P-creativity) and the other is historical creativity (H-creativity). An idea is P-creative if the person in whose mind it arises could not have had it before; it does not matter how many times other people have already had the same idea. On the other hand, an idea is H-creative if it is P-creative and no one else has ever had it before. Thus artificial machine's creative is P-creative.

Hofstadter presented another important example. He designed a copycat; in this, a program can generate many different analogies, where contextually appropriate comparisons are favoured over inappropriate ones. It does not rely on ready-made, fixed, representations, but constructs its own representations in a context-sensitive way. Its new analogies and new perceptions develop together.

As we have seen, cognitive science tries to provide computational models of the mind, that is, computational simulations of human cognitive process. If creativity is not a computational process, it might still be possible to simulate it computationally, just as it is possible to simulate digestive process without the simulation itself being a digestive process. It might be possible to have machine models of human creative processes, even if machines themselves cannot be creative. As Dartnall says that if machines cannot be creative then I doubt there is any significant sense in which they can be intelligent, for they will never 'have minds of their own.' I do mean this in the weak sense that they will always slavishly do what we tell them, but in a strong-sense, they will never be able to generate their own ideas. And I take it as axiomatic that if they cannot generate their own ideas they cannot be intelligent.

4.4 MINDS IN MACHINES

This section will explore the states of mind in artificial intelligence. As we know the main aim of artificial intelligence is to reproduce mentality in machines. That is to say that AI aims at producing machines with mind. If we say that machines have minds, then we have to ascribe certain 'belief', 'knowledge', 'free will', 'intention', 'observations', etc. to a machine. In that case, the machines will perform intelligent tasks and thus will behave like human beings.

We may raise a question: Why should we want ascribe mental qualities to machines at all? According to MacCarthy, there are many reasons for ascribing belief and other mental qualities:

(i) Although we may know the program, its state at a given moment is usually not directly observable, and we can explain performance of a machine only by ascribing beliefs and goals to it.

(ii) Ascribing beliefs may allow the derivation of general statements about the machine's behaviour that could not be obtained from any finite number of simulations.

(iii) The difference between this program and another actual or hypothetical program may best be expressed as a difference in belief structure.

According to Haugeland, thought itself is not static and random: It develops in ways that obey different rules of inference. Haugeland says that since correct application of the rules of reason to

particular thoughts depends on what those thoughts mean, it seems that there must be some active rule-applier, which understands the thoughts (and rules), and which applies the rules to the thoughts as well as it can. If the activity of this rules applier, following the rules of reason, is to explain the rationality of our thought process, then it must be regarded as a complete little person – or homunculus (in Latin)- inside the head, directing the thoughts like a traffic cop. The trouble is: a theory that involves an homunculus to explain thinking has begged its own question, because the homunculus itself has to think, and that thinking has not been explained.

Cognitive scientists can be materialists and mentalist at the same time. They are materialist because they support the view that the mind is a complicated machines or matter. On the other hand, some support that along with mind the body exists. They can offer explanation in terms of meaning and rules following, without presupposing any unexplained homunculus. It would be peculiar to start assigning geometrical shapes and locations to the internal program routines and operation of a system. These same decisions clearly cause physical behaviour, yet no one is worried that the laws of physics are being violated. According to Haugeland, when the machine plays, it follows rules in at least two senses: it always abides by the rules of the game, and it employs various reasonable rules of thumb to select plausible moves. Though these rules are in no way laws of nature, the machine's behaviour is explained (in part) by citing them- and yet, no unexplained 'compunculus' is presupposed. Thus this explanation will necessary invoke the system's internal reasoning processes; yet it is far from easy to figure out processes that will consistently lead to the observed behavioural response. Dennett rightly says that human mind is a semantic engine, that is to say that the way human mind handles the meaning of a word or sentence, in the same way a machine handles the literal meaning of a word or a sentence. Thus Dennett's view shows that human mind is a machine like ordinary machine because both mind and machine have the same quality, the difference is only apparent.

4.5 STRONG AI & WEAK AI (REDUCTIONISM & NON-REDUCTIONISM)

As we have seen, the main thesis of AI is that the human brain is like a digital computer, and the human mind is just a computer program. It tries to prove that the relation between the programs and the computer hardware is like the relation between mind and brain. Some supporters of AI argue that we have every reason to believe that computers have intelligence. At the same time, some others argue that the computers' intelligence is limited whereas human intelligence has no limit. Nowadays computers have achieved some modest success in proving theorems, guiding missiles, sorting mail, driving assembly-line robots, diagnosing illness, predicting weather and economic events, etc. Computers receive, interpret, process, store, manipulate and use information. Thus, intelligent behaviour is programmed into the computers. On the contrary, we have no idea how the brain functions, but we have an idea of the general relationships between brain processes and mental processes. Mental processes are caused by the brain activities which are functions of the elements constituting the brain.

Strong AI argues that it is possible that one-day a computer will be invented which can function like a mind in the fullest sense of the word. In other words, it can think, reason, imagine, etc., and do all the things that we currently associate with the human minds. On the other hand, weak AI argues that computers can only simulate human mind and are not actually conscious in the same way as human minds are. According to weak AI, computers having artificial intelligence are very powerful instruments in the hands of man. Whereas Strong AI holds that computer is

not merely an instrument in the study of the mind, but that the appropriately programmed computer is really a mind in the sense that computers can think and do reasoning like the human beings. In Strong AI, the programmed computer has cognitive states, so the programs are not simple tools that allow us to test psychological explanations; rather the programs are themselves the explanations. Strong AI, according to Searle, basically claims that the appropriately programmed computer literally has cognitive states, and that the programs thereby explain human cognition.

The main aim of AI is to reproduce mentality in computational machines, and to try to prove that the functions of a machine are similar to the functions of the human mind. But the question is: Could a machine have mental states? For AI, in the words of Searle, there is nothing essentially biological about the human mind. The brain just happens to be one of an indefinitely large number of different kinds of hardware computers that could sustain the programs, which make up human intelligence. On this view, any physical system whatever that had the right program with the right inputs and outputs would have a mind in exactly the same sense that you and I have minds.

Searle is here critical of the view that any physical system that has the right program with the right inputs and outputs would have a mind in exactly the same sense that human beings have minds. The cognitive scientists believe that perhaps they can design the appropriate hardware and programs - artificial brains, and minds- that are comparable to human brains and minds. Strong artificial intelligence is a reductionist theory. Because strong AI reduces mind or mentality to physical properties. Here, the term 'reduces to' names a relation between theories. When this relation holds between a pair of theories, for example, R^1 and R^2, then R^2 is said to be reducer of R^1. According to Fodor, the reduction relation is transitive and asymmetrical, hence irreflexible.

Reducibility involves a good deal more than the ontological claim that things that satisfy descriptions in the vocabulary of R^1 also satisfy descriptions the vocabulary of R^2. This condition is stronger than the ontological requirement that whatever falls under the generalizations of R^1 should also fall under those of R^2. On this view, there is an important sense in which syntax is preserved under reduction. That is to say, reduction permits us to redescribe the events in the vocabulary of R^2. Thus according to strong AI, mental states reduce to the computational states in the same way.

On the other hand, weak AI is non-reductionist, because this theory is not reducing the human mind in terms of machines, but it can only simulate human mind and this does not mean exact replication. The above statement shows that the weak AI view is non-reductioni For the physicalist, life is a higher order property, which emerges out of the physical properties. However, in case of a zombie, there is an absence of consciousness. In other words, the logical possibility of a zombie world is considered as a world physically identical to our world, but conscious experiences is impossible in this world. The zombies may be psychological or phenomenal zombies, which are physically and functionally identical to human beings but they lack experiences. According to Chalmers, the logical possibility of zombies seems equally obvious to me. A zombie is just something physically identical to me but which has no conscious experience – all is dark inside.

The zombie and me have identical physical properties but differ in high-level properties like consciousness. The zombies lack consciousness. Therefore, the high-level property of being conscious cannot be logically supervienent on physical properties. In the same way, according to weak AI, mind and machines have some identical properties but differ mainly on some higher

qualities. Here, weak AI is non-reductionist because unlike strong AI, is does not reduce mind to machines.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What is a Computer which acts on its own when programmed?
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2) Can Computer think for itself? Explain.
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4.6 LET US SUM UP

Thus, to talk about minds and mental operations is to talk about machines and their states. If there are no functional distinctions between mind and machine, the machine has the functional capacity of creativity and competence. Because program can construct hierarchical plans, ascribing them to the individual characters, according to the sorts of motivation one would expect them to have. It can give one character a role in another's plan. NET talk is one of the famous and important examples of machine creativity and competence. If this is so, we will find out how AI scientists are explaining mind from the reductionist, point of view.

4.7 KEY WORDS

Minds, Machines, functionalism, strong AI, weak AI & creativity

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Philosophy of Mind

Block 2

MIND AND BODY IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: WESTERN AND INDIAN

UNIT 1
Mind and Body in Ancient Philosophy

UNIT 2
Mind and Body in Medieval Philosophy

UNIT 3
Mind and Body in Modern Philosophy

UNIT 4
Mind and Body in Contemporary Philosophy

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BLOCK INTRODUCTION

The mind-body problem is a philosophical problem addressed by the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. What is the nature of the mind, of mental states and events generally? What is the nature of body, of physical states and events? Can mental phenomena exist independently of physical phenomena? Do they depend upon then for their existence? If physical states do indeed give rise to mental states, how can this occur, since the mental and physical seem so different from each other? There are various theories spelt out in the history of Western and Indian philosophy, dualism, monism, substance materialism, behaviourism, functionalism etc. The dualist viewpoint divides the human being into two basic or primary substances: matter and mind. It is quite common to distinguish between "my body" and "my self", and our bodies may become injured or ill whilst our minds are active and alert. Our mental experience is also private, reinforcing the feeling that it is somehow separate. As opposed to Dualism, Monism is the position that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kinds of entities. The philosophical theory of behaviourism - or to give its full title, logical behaviourism - holds that being in a mental state (such as being happy) is the same as being in a physical state. Functionalism is currently the most popular theory of mind. 1. Brain states are not mental states. Identity Theory supposes that brain states are identical to mental states. If not, and certain types of neurological process cannot be matched up with certain types of mental state, then something over and above simple physical processes must be taking place.

Unit 1 is an attempt to map the thought pattern of philosophers. It is a task and a puzzle in understanding the mind/body problem throughout history of human thought. This unit tries to present how this problem was addressed in the ancient Western and Indian philosophy and an attempt was made to find acceptable solution. The philosophy of the ancient times developed the conceptual basis and the central formulations of the questions for the entire subsequent European philosophy.

Unit 2 presents how this problem was addressed in the medieval western philosophy. Medieval philosophers left an enduring legacy of Platonistic metaphysical and theological speculation. Although most of the greatest thinkers of the period were highly trained theologians, their work addresses perennial philosophical issues and takes a genuinely philosophical approach to understanding the world. Medieval philosophers understood the nature of human beings in terms of the metaphysics of form and matter, identifying the human rational soul, the seat of the capacities specific to human beings, with form.

Unit 3 brings in the basic understanding of the mind-body problem in the modern Western Philosophy. The modern western philosophers were all deep occupied with the nature of the physical and the mental and the relation between the two. Both the theories of monism and dualism were briefly looked at in this unit along with the standpoint of various modern philosophers on this particular issue of mind and body.

Unit 4 surveys the seven metaphysical strategies in understanding the mind in contemporary philosophy. A brief evaluation of the different positions in contemporary philosophy is taken. After discussing the mind-body problem if it is a false problem which should be "dissolved away,' the unit takes up the continental tradition and see the significance of "lived body" there. Here the body is taken much more seriously and not apart from the mind.

UNIT 1 MIND AND BODY IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

Contents

1.0 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this unit is to map the thought pattern of philosophers. It is a task and a puzzle in understanding the mind/body problem throughout history of human thought. This unit tries to present how this problem was addressed in the ancient Western and Indian philosophy and an attempt was made to find acceptable solution.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The mind-body problem is a philosophical problem addressed by the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. This problem poses three questions which insistently press themselves upon us. 1. What is the nature of the mind, of mental states and events generally? 2. What is the nature of body, of physical states and events? 3. Can mental phenomena exist independently of physical phenomena, or do they depend upon then for their existence? If physical states do indeed give rise to mental states, how can this occur, since the mental and physical seem so different from each other?

The reason for this problem is the fact that mental phenomena appear to be qualitatively and substantially different from the physical bodies on which they appear to depend. There are a few major theories on the resolution of the problem. For example, dualism is a theory that has at its basis two radically distinct concepts or principles. Psychophysical dualism deals with the view that human beings are made up of two radically distinct constituents namely body, constituted by matter like other natural objects and an immaterial mind or soul. There is another theory namely monism which in general affirms the unity or the uniqueness of its subject matter. It asserts that mind and body are, in reality, just one substance.

But this unit makes an attempt to present how mind and body were treated in the ancient western philosophy. The philosophy of the ancient times developed the conceptual basis and the central formulations of the questions for the entire subsequent European philosophy. The main questions discussed in this period were cosmological problems. Besides what is the basic or primordial

stuff from which the different things in the world are made up of? What is the difference between dust and oneself? They also raised a question about the relation between mind and body. Let us also remember that the ancient thinkers were pioneers, venturing on a new territory. They did not have the centuries of experience and trial and error that we have to fall back upon. Indeed, sometimes the very freshness and simplicity of their vision can be a lesson to us it is the foundation of all true philosophy. To know the actual meaning of mystery behind the natural world, and to go into the internal nature of human beings from external appearance of the universe were the silent features found in the history of ancient philosophy. They also turned their attention from cosmos to human mind and human body. They treated soul as a synonym for spirit, mind or self.

1.2 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS

The pre-Socratic philosophers or the early Greek philosophers were the first and free thinkers indulged in free enquiry. They were not trammelled by any supernatural reference. Some of them were deemed anti-religious. They did not give due importance to body. They considered soul as superior and treated body as inferior with material elements. For example, Ionian school insisted on the element of becoming relying on senses. One of its members Anaximenes of Miletus (588-524 BC) explained that the human soul is composed of air and it is likely that believed the entire *kosmos* (world) to be alive, with air functioning as its soul.

By laying stress on certain inner experiences and intuitive truths revealed only to the initiated, Pythagorean school seems to have represented a soul-directed subjectivism. Pythagoras of Samos (580-500 B.C) was an early Greek sage and religious innovator. He holds that human life and conduct is to be guided by a moral sense and discipline. Life on earth is only a passing phase in a long journey. Soul is immortal and it exists after death. It was there before birth. Body is the tomb of the soul and it leads a prisoner's life. Life on earth is a time for preparing for the next life. One must triumph over the passion of life by disciplines of soul.

Another pre-Socratic school flourishing at the time in Greece was Eleatic school. The thinkers of this school preferred to make use of their reason, rather than rely on the data of their senses. Hence they are called rationalists. They tend to assert that Being alone is real, that Becoming is illusory. For example, Xenophanes (570-480 BC) who was Greek poet, religious thinker and reputed precursor of the Eleatic school of philosophy, stressed unity rather than diversity and viewed the separate existences of material things as apparent rather than real. He also rejected the doctrine of transmigration of souls.

There was one more school whose philosophical stand point explains reality in terms of discrete, unconnected and irreducible entities or elements. Those who took this stand are called Pluralists or Atomists because they accepted Plurality of primary principles. Apparently a firm believer in the transmigration of souls, Empedocles (490-430 B.C), a Greek philosopher, statesman, poet, religious teacher, and physiologist declared that those who have sinned must wander through many mortal bodies and be tossed from one of the four elements to another. Escape from such punishment requires purification, particularly abstention from the flesh of animals, whose souls may once have inhabited human bodies.

Democritus (460-360 B.C), a Greek philosopher and a central figure in the development of the atomic theory of the universe attributed his theory of atoms to epistemology, ethics and metaphysics. For him, even the soul is nothing but aggregate of atoms. However, the soul consists of those atoms which have the essence of fire. These fiery atoms are the finest,

smoothest and most mobile. These atoms are distributed throughout the whole universe including animals, plants and other things, but these fiery atoms are found in the largest number in humans. Hence he terms nature and fire divine.

1.3 PLATO-ARTISTOTLE

Plato, the first great systematic philosopher of ancient Greece, laid the philosophical foundations of Western culture. Building on the life and thought of Socrates, Plato developed a profound and wide-ranging system of philosophy. His thought has logical, epistemological and metaphysical aspects; but its underlying motivation is ethical. Thus the core of Plato's philosophy is a rationalistic ethics.

Plato holds that reality is not of one piece like either flux or permanence but two fold (dualistic). There are two kinds of reality. First, the physical spatio – temporal reality perceived by senses: A changing reality in constant flux. This is material and physical. Second, the Spiritual Reality of our ideas and thought – contents: universally true, unchanging, eternal. This is the world of reason, a spiritual realm. Hence, two worlds exist: the material world of the senses, the empirical, temporal reality in constant change. It is a shadowy dark inferior type of reality: Matter. In contrast, there is the world of ideas, of stable, universal, eternal realities: Sprit

Applying this two world theory, Plato conceives a human person as empirical belonging to both worlds. He/she is a dual being composed of a material body and a spiritual eternal soul. But the true reality of human is his soul alone which is not only immortal but eternal. Soul is utterly superior to body and the body is nothing else but its shadow. Further Plato tells us that soul is immortal and imperishable and will certainly live after death. Each soul has to face judgment. The wicked ones who have cultivated gluttony or selfishness will assume the form of donkeys and other animals. However those who have lived in purity will enjoy the company of gods. Though Plato laid foundation in the dualism he has not clarified the relationship between Soul and Body. Their nature is quite opposed. The Soul is immortal, the body is perishable. The Soul is simple; the body is composite of the four elements of fire, air, earth, and water. Due to some mysterious fault, soul became embodied and imprisoned in the body. This embodiment is the cause of all human miseries, for; through it the pure souls lost their original perfection. Physical death is human salvation and the recovery of original state of perfection in the contemplation of ideas.

The Two Horses

Soul has three parts: 1. Rational part resides in the soul. 2. The spirited part or irascible courageous part (*thymos*) in heart. 3. Appetite part (*epithaimai*) resides in the abdomen. Plato noticed the evident fact of conflict within the depths of human. In the *Phaedrus,* he gave his classic comparison of the charioteer who struggles to control two troublesome steeds who tend to pull in different ways. The charioteer is the rational element in human. It struggles to bring about a harmony between the opposing pulls of the spiritual and appetitive elements in human, the two horses. The spiritual element is really a good horse; it is docile and obedient to the reason and would lead it straight up to the Good. But the appetitive element is unbridled and unruly and can only be driven by the whip.

The Immortality of the Human Soul

This is the cardinal doctrine of Platonist anthropology. If the body is prison of the Soul, then death is the moment of its joyful release. His famous dialogue, *Phaedo* contains the proofs in favour of the immortality of the human soul. Epistemologically speaking the soul has

contemplated eternal ideas. The soul cannot be produced by composition or destroyed by disintegration as it is the source of its own motion. The soul is eternal and moral from the superiority and dignity of the soul: it must survive the body. It has got both pre-existence, post existence as well. The soul is the only entity which moves by itself and moves all other things.

Aristotle

Aristotle's achievement in the history and development of Western thought are both stunning and unrivalled. More than just a philosopher, he was a scientist, astronomer, political theorist and the inventor of what is now called symbolic or formal logic. In contrast to Plato's dualist concept of human, Aristotle holds that human is a living substance, an animal composed of matter and form that is body and soul. The soul is seen as the form of the body. The soul is not a separate spiritual entity but the principle of life. He defines it as "the entelechy of a natural body endowed with the capacity of life" or as "the first entelechy of natural organic body." Being the act of the body, the soul is at the same time form, principle of movement, and end. The body is for the soul, and every organ has its purpose, that purpose being an activity.

It is non-sensical to conceive of the soul as being separate from the body. If there is no soul, there is no body and vice-versa. The body and soul are one single composite of matter and form. The composite substance, says Aristotle, is a natural body endowed with life, the principle of this life being called the soul. Body cannot be soul, for body is not life but what has life. The human soul is not separable and therefore the idea of the human soul's immortality is meaningless. The soul is thus the realisation of the body and is inseparable for it. The soul is thus the cause and principle of the living body, a) as a source of movement, b) as final cause and c) as the real substance of animate bodies. Hence Aristotle's anthropology is neither dualistic nor monistic (man is only matter or only spirit), but *hylomorphistic* (one substance composed of inseparable materials and spiritual principles).

Altogether, Aristotle allows a much closer union between soul and body than did the Platonists: the tendency to look on the body as the tomb of the soul is not that of Aristotle. Rather is it for the good of the soul to be united with the body, since only so can it exercise its faculties. Aristotle insisted that the Platonic school failed to give any satisfactory explanation of the soul's union with the body.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) How did Ionian School consider the relation between Soul and Body?

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2) Who are the Pluralists exposing the place of soul and body in Human nature?

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3) What is the cardinal doctrine of Platonist Anthropology?

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4) Why is Aristotelian Anthropology called Hylomorphistic?

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1.4 POST-ARISTOTELIANS

The Hellenistic period is usually accepted as having begun with the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C, and to have ended with the establishment in power of Augustus Caesar in 30 B.C. in Rome. Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C) was encouraged at an early age by his parents, King Philip II and Olympia's, to carry out their plan of uniting the Greek states under Macedonia (in northern Greece) and to carry out further conquests of nearly territory. Alexander conquered and united the Greek city states while still in his teens, and then moved on to the conquest of a great empire in Europe, Asia and North Africa. He established local government and broke down the barriers between Greek and barbarian. He founded new cities and promoted education. He strove to unite all races and factions into one Greek cosmopolitan people. Greek ideas and Hellenic forms in art, literature and Philosophy, modified by oriental and Egyptian influence became widespread throughout these areas during the last three centuries B.C.

The period has become known as the Hellenistic period, the age of classical civilization. The Hellenistic period was a time of political, social and religious upheaval. It was for this reason that philosophy now took on a new practical importance. Philosophers concentrated on the individual, on character, ethics, codes of conduct and personal behaviour. Popular philosophy was called on to satisfy the religious and moral needs of individuals seeking personal salvation and sure standards for life and conduct.

Poseidonius of Apamaea

Of all the post-Aristotlean philosophers, Poseidonius was the one who has dealt with the relation between mind or soul and body. He is a Greek Stoic philosopher, politician and astronomer. Although his philosophy was monistic, he admitted a dualism, apparently under the influence of Platonism. There are two divisions of the Cosmos, the supra-lunar world which is heavenly and 'imperishable' and the infra-lunar world which is earthly and perishable. The former sustains the latter through the forces which it imparts. These two worlds are, however, bound together in human who is the bond between them. Composed of body and spirit, he/she stands on the borderline between the perishable and the imperishable or the earthly and the heavenly. Just as man or woman from the corporeal viewpoint is the highest grade, so, conversely, from the spiritual viewpoint, he/she is the lowest grade. He makes the soul a fiery and so material like the body- he then proceeds to emphasise the dualism of soul and body in manner reminiscent of Plato. Thus the body is a hindrance to the soul, impeding the free development of its knowledge.

1.5 PLOTINUS

He is ancient philosopher, the centre of an influential circle of intellectuals and man of letters in 3rd-century Rome, who is regarded by modern scholars as the founder of the Neoplatonic School of philosophy. It is the dominant philosophical movement of the Graeco-Roman world in late antiquity, and the most significant thinker of the movement. He is sometimes described as the last great pagan philosopher. He is historically important as an influence in moulding the Christianity of the Middle Ages and of Catholic theology. Plotinus' Vision of philosophy was

that philosophy is a kind of religion of interiority or religious wisdom, the aim of which was salvation. But salvation implies a detailed picture of Reality.

According to Plotinus the Reality is made up of four grades (levels). Or, to put it more accurately, the Real is the One (*Monos*) and it communicates itself by emanation into the Intelligence (*Nous*), this in turn into the Soul (Psyche) which, finally emanates Matter, the lowest grade or level of reality.

The first emanation from the One is Thought or Mind which is intuition or immediate apprehension, having a twofold object, (a) the One, (b) itself. In Nous exist the Ideas, not only of classes but also of individuals, though the whole multitude of Ideas is contained indivisibly in Nous. It enjoys that eternity which time does but mimic. It knows all things together, having neither past nor future but seeing all in an eternal pa From Nous, which is Beauty, proceeds Soul, corresponding to the World-Soul. This World-Soul is incorporeal and indivisible, but it forms the connecting-link between the super-sensual world and the sensual world, and so looks not only upwards to the Nous but also downwards towards the world of nature.

Individual human souls proceed from the World-Soul, and, like the World-Soul, they are subdivided into two elements a higher element which belongs to the sphere of Nous, and a lower element, which is directly connected with the body. The soul pre-existed before its union with the body, which is represented as a fall, and survives the death of the body, though apparently without memory of the period of earthly existence. Below the sphere of Soul is the material world. It forms the lowest stage of the universe and is the antithesis to the One. Plotinus combined Platonic conception of matter and also adopted the Aristotelian conception of matter explaining that matter is partially illuminated by its information and does not exist separately in the concrete as complete darkness, the principle of not-being.

In his psychology, Plotinus assigns three parts to the individual soul. The highest of these is uncontaminated by matter and remains rooted in the intelligible world, but in so far as the soul enters in the real union with the body, to form the *compositum*, it is contaminated by matter, and so there follows the necessity of an ethical assent, as union with the One as the ultimate goal. Secondly the soul must rise above-perception, turning towards Nous and occupying herself with philosophy and science. This is a higher stage which carries the soul beyond discursive thought to union with Nous. In this union the soul retains her self-consciousness. But all these stages are but a preparation for the final stage, that of mystical union with God or the One in an ecstasy characterised by the absence of all duality.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) How does Poseidonius of Apamaea connect body and soul to the two world theory?

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2) Explain Briefly the doctrine of Plotinus?

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1.6 ANCIENT INDIAN THINKERS

Eastern traditions such as Buddhism do not hold to the dualistic mind/body model but do assert that the mind and body are separate entities. Buddhism in particular does not hold to the notion of a soul, or atman. Some forms of Buddhism assert that a very subtle level of mind leaves the body at the time of death and goes to a new life. According to Buddhist scholar Dharmakirti, the definition of mind is that which is clarity and cognizes. In this definition, 'clarity' refers to the nature of mind, and 'cognizes' to the function of mind. Mind is clarity because it always lacks form and because it possesses the actual power to perceive objects. Mind cognizes because its function is to know or perceive objects. In Ornament of the Seven Sets, Buddhist scholar Khedrubje says that thought, awareness, mind and cognizer are synonyms Buddha explained that although mind lacks form, it can nevertheless be related to form. Thus, our mind is related to our body and is "located" at different places throughout the body. This is to be understood in the context of how the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness are generated. There are many different types of mind—sense awarenesses, mental awarenesses, gross minds, subtle minds, and very subtle minds—and they are all formless (lacking shape, color, sound, smell, taste or tactile properties) and they all function to cognize or know. There is no such thing as a mind without an object known by that mind. Even though none of these minds is form, they can be related to form is the essence of what Buddha said.

1.7 LET US SUM UP

The unit has explained the different views of the ancient philosophers. Aristotle approaches the problems of philosophy in a scientific frame of mind. He makes experience to be the true source of all our knowledge, intellectual as well as sensible. "There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses" is a fundamental principle with him. It needs to be emphasized here that although Aristotle studied under Plato, he fundamentally disagreed with his teacher on just about everything. He could not bring himself to think of the world in abstract terms the way Plato did; above all else, Aristotle believed that the world could be understood at a fundamental level through the detailed observation and cataloging of phenomenon. That is, knowledge (which is what the word science means) is fundamentally empirical. The mind does not, as Plato imagined, bring out of a previous existence the recollection of certain ideas, of which it is reminded at sight of the phenomenon. It brings to bear on the phenomenon a power peculiar to the mind, by virtue of which it renders intelligible essences which are imperceptible to the senses, because hidden under the non-essential qualities. The Universal does not exist apart from the particular, as Plato taught, but in particular things; The Universal as such, in its full-blown intelligibility, is the work of the mind, and exists in the mind alone though it has a foundation in the potentially universal essence which exists independently of the mind and outside the mind.

1.8 KEY WORDS

***Monos*:** Real is the One according to Plotinus

Atman: Self of the individual.

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UNIT 2 MIND AND BODY IN MEDIEVAL WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Contents

2.0 OBJECTIVES

A human being is a conscious, experiencing subject and a possessor of a variety of mental states like hearing, seeing, feeling an ache or pain, remembering, thinking and wondering. He or she becomes the centre of a universe of experiences. Even animals, birds, fish, insects and possibly even mollusks also have mental lives, however underdeveloped and rudimentary some of these minds might be. This characterisation is called mental phenomena. At the same time, a human person possesses another phenomenon which is called physical. He or she possesses human nature, behaviour of physical bodies, processes and events. Obviously there is plenty we do not yet know about the ultimate nature of physical reality, but it seems reasonable to say that we have a better grasp of what is going on when physical occurrences take place than when mental events happen. For example, scientific investigation is uncovering more and more about the processes that take place in our bodies and brains and although our understanding is far from complete, we do at least have a good idea of what further kinds of detail we need to discover and how to set about this task. This task and puzzle leads to the mind/body problem. This unit tries to present how this problem was addressed in the medieval western philosophy and an attempt was made to find acceptable solution.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Medieval philosophy is nothing but the philosophic thought and systems which were elaborated between 400–1400 AD roughly the period between the fall of Rome and the Renaissance. Medieval philosophers are called the Christian thinkers who left an enduring legacy of Platonistic metaphysical and theological speculation. The philosophical discussions and disputes of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries record later medieval thinkers' sustained efforts to understand the new Aristotelian material and assimilate it into a unified philosophical system. Although most of the greatest thinkers of the period were highly trained theologians, their work

addresses perennial philosophical issues and takes a genuinely philosophical approach to understanding the world. Even their discussion of specifically theological issues is typically philosophical, permeated with philosophical ideas, rigorous argument and sophisticated logical and conceptual analysis. The enterprise of philosophical theology is one of medieval philosophy's greatest achievements. Medieval philosophers understood the nature of human beings in terms of the metaphysics of form and matter, identifying the human rational soul, the seat of the capacities specific to human beings, with form. All medieval philosophers, therefore, held broadly dualist positions according to which the soul and body are fundamentally distinct. But only some were also substance dualists holding in addition that the soul and body are themselves substances.

2.2 THE PATRISTIC PERIOD

The Patristic era begins immediately after the death of the last Apostle John, which marked the end of the Apostolic era. The term 'patristic philosophy' covers all of these activities by the 'fathers' (*patres*) of the Church. Obviously this term was at first attributed by some Christians to their bishop and which soon was extended to all bishops. Around 4th cent, the term "Father" began to be applied to men, who, even if they were not bishops, distinguished themselves because of their doctrinal authority. Later, the criteria were established for the use of the term "Father". There were four: purity of doctrine, sanctity of life, approval of the Church and antiquity (they belonged to the 1st centuries). Later the title was attributed to all ancient ecclesiastical authors without even excluding the figures of some heretics whose knowledge is indispensable to understand the history of Christian Tradition. This period refers to any of the great bishops and other eminent Christian teachers of the early centuries whose writings remained as a court of appeal for their successors, especially in reference to controversial points of faith or practice.

As the first group of those Christian writers whose works contain philosophical elements one can count the early apologists who were particularly concerned to defend the Christian faith against pagan attack. Some of them have also treated the problem of mind and body in their philosophical analyses. For instance Athenagoras (133 – 190) a Christian apologist a philosopher and a convert to Christianity had a primary purpose to defend his theological premises. He utilised philosophical arguments and themes in his pursuit of that purpose. In his attempt to prove the reasonable character of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, he made clear his conviction, as against the Platonic view, that the body belongs to the integral person, that the person is not simply a soul using a body.

There was a group of Latin Apologists who defended Christian faith from different heresies of those days. One of the most important fathers is Tertullian (160 – 220 AD), a prolific early Christian author, "the father of Latin Christianity". Speaking of the human soul, he says that it must be a bodily substance since it can suffer. However, he speaks ambiguously even on the nature of soul, and in his Apology, he gives as a reason for the resurrection of the bodies of the wicked that "the soul is not capable of suffering without the solid substance, that is, the flesh".

He held that the soul was not pre-existent, as Plato affirmed, nor subject to reincarnation, as the Pythagoreans held. In each individual it is a new product, proceeding equally with the body from the parents like a kind of sprout, and not created later and associated with the body. This position is called traducianism in opposition to creationism, or the idea that each soul is a fresh creation

of God. For Tertullian the soul is, however, a distinct entity and a certain corporeity and as such it may be tormented in Hell.

He affirmed that the soul's sinfulness is easily explained by its Traducian origin. It is in bondage to Satan (whose works it renounces in baptism), but has seeds of good, and when awakened, it passes to health and at once calls upon God and is naturally Christian. It exists in all people alike; it is a culprit and yet an unconscious witness by its impulse to worship, its fear of demons, and its musings on death to the power, benignity, and judgment of God as revealed in the Christian's Scriptures.

The origin of the soul by God's direct creation, in opposition to any form of traducianism, was clearly affirmed by an early Christian author Lactantius (250-325 AD). The Greek Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries were occupied mainly with theological questions. There had been various eminent figures in this period. One of the most important fathers is St Gregory of Nyssa (335-395 AD). He was the most learned of the Greek Fathers and one of the most interesting from the philosophic standpoint. He held that the soul, which is not confined to any one portion of the body, is a 'created essence, a living essence that has the power of giving life and perceiving sensible objects, so long as the bodily instruments endure.' As simple and uncompounded, the soul has the power of surviving the body, with which, however, it will in the end be reunited. The soul is thus spiritual and incorporeal, but how is it different from body, for body, i.e. a concrete material object, is composed of qualities which in themselves are incorporeal. He holds that the union of qualities like colour, solidity, quantity, weight, results in body, whereas their dissolution spells the perishing of the body.

It is noteworthy that St Gregory of Nyssa was the first real founder of systematic mystical theology. His scheme of the soul's ascent certainly bears some resemblance to that of Plotinus, but at the same time, it is thoroughly Christocentric. The advance of the soul is the work of the Divine Logos, Chri Moreover, his ideal is not that of a solitary union with God, but rather of a realisation of the *Pleroma* (generally refers to the totality of divine powers) of Christ: the advance of one soul brings grace and blessing to others and the indwelling of God in the individual affects the whole Body. .

2.3. AUGUSTINE ON MIND AND BODY

Also called Saint Augustine of Hippo, original Latin name *Aurelius Augustinus*, bishop of Hippo from 396 to 430, is one of the Latin Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and perhaps the most significant Christian thinker after Paul. Augustine's adaptation of classical thought to Christian teaching created a theological system of great power and lasting influence.

Human person is seen by Augustine, after the biblical view, as the peak of material creation. He/she consists of body and immortal soul. He is quite clear about the fact that human does consist of soul and body, as when he says that 'a soul in possession of a body does not constitute two persons but one person.' The Platonic view of human still has its repercussions on him for, if he does not quite see the body as the immortal soul's prison, he will call it the soul's instrument. He defines man as "a rational soul using a moral and earthly body". So man is a union of soul and body. The soul, being superior to the body, cannot be acted on by the body, but it perceives the changes in the body due to an external stimulus. This union is not the result of sin. The soul is a simple, immaterial or spiritual substance, entirely distinct in essence from the body. Soul is life principle, directing and forming the body, but how it acts on the body is a mystery.

Augustine clearly held that the soul is created by God, but does not seem to have made up his mind as to the precise time and mode of its origin. He rejects the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence developed by Plato. He refused to allow that the soul was put into the body as a punishment for faults committed in a pre-earthly condition, but the chief question for him was how the souls arose, he leaves unsettled. He finds it hard to decide in favour of either of the two prevalent views of his day: 1) God creates a new soul for every child that is born, or 2) souls are generated from the souls of parents at the same time and in much the same manner as their bodies are produced by their parents' bodies. This theory is called "*Traducianism*". This theory seems to imply a somewhat materialistic view of the soul, no matter how one tries to refine it, for it implies that the soul is divisible and having parts is the characteristic of matter. Of course, Augustine never had the least intention of saying anything like that, but it is difficult to see how one is to avoid such a logical conclusion. This theory was condemned by Pope *Anastasius* II in 498.

Although the soul has a beginning in time, it does not die. Augustine proves its immortality by the usual arguments of his age, all of which stem from Plato. Although the soul is immortal in the sense of continuing to exist after death, it is not necessarily immortal in the sense of realising eternal blessedness. The eternal blessedness of the soul in God cannot be demonstrated: our expectation is an act of faith.

2.4 BONAVENTURE ON MIND AND BODY

He was from Italy. *San Bonaventura*, (original name *Giovanni Di Fidanza)* was a leading medieval theologian, minister general of the Franciscan order and cardinal bishop of Albano. He wrote several works on the spiritual life and recodified the constitution of his order in 1260. He was declared a doctor of the church in 1587. He developed a synthesis of philosophy and theology in which Neoplatonic doctrines are transformed by a Christian framework. He has also dealt with the unity of human soul and relation of soul to body.

According to him, the human soul is produced immediately by God, created by Him out of nothing. The human soul is the image of God, called to union with God, and on this count its production was fittingly reserved by God to Himself. He also argues that since the human soul is immortal, incorruptible, its production can be effected only by that principle which has life and perpetuity of itself. It is the entire human soul, not the rational faculty alone. There is one soul in human person, endowed with rational and sensitive faculties, and it is this soul which God creates.

The body was contained *seminaliter* in the body of Adam, the first man, and it is transmitted by means of the seed, but this does not mean that the body has a sensitive soul, educed from the potency of matter and distinct from the created and infused rational soul. The seed contains, it is true, not only the super-fluity of the father's nourishment, but also something of his *humiditas radicalis*, so that there is in the embryo, before the infusion of the soul, an active disposition towards the act of sensation, a kind of inchoate sensibility, but this disposition is a disposition to accomplishing the act of sensation through the power of the soul, once it has been infused: at the complete animation of the embryo by the infusion of the soul this inchoate sensibility creates or rather it is subsumed under the activity of the soul, which is the principle of sensation as well as of intellection,.

The human soul is the form of the body. St Bonaventure uses the Aristotelian doctrine against those who hold that the souls of all men are substance. The rational soul is the act and entelechy

of the human body, therefore, since human bodies are distinct, the rational souls which perfect those bodies will also be distinct, the soul is an existent, living, intelligent form, endowed with liberty. The soul is present wholly in every part of the body. Because it is the form of the whole body, it is present in the whole body; because it is simple, it is not present partly here and partly there, because it is the sufficient moving principle of the body, it has no particular situation, is not present at one point or in a determinate part.

Though Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body, his general tendency is Platonic and Augustinian in character, inasmuch as he insists that the human soul is a spiritual substance, composed of spiritual form and spiritual matter. The important matter is that the soul, though the form of the body and moving principle of the body, is also much more than this, and can subsist by itself. The doctrine of the hylomorphic composition of the human soul is calculated to ensure its dignity and its power of subsistence apart from the body.

If the soul is composed of form and spiritual matter, it follows that it is individuated by its own principles. If this is so, however, why is it united with the body, for it is an individual spiritual substance in its own right? The answer is that the soul, even though a spiritual substance, is so constituted that it not only can inform a body but also has a natural inclination to do so. Conversely, the body, though also composed of matter and form, has an *appetitus* for being informed by the soul. The union of the two is thus for the perfection of each and is not to the detriment of either soul or body. The soul does not exist simply, or even primarily, to move the body, but to enjoy God; yet it exercises its powers and potentialities fully only in informing the body and it will one day, at the resurrection, be reunited with the body.

2.5 AQUINAS ON MIND AND BODY

ThomasAquinas (*San Tommaso d'Aquino*) is Italian Dominican theologian, the foremost medieval Scholastic philosopher. He is known as ‘Angelic doctor’, (*doctor angelicus*), ‘Dean of Medieval Scholastic Theologians’, ‘Founder of Father of scholasticism’, ‘Universal Doctor’, ‘Second Augustine’, and ‘Prince of Scholastics’. He developed his own conclusions from Aristotelian premises, notably in metaphysics, creation, and Providence. His doctrinal system and the explanations and developments made by his followers are known as Thomism.

ThomasAquinas holds that the human person is the most perfect in all of nature. It is a being subsisting in a rational nature. The person is not the same as Nature. It is the perfection of *who-ness* that makes a person. It is this perfection which makes Thomas to describe as ‘that which is most perfect in all of Nature’. It is ironic that what is most perfect in all of Nature is often the cause of what is the most abominable in all of Nature.

For Aquinas, sensation is an activity of the total human composite and not an act of the soul, using the body as its instrument as Augustine would hold. The union of body and soul is not something unnatural, not a kind of punishment due to some fault in a previous state. The soul of man has no innate ideas: it needs a body in order to have sensation and to think. The union of soul and body is not to the detriment of the soul but to its good. Furthermore, there is only one substantial form in man and this is his human soul which confers on him his bodiliness. It includes his vegetative and sensitive functions together with his rationality.

ThomasAquinas maintained that the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism and that, departing from the views of his predecessors, he defended the unicity of the substantial form in a material substance, but in any case he soon opposed this opinion and held that the specific substantial

form informs prime matter immediately and not by the medium of any other substantial form. This doctrine he applied to human person, maintaining that there is but one substantial form in the human *compositum*. This one substantial form is the rational soul, which informs matter directly: there is no forma corporeitatis, still less are there vegetative and sensitive substantial forms. The human being is a unity, and this unity would be impaired, were we to suppose a plurality of substantial forms. The name 'human person' applied neither to the soul alone, nor to the body alone, but to soul and body together, to the composite substance.

The theory of the substantial union of the human composite ensures human's unity but does not it overdo it. Aquinas has made his famous distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic dependence. The purely sensitive soul of an animal is totally dependent on the body for all its operations. Hence when the body, on which it totally, intrinsically depends, perishes or corrupts, the sensitive soul of the animal cannot but corrupt too. But man has a rational soul which does not always depend on the body for all its actions. It has a subsistent form and so is only extrinsically dependent on matter. Hence, when the body corrupts, the soul is not affected.

Thomasfollows Aristotle in stressing the unity of the human substance. It is the one soul in human person which confers on him/her all the determinations as human person, his/her corporeity, his/her vegetative, sensitive and intellectual operations. In a plant, there is present only the vegetative principle or soul, conferring life and the powers of growth and reproduction; in the brute there is present only the sensitive soul which acts as the principle not only of vegetative life, but also of sensitive life; in human person there is present only the rational principle or soul, which is not only the principle of the operations peculiar to itself, but also of the vegetative and sensitive operations. When death comes and the soul is separated from the body, the body disintegrates: it is not merely that rational functions cease, for the sensitive and vegetative functions also cease: the one principle of all these operations no longer informs the matter which it previously informed and instead of the unified human substance there results a multiplicity of substances, the new substantial forms being educed from the potentiality of matter.

Clearly the Platonic idea of the relation of soul to body was unacceptable to Thomas. It is the one individual man who perceives not only that he reasons and understands, but also that he feels, and exercises sensation. But one cannot have sensation without a body, so that the body, and not the soul only, must belong to human person. A person is generated when the rational soul is infused and he/she dies when the rational soul departs from the body: there is no other substantial form in human person than the rational soul and this soul exercises the functions of inferior forms, itself performing in the case of human person what the vegetative soul does in the case of plants and the sensitive soul in the case of irrational animals. It follows from that the union of soul with body cannot be something unnatural; it cannot be a punishment to the soul for sin in preceding state.

The human soul has the power of sensation, for example, but it cannot exercise this function without a body; it has the power of intellection, but it has no innate ideas and has to form its ideas in dependence on sense-experience, for which it needs a body, the soul, then, is united to a body because it needs it, because it is naturally the form of a body. The union of soul and body is not to the detriment, but to the good of the soul, *propter animan*. Matter exists for the form and not the other way about, and the soul is united to the body in order that it (the soul) may act according to its nature.

But though, Thomasemphasised the unity of human person, the close union between soul and body, he held that there is a real distinction between the soul and its faculties, and between the

faculties themselves. In God alone, are the power of acting and the act itself identical with the substance, since in God alone is there no potentiality; in the human soul there are faculties or powers of acting which are in potentiality to their acts and which are to be distinguished according to their respective acts and objects. Some of these powers or faculties belong to the soul as such and are not intrinsically dependent on a bodily organ, while others belong to the compositum and cannot be exercised without the body, the former, therefore, remain in the soul even when it is separated from the body, whereas the latter remain in the separated soul only potentially or virtually, in the sense that the soul still has the remote power to exercise the faculties, but only if it were reunited with the body; in its separated state it cannot use them.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) How does Athenagoras prove the union of the soul and body?

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2)What is the position of Tertullian Regarding the Relation between the Soul and the body?

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3) How does Aquinas apply hylomorphism to relation between Soul and body?

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2.6 DUNS SCOTUS ON MIND AND BODY

John Duns Scotus was one of the most important thinkers of the entire scholastic period. Of Scottish origin, he was a member of the Franciscan order and undertook theological studies first at Oxford and later at Paris. He is influential realist philosopher and scholastic theologian who left behind a considerable body of work, much of which unfortunately was still undergoing revision at the time of his death. A notoriously difficult and highly original thinker, Scotus was referred to as 'the subtle doctor' because of his extremely nuanced and technical reasoning. On almost every major point of contention, Scotus took the opposite side to Aquinas. Scotus made important and influential contributions in metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.

In relation of soul to body, he holds that in human person there is only one soul, though there is, as already mentioned, a form of corporeity. There are various formalities in the human soul, which, though not really distinct from one another, are distinct with formalities, since the intellectual, sensitive and vegetative activities are formally and objectively distinct, but they are formalities of the one rational soul of human person. This one soul, therefore, not only the principle of human rational cognition, but it is also the principle of his/her sensitive activity and of life. The soul is, therefore, a part of human person, and it is only improperly that it can be

called subsistent, since it is part of a substance rather than a substance by itself; it is the composite being, soul and body, which is a *per se unum*. The soul in the state of separation from the body is not, properly speaking, a person. The soul perfects the body only when the latter is properly disposed for it, and this soul has an aptitude for this body. This means, says Scotus, that the soul cannot be individuated by the matter it informs, since the soul, that is, a particular soul, is infused into a body, and the creation of that soul is logically prior to its union with the body.

The soul is united to the body for the perfection of the whole person, who consists of soul and body. According to Thomas Aquinas, the soul is united to the body for the good of the soul. The soul is naturally dependent on the senses for its cognition, and therefore the soul is united to the body for the soul's good, in order that it may operate according to its nature. For Scotus, however, the direction of human intellect towards material things and its *de facto*, dependence on the senses originate not so much in the nature of the human reason as such as in the present state of the soul, its condition in the body as wayfarer. He holds that the soul is united to the body, not for the good of the body simply, but for the good of the composite being, the human person. It is the composite being who is the term of the creative act, not soul taken by itself or body taken by itself, and the union of soul and body is effected in order that this composite being may be realised: the union exists, therefore, for the good of the whole person.

2.7 SAMKHYA THEORY AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF KANT

There is a striking similarity between the Samkhya theory of perception and the epistemological analysis made by Kant. According to Kant the manifold of sensations is transformed into perceptions and conceptions by the mind by means of the perceptual categories and the conceptual categories with their judgments. The perception is referred to the unity of the ego and converted into personal knowledge. The intellect classes the perception under its categories together with those of space and time. The transcendental unity of the ego to which all experience is referred is responsible for the synthesis of knowledge which is made available to the perceiver. In Kant, however, the order is brought about in the sensations directly by the mind or the understanding, while in the Samkhya the manifold of sensations undergoes the process of synthesis gradually through the mind, the ego and the intellect.

To Kant space and time are perceptual categories, but to the Samkhya they are conceptual categories. Both Kant and the Samkhya hold that knowledge is caused by the joint action of the senses and the internal organ presided over by the intellect. Paraphrasing the analysis of the Samkhya, it can be said that "Our eyes are only the external instruments of perception. They are not the organ of vision. The organ of vision is a centre situated in the brain. So is the case with all the senses.

The mind is connected with the senses, the senses with the corresponding centres in the brain and these centres with the physical organs in the direction of the external object. The mind presents the sensation to the ego and the intellect (Bu*d*dhi); the intellect takes it to the Self (*Purusha*) which is pure Spirit and is immaterial. Now real perception takes place. "The Purusha gives orders back to the motor centres or organs of action for execution through the intellect, ego and the mind".

According to the Samkhya theory of knowledge, the validity or the invalidity of knowledge is self-evident and does not stand in need of any external conditions. These characters are inherent in the nature of knowledge itself. In perception there is first the illumination of the mind by the

Consciousness, then the activation of the senses by the mind, and thirdly the contact of the senses with the external object. In order that perception may be right and not erroneous, there should be no defect either in the operation of the mind, the activity of the senses or the manner of the location of the object. The presence of the current of an unceasing consciousness linking up these different elements contributing to perception makes perception possible.

You may have head often: "Everything is in the mind". This is because the mind assumes the shape of any object it intensely thinks upon. When you pass through a mango garden, a ray of the mind comes out through the eye and envelops the mango. It assumes the shape of the mango. The ray is termed a *Vritti*. The enveloping process is called *Vritti-vyapti*. The function of a Vritti is to remove the *Avarana* (veil) that envelops the object and the *Upahita-chaitanya* (consciousness defined by an adjunct). The veil that envelops the mango is removed by the *Vritti* or the mental ray. There is *Chaitanya* (consciousness) associated with the Vritti. This *Chaitanya* illuminates the object 'mango.' This result is termed *Phala-vyapti*. Just as a torch-light illuminates an object in a flash, this Vritti-*chaitanya* (consciousness conditioned by the mental mode) illumines the object. Only then does perception of the mango take place". "According to the Advaita theory of perception, it is the *Chaitanya* within us that makes perception possible. The *Chetana* (intelligence) within us unites with the *Chetana* (intelligence) in the object, and the result is perception. It does not follow from this that the mind and the senses are useless,…..for they serve the purpose of determining the special object of each sense.

"Knowledge comes through contact of the senses with objects. The objects come in contact with the senses. The senses are linked to the mind. The mind is connected to the Atman. The Atman illumines these" "The mind is formed out of the Sattvika portion of the five Tanmatras (subtle rudimentary principles out of which the gross elements are formed). There is light outside. The sun also emits light. The eye is made up of Agni-Tattva (fire-principle). That portion of the mind which perceives (through the eyes) is also made up of this fire-principle. So fire sees fire. Only that portion of the mind which is made up of Sabda-Tanmatra (the subtle principle of sound) can hear. Sound comes from Akasa (ether) outside. So the Akasa in the mind hears the Akasa from outside. But the Atman can see, hear, taste and feel everything. The Atman alone can be seen by the Atman. Therefore, whatever we see outside is only the "Atman" The consciousness of the oneness of the object and the subject can arise only in the realisation of the Atman.Sense-perception is thus the consciousness of an identity in difference, a perception of the object as different from the subject, together with the consciousness of its relation to the subject by way of a mysterious uniting link. This identity-consciousness owes its existence to the universal Self, and the difference-consciousness is caused by its being modalised, restricted and reflected in the Vritti of the Antahkarana.

"Perception through the finite mind or cognition or experience takes place serially and not simultaneously". Simultaneous knowledge can be had only in Nirvikalpa Samadhi where past and future merge in the present. Only a Yogi will have simultaneous knowledge. A man of the world with a finite mind can have only a knowledge in succession. Though several objects may come in contact simultaneously with the different sense-organs, yet the mind acts like a gate-keeper which can admit only one person at a time through the gate. The mind can send only one kind of sensation at a time into the mental factory for the manufacture of a decent percept and a nice concept.

What we call correct perception is no doubt valid for all practical purposes in life, as it corresponds to facts that can be verified by observation, coheres with the perceptions of the

different senses and with the experiences of other people, and also as it is seen to lead one to successful activity and therefore to possess the character of practical efficiency.

2.8 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have described the philosophical understanding of the mind and body, in terms of scholastic western philosophy which they called as body and soul. The brief understanding of the Indian views is also presented.

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UNIT 3 MIND AND BODY IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Contents

3.0 OBJECTIVES

The objective of the unit is to introduce to the students a basic understanding of the mind- body problem in the modern Western Philosophy. Here the nature of reality from two viewpoints – monism and dualism has been talked about. The interrelation between mind and body and the various theories regarding the interaction between the two have been dealt with. Also a brief look at the standpoint of various modern philosophers on this particular issue has also been discussed.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The surprise and confusion regarding the nature of man has baffled philosophers of all ages. The world seemed full of contradictions. The mind and body did not seem to be one and the same substance or properties of one. A dualistic stand was there even in the earliest philosophical traditions. In the Cartesian philosophy, this distinction became so systematic that its effects got so rooted into various aspects of human life and thinking. Problem of understanding reality as two had its own problems. Though the interaction between the two seemed quite natural to common sense but to state it in a solid theory, it became difficult. There were other theorists who with equal conviction argued that there were not two different substances but the world was full of properties and appearances of the one and the same reality. The modern period of western thought was in fact preoccupied with the debates on the nature of reality and understanding the relation between both mind and matter.

3.2 UP TO DESCARTES

The mind-body problem, i.e. how the mind and the body are interrelated, is commonly seen as the most centric problem in the philosophy of mind. The other relevant issues discussed in the philosophy of mind are about the nature of the mind and it may not be much concerned about the nature of the physical body. Throughout history, be it in philosophy, religion or myth, there have been representations of a separation between the corporeal and spiritual and prominence have always been given to mind or the spiritual. It has been considered more enduring, efficacious and valued.

For long, in the history of philosophy, the mind body problem did not exist with such a severe dichotomy as happened in the modern period. The reigning mode of explanation sorted out reality and causality along quite different lines or, rather, without the sort of lines associated with a sharp dichotomy between the mental and the physical. Neither was there any serious difference between ideas of causality, of what is ultimately real, and how we can know with certainty - ontology and epistemology respectively. These concerns were all rather neatly integrated in to an Aristotelian, organismic framework of things. But during the renaissance, the group of causes started drifting towards two poles, putting this framework under strain. The material and efficient causes were drifting towards one pole and the formal and final ones towards another. Though we do not take them to be extremes in a mind-body dichotomy, yet, along with concepts like substantial form or pre-Aristotelian understanding of matter must have given rise to the problems that we saw in the modern world.

If we try to locate the beginning of the problem of mind-body dualism, as we understand it today, it would be doubtlessly in the writings of Rene Descartes. We find the full-blown paradox of the mind-body dichotomy in the Cartesian writings. In thinking, his method of radical doubt reaches a single certainty. A class of existence gets derived as the thinking substances. Mind was being put forward as a self-contained sphere of enquiry. This pole of the dualism was linked to an equally strongly-held belief that causality in the material world is based on matter in motion, 'extended substances', obeying their own material laws. Introspection became the basis of certainty, while scientific knowledge of the external world depended on the laws of matter and motion. These two bases for knowing introduced two closely-linked chasms in modern thought: the gap between mind and body in Ontology and the gap between the subject and the object in epistemology. Matter was considered something that was available for dealing in mathematical terms and to experimental method. Hence came the notion that what science deals with should be in terms of bodies having extension and shape. Similarly the non-extendable substance was understood in the negative, something that could not be treated mathematically and experimentally.

3.3 TWO APPROACHES: MONISM AND DUALISM

Dualism and monism are two important approaches taken to account when trying to solve the mind body problem.

Monism

Monism comes from the Greek word *monas,* meaning *one.* Monism is the strong argument that the mind and body are not ontologically distinct entities. This was first advocated by Parmenides

in the West and then in the seventeenth century, this stream of thought was further taken to greater significance by Baruch Spinoza. There are three strands of thought under this mode of thought. The physicalists claim that entities postulated by physical theories exist and the mind and its properties will be explained eventually as the physical theories evolve further. Idealists maintain that the mind is all that there is and the external world is either the mind itself or only an illusion created by the mind. And the neutral theorists maintain that there is some other neutral substance and both mind and matter are but two different properties of the same.

As we understand monism, it responds to the mind body problem stating that there are no two distinct substances. It would go on to mean that in fact there is only body or mind. These thoughts are contrary and the consequences of the two are quite distinct. We will look at some of the further explanations of the monistic thought.

Physicalism

To state in quite general terms, the theory proposes that everything is *physical*. The contemporary philosophers state the same as that everything supervenes on, or is necessiated by, the physical. The actual world, the universe and everything in it, conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. Physicalists but never deny that there are many items in the world that do not appear physical in the first glance like the items of biological, or psychological, or moral, or social. But they hold on to the view that in the ultimate case, these items turn out to be either physical or supervene on the physical.

It is important to understand the concept of supervenience here. It is a central notion in analytic philosophy and claims that aesthetic, moral and mental properties supervene upon physical properties. If we consider two pictures on a computer screen, composed of pixels, we can say that the pictures supervene on the pixels. Or if we were to analyse closely a painting, going closer to it, we no longer see the painting but the brush strokes. Then we could say that the painting depends on the brushstrokes, but is not identical with them – the painting supervenes on them. Here we may have two possible theories: reductive and non-reductive. The reductive theorists might say that every mental concept can be reduced, somehow or other, to a physical concept and the non-deductive theorists might say that instead of trying to reduce the mental to the physical, the mental supervenes on the physical, as we saw above. It is a hope based enterprise that as science progresses, physics and neuroscience may be able to explain everything that is there.

Identity Theory

The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. For example, if we feel pain somewhere in the body, then it is equal to say that the appropriate activity is going on in the brain, and if we feel love for someone, then it is another state in the brain. It may not be that the mind is identical to the brain. To ask, when we experience something green, does it mean that the brain state is green too, does not make much sense. Mind and brain remain a matter of identifying processes. The identity theory of mind is to the effect that these experiences just *are* brain processes, and not merely *correlated with* brain processes.

Functionalism

It is a questioning as to “how” rather than “what”. It is to wonder what the *function* of the mind is, or how the mind works, and to distinguish it from the body by saying that this function is different from those performed by the body. According to functionalism that which makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. It is a philosophical thesis about the nature of mental states. According to these theorists, mental states can be identified with the function they have on behaviour. Instead of questioning about what a mental state *is*, i.e. what it's composed of, or where it is, we call it *mental* because of what it does. The fact may be that we identify different bridges by the same concept for the function they do though they may be different in size, shape and strength.

Eliminativism

Eliminative materialism or eliminativism is the radical claim that many of our common sense understanding about the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist. The theorists claim that folk psychology, our ordinary common-sense understanding of the mind is hopelessly flawed and will eventually be replaced or eliminated by an alternative. This is usually taken to be an accomplishment that will be made by neuroscience, the study of the brain and nervous system. Eliminative materialism dates back to the 1960s and perhaps earlier. Descartes famously challenged much of what we take for granted, but he insisted that, for the most part, we can be confident about the content of our own minds. Eliminative materialists go further than Descartes on this point, since they challenge the existence of various mental states that Descartes took for granted. They might agree that folk psychology "works" to a certain satisfaction, but claim it will be replaced. For instance, the existence of malevolent spirits was invoked to explain some mental disorders in the past, but now we say that this account has given way to psychological and other explanations. Thus we generally note that malevolent spirits turned out to be not real after all. In a similar way, notes the eliminativist, the folk psychologist's theories will give way soon as mental states do not exist.

Idealism

Idealism offers an explanation to the reality or human experience in which ideas or spiritual, non-materialistic elements are central. The most famous idealist, perhaps, was George Berkley. This theory considerably differs from all the other monistic explanations that we saw before. In idealism the argument is that, instead of all mental concepts being actually physical, whatever be the way, the opposite may be true. Only minds and the mental are true and exist, and the physical should be explained in terms of the mental. Idealism, like any other monistic theory, does not need to explain the problem of mind-body interaction as ultimately there is only one substance.

Monism, particularly physicalism, is not without its share of criticism. We often find that there is something beyond all that is physical. In the famous article “what Mary didn’t know” by Frank Jackson a situation is presented. Herein Mary is given all possible information about colour, though she has never seen any colour for herself. Her world is in black and white. The day she is out in front of something red, she comes to know about the colour red that was not available to her before. From the two claims from this situation, i.e. 1. Mary had all the information about the physical before she was released and that 2. Mary learned some new information after she was released, we may come to conclude that after all everything may not be physical.

Dualism

The history of dualism could be traced as back as to Plato and Aristotle. But until in the seventeenth century, it was not precisely formulated and presented. This systematization we see happening in the writings of Rene Descartes. In philosophy of mind, dualism is considered to be any of those views about the relationship between mind and matter, which goes on to claim that the two are ontologically different and separate categories. Dualists are strong in claiming that neither mind nor matter could be reduced to the other. There are different kinds of dualistic theories and grades corresponding to the extremity of their claims.

The predicate dualists claim that there should be more than one predicate to make sense of the world. It is to ask if everything could be reduced to the physical. Suppose, one has to say that he/she is happy, can the experience of being happy be reduced to a physical predicate, such as one explaining it in terms of the brain states? If we cannot do that, then it means we need more than a single predicate to explain about the world. Almost all the psychological experiences may point to dualism this way. The arguments of the property dualists are stronger. The property dualists would argue that the two may not be substantially different but the mental and physical properties are categorically distinct and not reducible to each other. This is commonly called as mind and matter and is in opposition to monism which tends to treat both mind and matter as ultimately the same thing. They claim that whatever there *is* in the world, it must have more than one property, such as the property of being physical. It proposes that, although the world is constituted of just one kind of substance - the physical kind – there exist two distinct types of properties: The physical properties and the mental properties. To say it differently, it is the claim that non-physical, mental properties such as beliefs, desires and emotions inhere in some physical substances, such as in the brains.

Another kind of dualism, substance dualism, claims that there are just different types of substances, not just predicates or properties. Here substance is understood as something more than the collection of the properties it possesses; it is *the thing which* possesses them. So the mind is not just a collection of thoughts, but is *that which* thinks, *that which has them*, an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states. The substance dualists argue that the mind is an independent substance and the property dualists argue that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain.

3.4 TOWARDS A SOLUTION - THE PROBLEM OF INTERACTION

Every other philosopher has something to say about the mind body problem and there does not seem to be a conclusive theory yet. Thinkers even today face the hard problem of consciousness, i.e. how the physical neural properties give rise to the mental faculties. How body and the mind interact with each other? How do thoughts cause actions or how do unconscious fantasies cause psychosomatic illnesses? How do thoughts impact on particles of matter and how do material impacts cause thoughts? Why do we have any experience at all, especially the experience of other minds? The problem of mind and matter influencing each other has been one of great magnitude. There have been many theories proposed to explain the same. Considering the claims

of dualism, we will look at certain solutions proposed to the problem of mind – body interaction and see how far they are viable.

Interactionism

If the mind and body were distinct, how do they interact. It seems there is some interaction between the two. Descartes gave interactionism its classical formulation. In the Cartesian philosophy, the theorists who propose an interaction between the mind and body hold that the two, though separate and distinct substances, casually interact with each other. They assert that a mental event can be the cause of a physical event and the physical event as that of a mental event. It means that there are two types of events, physical and mental, either of which can cause the other. For example, a pin-prick causes pain and the pain causes screaming. The dualist position according to this view go on to show the existence of two substances, body and mind, where physical events take place in the one and mental events in the other, while the two series of events can interact causally. Though Descartes could give no satisfactory account of the how the interaction takes place, he suggested that the pineal gland deep within the brain was the place to look for a possible explanation.

Epiphenomenalism

While Cartesian dualism argues that there is a two way interaction between the mind and body, all dualists do not hold on to the same view. Epiphenomenalism holds the view that the interaction is one sided. They argue that the mental events are caused by – or are a by-product of the physical events and it does not work the other way round. It is a one-way process. There is a denial of the interaction of the mental to the physical. One of the common analogies used to show the effect is that of the smoke rising from a factory. The smoke is a by product of the factory's running, whereas it actually does not cause the running of the factory. This theory holds the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but they have no effects upon any physical events. They claim that the mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley, who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of a locomotive.

Occasionalism

occasionalism is a philosophical theory about causation. It says that the created substances cannot be efficient causes. But all the events are taken to be caused directly by God. Following Descartes' death, some philosophers like Malebranche tried to address the problem of interaction. Holding on to a dualistic view, he suggested that neither body nor mind was causally related, but the two were in fact connected by divine interaction. On every occasion in which an interaction occurred, the intervention of God was required to explain it. So, whenever we wish to lift an arm God must intervene to cause the body to obey and similarly, whenever the body feels pain, God must allow that sensation to occur in the mind. The theory states that the illusion of the efficient causation between mundane events arises out of God's causing of one event after another. However there is no necessary connection between the two. It is not the first event causes God to cause the second event. Rather, God causes one and then the other. Occasionalism

is considered to be a rather odd viewpoint that seems unable to exist outside of a theological setup.

Parallelism

Parallelism is the view that mental and physical phenomena occur in parallel but that these simultaneities never involve causal interactions. They accept that the mind-body interaction is deeply problematic and there is no direct causal link between the two. The mind does not affect the body and the body does not affect the mind. This solution was proposed by Leibniz, but did not have much relevance outside the theological perspective. He argued that some kind of pre-established harmony between the two makes it look like having mutual interaction, but it is nothing but a coincidence. He claimed that no interaction or causation was necessary because like, the two clocks that keep the same time, behaviour of the two substances has been synchronized. Parallelism claims that though there is a correlation between the two, there is no causal interaction between the mental and the physical. Body and mind do not interact with each other but simply run alongside one another, in parallel. It is like saying that the event of burning one's finger and the feeling of pain happen to occur simultaneously but one does not cause the other. Hence it is a difficult position to hold. It does not account for the interaction that we experience in everyday life. To hold that there are two substances and there are obvious changes simultaneously in both without any causal relation seems counterintuitive.

3.5 SOME MODERNS THINKERS

Descartes

Descartes is famous and is celebrated for his position on the nature of mind and body. But he is not the inventor of the problem of mind-body interaction. A dualistic stand on reality could be traced back to the works of Plato. The concept of an immaterial soul that survived death was common to many of the early Christian thinkers. But what made Descartes famous was his method of approaching the point and the arguments that he forwarded in favor of the same.

Descartes claimed in the *Discourse* that the mind-body distinction directly followed from the cogito argument. Descartes claimed that mind could survive without the body and as per the definition of substance, 'nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence', falls in to this category. For Descartes, the substance in particular has attributes as well. Mind has thought as its property and extension is that of the matter. Mind and body were considered separate by Descartes, as the two, he believed could exist independently. The distinction is made based on their completely different nature. In the *second meditation*, Descartes argues that he is nothing but a thinking thing or being and it makes no sense to ascribe such modes to entirely extended and thoughtless things in the world. And also it is senseless to ascribe the properties of shape, weight or motion to the thinking, non-extended beings. Though, he opines, in this world the two cannot be entirely separate, he failed to provide a satisfactory answer to how the two interacted.

Spinoza

Baruch Spinoza, a monist, does not hold on to the view that man is a combination of two substances. Mind and body are nothing but two expressions of one and the same thing – under

thought and extension. Hence the mind-body problem, the question of the interaction between the two does not arise. According to him, there is a corresponding idea to every extended body and the vice versa. Just as the attribute of extension is the totality of extended things, so the attribute of thought is the totality of ideas. Hence mind and body are just two ways of considering one thing and in themselves they are not two distinct substances. Since his system did not take two separate things in to account, there was no question of interaction between the bodily and mental events. They do not cause each other, but he believed, that they *are all caused* as the universe is a deterministic system.

Descartes had the problem of deciding whether sensations were modes of matter or of mind, and he never came to a clear decision on the issue. On the one hand, they seem to be part of our stream of consciousness; on the other hand, they are extended, which means that they must belong to the brain. As far as Spinoza is considered, there was no such problem of thinking if the sensations were modes of matter or mind, since a single thing could be *both* extended *and* thinking.

John Locke

According to John Locke, there was an error in our thinking about the issue of mind and body. Locke's agnosticism could be understood as a warning not to confuse human point of view with what reality is. There may not be a problem in fact, Locke believes. It was an error of confusing nominality with reality – it was not a real problem but a nominal one.

Both Descartes and Locke make a distinction between the body and mind and both explain identity in terms of thinking. Locke here considers the persisting thought unlike Descartes who considers thought at a given moment. Locke, in contrast to Descartes who says that the self is but the thinking being alone, goes on to argue that the self is both the soul and the body. Locke thinks that soul and body are separate, but related. He does not seem to be making a sharp, substantial difference between the two. He does not agree that 'essence consists solely in the fact that he is a thinking being'. He does not give much of an importance to thinking at a given moment, but takes into account memory and thought as a persistent stream of happening.

Hume

Hume seems committed to the existence of two different kinds of events – mental and physical. But he does not ascribe them to different substances. He considers thus mind to be no more than a collection of perceptions and body, a collection of sensible qualities. Hume appears to be advocating a dualistic distinction between objects that belong to fundamentally different categories – those that are spatially located and those that are not. Hume rejects both materialism and immaterialism as rival forms of substance theory. But he equally rejects the alternative proposal by Spinoza, who thought there was a substance that is neither material nor immaterial but something to which both thought and extension belonged.

For Hume, both mind and body are important. Hume's idea that the mind is a collection of perceptions emerges clearly in the *Treatise*, where he elaborates on the bundle theory of mind by comparing it to a theater where perceptions appear and reappear. Central to his thought is the body as well. He considers a person to be embodied consciousness. He defends the idea that

one's body is essential to one's identity. He also takes to the view that our thoughts and perceptions have material causes. All mental events have physical causes, and this idea is reflected in his treatment of both impressions and sensations. Ideas too have a bodily foundation as they are associated in a way that depends on corresponding traces in the brain. He also holds on to the view that some mental events give rise to physiological or physical changes too.

Berkeley

George Berkeley is a monist who believes in the existence of the mind alone. In the pursuit for certainty, to avoid skepticism, Berkeley adopts Descartes' 'cogito'. Instead of the word 'matter', he uses the term, 'sensible things'. He defines it as a collection of sensible qualities which are immediately perceived. He argues that that the sensible properties are property of the mind and not objects. Thus, he claims, there cannot be any thing independent of mind.

Berkeley does not accept two different notions of properties like Descartes. When examining his perception of things, Berkeley claims that whatever information he has are all secondary properties, which are functions of his mind. He, thus, rejects the existence of primary qualities. Hence the existence of physical world as a substance is rejected as well. To him, mind alone is the one and only substance and reduces matter to nothing but mere noise. He, like Descartes, brings in the concept of God as the cause of our ideas, the only possible cause of all ideas. And he claims that the sensible things do not vanish once no one perceives them though 'being is to be perceived'. The collection of sensible things is always there in God's mind and they do not cease to exist when some one does not perceive them.

3.6 LET US SUM UP

The approaches to reality have been many. Some have taken it as appearances or properties of one and the same substance, whereas, some believed there to be substantially different things. Mind and body problem is a phase in this understanding of reality. The monists faced the problem of explaining how the one appeared to be two contrary things and the dualists faced the task of explaining how two different substances are causally related. The modern western philosophers were all deep occupied with the nature of the physical and the mental and the relation between the two. Both the theories of monism and dualism were briefly looked at in the chapter. Also the views of a few modern thinkers were taken into consideration to see how different thinkers tried solving the issue, with or without the need of God.

3.7 KEY WORDS

Supervenience - It is a central notion in the analytic philosophy and claims that aesthetic, moral and mental properties supervene upon physical properties.

Eliminativism – It is a theory that folk psychology, our ordinary common-sense understanding of the mind is hopelessly flawed and will eventually be replaced or eliminated by an alternative better explanation of the physical world.

Parallelism – It is the view that mental and physical phenomena occur in parallel but that these simultaneities never involve causal interactions.

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UNIT 4 MIND AND BODY IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

Contents

4.0 OBJECTIVES

- To introduce the students to the complex notion of mind-body relationship and see its significance for our self-understanding.
- To make a survey of the various contemporary positions on this complex issue.
- To relate the mind-body problem to the contemporary phenomenological understanding of "lived body" and thus to appreciate the body as profoundly more than material.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The unit surveys the seven metaphysical strategies in understanding the mind in contemporary philosophy. A brief evaluation of the different positions in contemporary philosophy is taken. Then we ask if the mind-body problem is a false problem which should be "dissolved away". Finally, we take up the continental tradition and see the significance of "lived body" there. Here the body is taken much more seriously and not apart from the mind.

4.2 THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: CONTEMPORARY DEBATE

The mind–body problem is the problem of giving an account of how minds are related to bodies, or how mental states and processes are related to bodily states and processes. That they are intimately related seems beyond doubt, and has not been seriously disputed. Evidently, our perceptual experiences depend on the way external physical stimuli impinge on our sensory surfaces, and, ultimately, on the processes going on in the brain; our desire for a drink of water somehow causes our body to move in the direction of the water-cooler; a bruised elbow causes me pain when it is touched, and the pain in turn causes me to groan and wince; and so on. But how do conscious experiences emerge out of the electrochemical processes in a grey mass of neural fibres? How do our beliefs and desires manage to get the appropriate neurons to fire and thereby cause the right muscles to contract? Schopenhauer called the mind–body problem 'the world knot', a puzzle that is beyond our capacity to solve (Kim 2011).

The mind–body problem as it is now debated, like much else in contemporary philosophy of mind, has been inherited from Descartes. Descartes conceived of the mind as an entity in its own right, a ‘mental substance’, the essential nature of which is ‘thinking’, or consciousness. In contrast, the defining nature of material bodies, or material substances, was claimed to be spatial extendedness—that is, having a bulk in physical space. Thus, Descartes envisaged two disjoint domains of entities, one consisting of immaterial minds with their mental properties (e.g. thinking, willing, feeling) and the other of material bodies with their physical properties (e.g. size, shape, mass, motion). For Descartes, not only did minds lack spatial extension; they were not in physical space at all. However, the two domains are not to be entirely unconnected: a mind and a body can form a ‘union’, resulting in a human being. Although the nature of this ‘union’ relationship was never made completely clear, (Descartes claimed it to be a primitive notion that is intelligible in its own right), it evidently involved the idea that a mind and a body joined in such a union are involved in intimate and direct causal interaction with each other.

Thus, Descartes's mind–body doctrine combines substance dualism, i.e. a dualism of mind and body, each conceived as an independent substance, with the idea that there is causal interaction between the two. Many of his contemporaries, like Leibniz and Malebranche, were substance dualists, but they rejected the idea of mind–body causal interaction. They found it difficult to make sense of the idea that immaterial minds with neither extension nor mass, and not even in physical space, could somehow move material bodies with mass and inertia. Substance dualism, however, has largely dropped out of contemporary discussions, although it has by no means disappeared; few philosophers now find the idea of minds as immaterial substances coherent or fruitful.

There has been a near consensus, one that has held over almost a century, that the world is essentially physical, at least in the following sense: all that exists in the space-time world are bits of matter and complex structures aggregated out of bits of matter, and the space-time world is the whole world. If all matter were to be removed from this world, nothing would remain—no minds, no ‘entelechies’, no ‘vital forces’, and not even an empty space-time. According to this physical monism (or ‘ontological physicalism’), mental states and processes are to be understood as states and processes occurring in certain complex physical systems, such as advanced biological organisms, not as states of some ghostly immaterial beings. This means that the principal remaining project for contemporary discussions of the mind–body problem is that of explaining how the mental character of an organism or system is related to its physical nature (Kim 2011).

Recently, the Schopenhauerian pessimism has been resurrected by some philosophers, who argue that the mind–body problem is insoluble, and that we will never be able to understand how consciousness, subjectivity, and intentionality can arise from material processes. In any case, one thing that is certain is that the mind–body problem is one of the deepest puzzles in contemporary philosophy, and that it will continue to test our philosophical intelligence and imagination (Kim 2011).

4.3 DIFFERENT POSITIONS ON MIND AND BODY

Each and every culture has its peculiar views about what the soul or the mind is, where is it "seated", what is it made of, and how does it function. Contemporary debates reflect in many respects the distinction between mind and body made by the early modern philosopher Rene Descartes. Descartes has bequeathed to the next generations of philosophers the very language in which we often talk about minds and bodies. This language, according to the English analytic philosopher G. Ryle has prevented philosophy and psychology from a satisfactory solution of the problems that arise from the mind-body dichotomy (Karageorgiev 2008).

Moreover, the Cartesian language speaks about minds with the same words used to speak about bodies: as if our thoughts, desires, and beliefs are 'things" or substances on a par with tables, chairs, and houses. This is a category mistake G. Ryle which makes the mind look as something impossible to catch, 'a ghost in the machine' G. Ryle of the human body. Many contemporary philosophers and scientists object to ghosts of whatever kind and their debate with adherents of Cartesianism has gave birth to the three major strategies in the metaphysics of mind: dualism, reductionism, and eliminativism.

In what follows we will take up the major features of these strategies in comparison to each other. Then we will sketch the explanatory approaches which supervene the metaphysical strategies – functionalism (dualistic and reductionistic), connectionism(eliminativistic), and the emerging view of the so called dynamic systems theory.

Dualism

Modern dualism has been stated most clearly by Descartes, who insists: 'The rational soul could not be in any way extracted from the power of matter but must be expressly created." More recently, the Austrian philosopher F. Brentano replaces the soul with the phenomenon of intentionality and turns it into the most important and un-eliminable feature. Of consciousness: 'the reference to something as an object is a distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything similar." This has become known as 'Brentano's thesis' and many contemporary dualists like Thomas Nagel accept it. What dualism – beside superstition, religious belief in angels and immortal souls, and other historical roots – amounts to, is that mind is a 'brute metaphysical fact' which cannot be explained in non-mental terms like physical or biological ones. Nagel adds that mind could be never known in the way we know material things, i.e. from an objective perspective. We will never be able to understand what it's like to be a bat, because 'some things can be known only from the inside' (Karageorgiev 2008).

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What is basically the mind-body problem?

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....
....

2) What is Brentano's thesis?

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....
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Reductionism

Not all philosophers agree with Nagel. Some raise the question whether any phenomenon can be known in some other way different from the first person perspective, insofar as we cognise ultimately as persons, not from an objective perspective as e.g. telescopes or thermometers. These philosophers believe that mental phenomena can ultimately be explained -in one way or another - as physical phenomena. It is a matter of scientific development and philosophical analysis of mental concepts like 'mind', 'belief', or 'hope' to achieve such explanation. This doesn't mean that belief is a physical thing. It means that the word 'belief' refers to something in our lives that can also be referred to by non-mental terms like 'propositional representation that leads to a certain movement, e.g. avoiding negative stimuli'. By analogy, when chemists speak of H_2O, i.e. when they have reduced 'water' to 'H_2O' it doesn't mean that water doesn't exist. Dualists claim that no proper reduction of the mental to the physical is possible, while some philosophers take the reduction to be actually elimination: not of the term by which we refer to the mind and its derivatives, but of the very thing itself. They are called eliminativists.

Eliminativism

Eliminativism holds that our commitment to different mental states is nothing more than an outdated folklore, and that it is certain to be superseded by a more scientific understanding of our nature. Thus, the standard eliminativist argument begins with the assumption that vernacular ('folk') psychology—in particular, the psychology of beliefs, desires, and other 'propositional attitudes'—is infested with massive and irremediable systemic errors and gaps, and concludes that it will be made obsolete as the scientific—in particular, neuroscientific—understanding of our behaviour continues to advance. Beliefs and desires will ultimately meet the fate that befell phlogiston and magnetic effluvia, the forgotten posits of discarded theories. This eliminativist argument is sometimes advanced against intentional psychology countenancing cognitive states that are analogous to propositional attitudes of vernacular psychology(Kim 2011).

Eliminativists propose that we may go on using the mental vernacular (words like 'depression', 'soul' or 'hope') in everyday communication, but such a language must be abandoned in science. This is similar to the situation in which we speak in everyday situations about sunsets and sunrises, although we know from physics that the sun does neither set, nor rise.

Functionalism

It is the approach which dominates contemporary research in not only philosophy of mind, but in the emerging interdisciplinary enterprise called cognitive science. The latter coordinates the efforts of philosophers, psychologists, linguists, artificial intelligence theorists, neuroscientists, and anthropologists to understand the nature of mind. Functionalism is arguably the most influential position on the mind–body relation during the past four decades. Functionalism conceives of mental kinds as 'functional kinds', not physical kinds. Pain, for example, is to be understood in terms of its function as a causal intermediary between sensory input (e.g. tissue damage), behaviour output (e.g. wincing, groaning, and escape behaviour), and other mental states (e.g. desire to be rid of it). An internal state of an organism that serves this function, which can vary from species to species (and perhaps from individual to individual), is said to be a 'realizer' of pain. Most functionalists are physicalists in that they hold that only appropriate physical states could serve as realizers of mental states functionally conceived. But they differ from type-physicalists in holding that, on account of their variable realizability, mental states

cannot be identified with physical–biological states. Functionalism construes psychology as an autonomous science of these functional properties and kinds, specified in terms of their causal roles and abstracted from their specific physical-biological realizations. This view of psychology has been influential; it can be considered the received view of the nature of cognitive science. The question whether or not functionalism is a non-reductive form of physicalism depends crucially on exactly what physical reduction requires, and it must be considered an open question. (Kim 2011)

Computationalism

Computational version of functionalism has been established due to the works of the English mathematician Allan Turing in 1940. The basic idea of his Turing Machine is that operations in the neurons which either fire an impulse or don't, can be represented as digital units, say of 1s and 0s. Performing computations on such symbols, a purely mechanical device can add 3 to 2 and get as a result 5, which is correct. More complex operations can be digitalized and implemented in a Universal Turing Machine, so we can say that mind is similar to a computer in that minds process information by the same rules as computers. This view has become known as the computer metaphor of the mind. However, there remains the broad and difficult question how those representations are being embodied in the nervous system of organisms (Karageorgiev 2008).

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) Briefly explain the "most influential position on the mind-body relation"?

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....
....

2) What is computationalism?

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Connectionism

Symbolic representation which we encounter in language does not seem possible for embodiment by the neurons which die too often to be able to use their growth or metabolic changes as a means for encoding information. Therefore connectionism evoked the concept of neural networks which implement in their sustainable patterns of activation memory and knowledge, even conceptual knowledge. Neural networks are being modeled in computers, and quite successfully – robots which keep balance when kicked by the experimentator are constructed on this basis. 'Connectionism can be distinguished from the traditional symbolic paradigm by the fact that it does not construe cognition as involving symbol manipulation. It offers a radically different conception of the basic processing system of the mind/brain. This conception is inspired by our knowledge of the nervous system. The basic idea is that there is a network of elementary units or nodes, each of which has some degree of activation. These units are connected to each other so that active units excite or inhibit other units. The network is a dynamical system which, once supplied with initial input, spreads excitations and inhibitions

among its units. In some types of networks this process does not stop until a stable state is achieved.'

According to connectionism, representation in the mind is distributed among neurons that form a network, so that if an individual neuron die, the pattern of activation persists as far as a new neuron joins the network to carry on the function of the dead one. You can see that connectionism is a variation of the functionalist approach. It is called also 'the brain metaphor of the mind.'(Karageorgiev 2008).

4.4 MIND-BODY PROBLEM AS CATEGORY ERROR

Each attempt to answer the mind-body problem encounters substantial problems. Some philosophers argue that this is because there is an underlying conceptual confusion. These philosophers, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and his followers in the tradition of linguistic criticism, therefore reject the problem as illusory. They argue that it is an error to ask how mental and biological states fit together. Rather it should simply be accepted that human experience can be described in different ways—for instance, in a mental and in a biological vocabulary. Illusory problems arise if one tries to describe the one in terms of the other's vocabulary or if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts. This is the case, for instance, if one searches for mental states of the brain. The brain is simply the wrong context for the use of mental vocabulary—the search for mental states of the brain is therefore a category error or a sort of fallacy of reasoning (PoM 2011).

Today, such a position is often adopted by interpreters of Wittgenstein such as Peter Hacker. This view is also supported by Hilary Putnam.

4.5 PHYSICAL BODY AND LIVED BODY

In this section, in order to understand mind better, we study some distinct characteristics of body, developed by two phenomenologist thinkers: Merleau-Ponty and Gabriel Marcel. Both have focused on the vulnerability as well as on the uniqueness of human body, seeing it not merely as a "physical body" or material object. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, one of the pioneers of phenomenology, has contributed much to a deeper perception of human body. In Phenomenology of Perception (1945) this French thinker developed a rich variety of phenomenology emphasizing the role of the body in human experience. In his phenomenological approach of the body, Merleau-Ponty looked to experimental psychology, analyzing the reported experience of amputees who felt sensations in a phantom limb. Rejecting associationist psychology, which focused on correlations between sensation and stimulus, as well as intellectualist psychology, which focused on rational construction of the world in the mind, his phenomenological approach focused on the "body image". That is, our experience of our own body and its significance in our activities.

Phenomenologically the "lived body" is my own body as experienced by myself, as myself. My own body manifests itself to me mainly as the possibilities of acting in the world. It is what lets me reach out and grab something, for instance, but it also, and more importantly, allows for the possibility of changing my point of view. This helps me differentiate one thing from another by

the experience of moving around it, seeing new aspects of it (often referred to as making the absent present and the present absent), and still retaining the notion that this is the same thing that I saw other aspects of just a moment ago (it is identical). My body is also experienced as a duality, both as object (I can touch my own hand) and as my own subjectivity (I am being touched).

The experience of your own body as your own subjectivity is then applied to the experience of another's body, which, through apperception, is constituted as another subjectivity. I can thus recognize the Other's intentions, emotions, etc. This experience of empathy is important in the phenomenological account of intersubjectivity. In phenomenology, intersubjectivity is what constitutes objectivity (i.e., what you experience as objective is experienced as being intersubjectively available - available to all other subjects. This does not imply that objectivity is reduced to subjectivity nor does it imply a relativist position, cf. for instance intersubjective verifiability).

In the experience of intersubjectivity, one also experiences oneself as being a subject among other subjects, and one experiences oneself as existing objectively for these Others. Here one experiences oneself as the noema of Others' noeses, or as a subject in another's empathic experience. As such, one experiences oneself as objectively existing subjectivity. Intersubjectivity is also a part in the constitution of one's Lebenswelt, that is, “lifeworld” or "homeworld." (LB 2010)

Extending Husserl's account of the lived body (as opposed to the physical body), Merleau-Pontywent beyond a dualistic or dichotomous approach of mind and body. For the body image is neither in the mental realm nor in the mechanical-physical realm. Rather, “my body is, as it were, me in my engaged action with things I perceive including other people,” according to him. In fact, his phenomenology addressed the role of attention in the phenomenal field, the experience of the body, the spatiality of the body, the motility of the body, the body in sexual being and in speech, other selves, temporality, and the character of freedom so important our human existence. Merleau-Ponty succinctly captures his embodied, existential form of phenomenology, when he asserts: “Insofar as, when I reflect on the essence of subjectivity, I find it bound up with that of the body and that of the world, this is because my existence as subjectivity [= consciousness] is merely one with my existence as a body and with the existence of the world, and because the subject that I am, when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world.” (LB 2010)
In short, consciousness is embodied (in the world), and equally body is infused with consciousness (with cognition of the world). That is the insight one gathers from a phenomenological appreciation of the body (Smith 2008).

Understood thus, we can perceive our body as much more than material. The deeper dimensions of our being may be embedded in the very bodily dimension of ourselves. So we can hope that we will have a deeper understanding of body that will take into consider the lived dimensions of our existence.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What is a "category error"?

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....
....

2) What is the "lived body" phenomenologically?

....
....
....

4.7 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have seen various theories on the relationship between mind and body in today's philosophy, including the assumption that it is a category mistake. We also saw the phenomeonological understanding of the body, that to some extent, eliminates the mind-body dualism.

4.8 KEYWORDS

Brentano's Thesis: The thesis proposed in Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) that it is the intentionality or directedness of mental states that marks off the mental from the physical. In other words: 'It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional'

Category error: It is a semantic or ontological error in which "things of one kind are presented as if they belonged to another." Here a property is ascribed to a thing that could not possibly have that property.

Computationalism: The computational theory of mind is the view that the human mind ought to be conceived as an information processing system and that thought is a form of computation.

Connectionism: Connectionism is a set of approaches in the fields of artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience and philosophy of mind, that models mental or behavioral phenomena as the emergent processes of interconnected networks of simple units.

Eliminativism: This theory holds that our commitment to different mental states is nothing more than an outdated folklore, and that it is certain to be superseded by a more scientific understanding of our nature. Thus, the standard eliminativist argument begins with the premise that vernacular ('folk') psychology is infested with massive and irremediable systemic errors and gaps, and concludes that it will be made obsolete as the scientific understanding of our behaviour continues to advance.

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Philosophy of Mind

Block 3

EXPRESSIONS OF MIND AND BRAIN

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BLOCK INTRODUCTION

In understanding the human mind and brain, philosophers of mind rely on the empirical data that are available such as perception, dreams, emotions and language. Perception is a process of the consciousness of an object. Languages incorporate values and beliefs. Hence perception is fundamental to the process of creating values and beliefs. Philosophers distinguish internalist accounts, which assume that perceptions of objects, and knowledge or beliefs about them, are aspects of an individual's mind, and externalist accounts, which state that they constitute real aspects of the world external to the individual. Anti-realist conceptions include idealism and skepticism. Emotions are conceived by few philosophers as responses to certain sorts of events of concern to a subject, triggering bodily changes and typically motivating characteristic behaviour. Mind and language are closely related; In western philosophical tradition, there has been a general consensus that mind and language are intimately related. In the middle ages, philosophers have started the debate on the ontological primacy of language *vis à vis* consciousness which was reflected in the discussion on the nature of 'universals and particular'. In the Enlightenment, both rationalists and empiricists have explored the nature of idea and given priorities to thought (consciousness) over language. Language is instrumental in expressing the thought. Phenomenologists were more interested to explore the structure and nature of consciousness; how consciousness constitutes the object of knowledge and at the same time how consciousness is constituted by the external objects. Analytical philosophers think that all philosophical problems arise due to misunderstanding of language. One of the major concerns of the Indian philosophical systems has been the relationship between language and reality. Almost in all Indian philosophical systems mind (*manas*) is considered as instrument that is an internal sense organ (*antahkarana*) for knowledge acquisition.

Unit 1 defines and distinguishes sensation and perception. Perception is a process of the consciousness of an object. This phenomena can be expressed with the help of a three-link chain of stimulus perception-coordination-response to the stimulus. It must be remembered that in this three-link chain, the first cortical response is sensation and the second cortical response is perception. In practice, sensation and perception are so closely intermingled that is quite difficult to say when sensation stops and perception begins. We call this process as perception rather than sensation.

Unit 2 deals with function of the mind in dreams. This had been a subject of curiosity and study for long. Scientific approach through Freudian psychoanalysis and the contemporary neurological studies have brought out recent wider understanding of the relationship between mind and the dreams.

Unit 3 helps us understand the concept of emotions, their relationship with mind and brain, and some views of various philosophers on this concept. Human live is full of emotions such as love, happiness, envy, boredom and excitement, and they are central to our identities and our experience of the world. The emotional mind consists of subconscious, unconscious and subconscious components. The unit also brings out the views of various eminent scholars on the concept of mind.

Unit 4 firstly discusses the different philosophical issues pertaining to the interface of mind and language such as intentionality of mind and language, basic structure and function of mind and

language, priority of language and mind, necessity and contingency in language from western perspective. Secondly, it analyses debates concerning the relationship of language and consciousness among Grammarian, Mimamsa and Buddhism in Classical Indian tradition.

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UNIT 1 MIND AND PERCEPTION

Contents

1.0 OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit, you should be able to

- define sensation and perception
- describe the sensory process which is common to all sensory channels
- describe how sensation develops into perception
- distinguish between sensation and perception
- interpret the scientific concept of perception
- tell and explain the philosophy of perception
- identify and describe the categories of perception
- describe the western and eastern views on perception
- distinguish between various theories of perception

Perception is a process of the consciousness of an object. It is one of the means of valid knowledge in the world and consists in an inseparable relation of the perceptive consciousness with its content. The objects that are seen in the world are considered by the human beings to be existing outside their body and the senses. Humans feel that the objects are reflected, as it were, in their mind in perception. Is it not true that both in the waking states and dream states, our life pivots around perception? Just ponder on this - If we did not possess perceptual ability, could language ever have been invented? Languages incorporate values and beliefs. Hence perception is fundamental to the process of creating values and beliefs. Even the person who is born blind learns their values and beliefs from visually-sighted family members.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

How do you get knowledge about yourself and the world around you? Surely, your answer would be: through the functioning of our sense organs. Yes, we see hear, taste and smell the things around us through our sense organs. The impressions received by our brain through are sense organs are called as 'sensations'. Right from the time we are born, we start feeling our world through our sense organs. The sensations felt by us from the time we are born keep getting modified. Let us take a simple experience –say, a child is shown an orange and then asked to feel it and finally eat it. The act of seeing, feeling and tasting the orange are sensations which enable

the child not only to concretize the object, but also to associate all these experiences with each other in terms of the colour, taste and smell of orange whenever this fruit is actually shown or even when its name is mentioned. As the child grows in age, more learning experiences would be added about the object orange. As an example, information that orange belongs to the citrus family to which other fruits like lime and lemon also belong may be added. What are the beneficial properties of citrus fruits may also be learnt later. In other words, all the previous experiences of an orange will modify with time and the sensations, too, associated with it get transformed with time. Addition of other experiences to the basic *sensations* of color, taste and smell with time about the object ORANGE is termed as *perception*.

Let us now examine the nature of sensation and perception. Sensation is the most elementary process of cognition. Sense organs are deemed to be the "windows of the soul" or simply put as the "gateways of knowledge". Sensation comes to consciousness by way of special sense organs. Sensation is a reaction aroused in us by *stimulus.* A sensation is an act of a sense organ which, when stimulated, sends nerve currents (impulses) to the sensory centers in the brain and the first response of the brain is a sensation.

Sensation is the simplest mental process and cannot be reduced further to simpler ingredients or parts. Pure sensation is almost impossible. Practically speaking, an adult can never experience a pure sensation. Why? This is because as soon as we feel a sensation – we consciously or unconsciously try to attach a meaning to it, which is generally based on our experiences. When we were infants, as our experiences were fragmentary and mostly impulsive, the sensations felt then can best be termed as *elementary sensations*. Scientifically speaking, five different type of sensations corresponding to the five sense organs i. e, seeing (visual), hearing (auditory),smelling (olfactory), touching and tasting can be differentiated. Touches, sensations can be further classified into three separate types-heat, cold and pressure. Individuals differ from each other depending upon their outlook, which may be visual, olfactory, etc.

1.2 UNDERSTANDING PERCEPTION

When we talk of perception, it is essentially sensation to which meaning is attached. Do remember that sensation is the initial response to a stimulus in the external environment and perception is the final response of an organism following a sensation. This phenomena can be expressed with the help of a three-link chain of stimulus perception-coordination-response to the stimulus. This three-link chain can be expressed in terms of sense organs as receptor (eye, nose, ear, tongue)skin-nervous system (brain, spinal chord and nerves)-effectors (muscles and glands) chain. It must be remembered that in this three-link chain, the first cortical response is sensation and the second cortical response is perception. It needs emphasis here that in any reaction of the organism, this division is only of theoretical importance. *In practice, sensation and perception are so closely intermingled that is quite difficult to say when sensation stops and perception begins.* Whenever you see an object, you try to recognize it first in some way or the other before your thinking takes it further regarding its attributes. We call this process as perception rather than sensation.

For instance, when a child who has been told about an apple before is shown the picture of an apple, child recognizes it first and then thinks about its texture and taste. The unlearned first

reactions which happen due to an interaction between the individual and the environment around them by virtue of the various sense organs are termed as SENSATIONS. As the baby grows from an infant to an adolescent, teenager, youth, etc. the sensations experienced during phases of life are linked with each other thereby building associations among various learning experiences. This results in meanings being attached to them. For example, sound of a barking dog or mewing of a cat enables the child to give meaning to the words dog and cat respectively. Similarly, the taste of various fruits produces the sensations of sour, bitter or sweet. Gradually, the sensory experiences are associated with the ones already received and stored in the CNS (Central Nervous System) with the passage of time during the life time of the individual enabling her/him to develop meanings. This process results in meaningful sensations which we term as PERCEPTIONS.

It must be remembered that perception does not merely refer to "seeing" as the objects may be perceived through any or various combinations of sensory organs. For example, when we smell a dish being cooked, taste the food, or look at a picture, or read a book, we are performing various perceptual activities. Perception, therefore, refers to the use of the senses to guide motor action. Knowing whether a recipe "tastes right" would depend upon the perception as defined above, as would knowing whether a car engine sounds like the motor is working properly.

As we mature physically, mentally, intellectually, culturally and socially our sense data becomes organized with time based on previous experiences. Hence, each successive experience is built upon a previous experience. A very good example of this is language learning – one's mother tongue or even a foreign language. Initially, language is a mere jumble of sounds when first heard by an individual, say a toddler, for instance. At the initial stage, no meanings are attached to the sounds of the language. Gradually, these sounds become associated with the individual's experience and the sounds of words acquire a meaning. Take the example of the word "*Amma*" – the sound of this word becomes associated with the sight of the mother, thereby giving meaning to the word "*Amma*" to the toddler. Initially, therefore, no meanings are attached to the sounds heard by a toddler. But as the toddler grows up, these sounds become associated with the individual's experience, with the learning of language spoken at home. With time, the character of sounds becomes altered in the experience of the individual and the language no longer is a jumble of sounds. Instead, the sounds are heard as words of the language in an organized fashion with meanings attached to them. It can be said that sensory data is enriched in the process of perception to the extent that we perceive more than is actually there. With the passage of time, therefore, the perceptions of individuals towards objects/subjects also change. Let us understand this by a very simple example. Seeing a lemon yellow coloured sphere may evoke thoughts of a lime, a lemon, a *laddoo* or maybe any other article of food which is yellow, say a yellow *dal*. The yellow colour may thus evoke not only the thought of various articles of food having yellow colour, but even their taste is anticipated. Thus, we see in this example both visual perceptions and taste perceptions are evoked by looking at a yellow object.

In our daily life, all of us are bombarded with potential stimuli. We are forever interpreting the sensory information received by us. We interpret a sequence of sounds as bird sounds, bark of a dog, and sound from a musical instrument or song being sung by somebody as a melody, a biting wind as cold or hot according to its temperature. It should be noted that we perceive relatively few stimuli at any one time. This is because it is impossible to respond simultaneously to all

potential sights, sounds and smells, as well as to subtle changes in temperature, pressure and even the position of our limbs which impinge on our sense organs. The chain of events is: stimulus, response of the sense organ and sensory nerve, first cortical response, which is sensation, second cortical response, which is perception. But it must be remembered that in any reaction of the organism, *this division is only of theoretical importance.* In practice, sensation and perception are so intermingled that we cannot say when sensation stops and perception begins!

Our past experiences as also our present psychological state shape our perceptions. Lot of scientific study has been done on perception. As human beings perceive their surroundings through all their senses, there are perceptions corresponding to each sense- visual perception, olfactory perception, auditory perception, and so on. Of these, visual perception has been studied extensively.

1.3 SCIENTIFIC ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION

An object at some distance from an observer will reflect light from the sun in all directions, some of which will fall upon the corneas of the eyes where it will be focused upon each retina, forming an image. The disparity between the electrical outputs of these two slightly different images is resolved either at the level of the lateral geniculate nucleus or in a part of the visual cortex called 'V1'. The resolved data is further processed in the visual cortex where some areas have specialized functions, for instance area V5 is involved in the modeling of motion and V4 in adding colour. The resulting single image that subjects report as their experience is called a 'percept'. Studies involving rapidly changing scenes show the percept derives from numerous processes that involve time delays. Recent MRI studies show that dreams, imaginings and perceptions of things such as faces are accompanied by activity in many of the same areas of brain as are involved with physical sight. Imagery that originates from the senses and internally generated imagery may have a shared ontology at higher levels of cortical processing.

Sound is pressure waves sensed by the cochlea in the ear. Data from the eyes and ears is combined to form a 'bound' percept. The problem of how this is produced, known as the binding problem, is the subject of considerable study. Perception is a cognitive process in which information processing is used to transfer information into the mind where it is related to other information. Some psychologists propose that this processing gives rise to particular mental states (cognitivism) whilst others envisage a direct path back into the external world in the form of action (radical behaviourism). Behaviourists such as *John B.Watson* and *B.F.Skinner* have proposed that perception acts largely as a process between a stimulus and a response but have noted that Gilbert Ryle's "*ghost in the machine* of the brain" still seems to exist. "The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that they are not relevant in a functional analysis". This view, in which experience is thought to be an incidental by-product of information processing, is known as epiphenomenalism.

1.4 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION

The philosophy of perception is concerned with the nature of perceptual experience and the status of perceptual data, in particular how they relate to beliefs about, or knowledge of, the

world. Any explicit account of perception requires a commitment to one of a variety of ontological or metaphysical views. Philosophers distinguish internalist accounts, which assume that perceptions of objects, and knowledge or beliefs about them, are aspects of an individual's mind, and externalist accounts, which state that they constitute real aspects of the world external to the individual. The position of naïve realism — the 'everyday' impression of physical objects constituting what is perceived — is to some extent contradicted by the occurrence of perceptual illusions and hallucinations and the relativity of perceptual experience as well as certain insights in science. Realist conceptions include phenomenalism and direct and indirect realism. Anti-realist conceptions include idealism and skepticism.

Categories of perception

Perception may be categorized as *internal* or *external*. Internal perception (proprioception) tells us what is going on in our bodies; where our limbs are, whether we are sitting or standing, whether we are hungry or tired and so forth. External or *Sensory* perception (exteroception), tells us about the world outside our bodies. Using our senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, we perceive colors, sounds, textures, etc. of the world at large. There is a growing body of knowledge of the mechanics of sensory processes in cognitive psychology. The philosophy of perception is mainly concerned with exteroception.

Philosophical accounts of perception

Important philosophical problems derive from the epistemology of perception — how we can gain knowledge via perception - such as the question of the nature of qualia. Within the biological study of perception naive realism is unusable.However, outside biology modified forms of naive realism are defended. *Thomas Reid*, the eighteenth-century founder of the Scottish School of Common Sense, realised that sensation was composed of a set of data transfers but declared that there is still a direct connection between perception and the world. This idea, called direct realism, has again become popular in recent years with the rise of postmodernism.

The succession of data transfers involved in perception suggests that sense data are somehow available to a perceiving subject that is the substrate of the percept. *Indirect realism*, the view held by *John Locke* and *Nicolas Malebranche*, proposes that we can only be aware of mental representations of objects. However, this may imply an infinite regress (a perceiver within a perceiver within a perceiver...), though a finite regress is perfectly possible. It also assumes that perception is entirely due to data transfer and information processing, an argument that can be avoided by proposing that the percept does not depend wholly upon the transfer and rearrangement of data. This still involves basic ontological issues of the sort raised by Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Whitehead and others, which remain outstanding particularly in relation to the binding problem, the question of how different perceptions (e.g. color and contour in vision) are "bound" to the same object when they are processed by separate areas of the brain.

1.5 KANT'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION

In context of perception, these points can be extracted from Kant's theses:

- that it is mind itself that necessarily makes a constitutive contribution to its knowledge.
- that this contribution is transcendental rather than psychological;

- that philosophy involves self-critical activity;

All the above theses given by Kant have had a lasting effect on subsequent philosophy. Kant defines his theory of perception in his influential 1781 work The Critique of Pure Reason, which has often been cited as the most significant volume of metaphysics and epistemology in modern philosophy. Kant maintains that our understanding of the external world had its foundations not merely in experience, but in both experience and a priori concepts, thus offering a non-empiricist critique of rationalist philosophy, which is what he and others referred to as his "Copernican Revolution". Before we proceed, let us first distinguish here what Kant meant by analytic and synthetic propositions. Analytic proposition is a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept; e.g., "All bachelors/spinsters are unmarried," or, "All bodies take up space."

Synthetic proposition is a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept; e.g., "All bachelors are happy," or, "All bodies have weight." Analytic propositions are true by nature of the meaning of the words involved in the sentence—we require no further knowledge than a grasp of the language to understand this proposition. On the other hand, synthetic statements are those that tell us something about the world. The truth or falsehood of synthetic statements derives from something outside of their linguistic content. In this instance, happiness is not a necessary predicate of bachelors/spinsters. Rather, happiness depends on the perceptions of each individual person in their day to day lives. Likewise, weight is not a necessary predicate of the body; until we are told the heaviness of the body we do not know that it has weight. In this case, experience of the body is required before its heaviness becomes clear. Before Kant's first Critique, empiricists (Hume) and rationalists (Leibinz) assumed that all synthetic statements required experience in order to be known.

Kant asserts that experience is based both upon the perception of external objects and priori knowledge. Kant writes that it is the external world that provides those things which we sense. It is our mind, though, that processes this information about the world and gives it order, allowing us to comprehend it. Our mind supplies the conditions of space and time to experience objects. According to the "transcendental unity of apperception", the concepts of the mind (Understanding) and the perceptions or intuitions that garner information from phenomena (Sensibility) are synthesized by comprehension. Without the concepts, intuitions are nondescript; without the intuitions, concepts are meaningless—thus the famous statement, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."

Kant's theses and Understanding

Let us take a simple example to illustrate the concept of perception as per Kant's theses. For example, a person says, "The sun shines on the stone; the stone grows warm", which is all the individual perceives in perception. This judgment is contingent and holds no necessity. But if the individual says, "The sunshine causes the stone to warm", the person subsumes the perception under the category of causality, which is not found in the perception, and necessarily synthesizes the concept sunshine with the concept heat, producing a necessarily universally true judgment.

Judgments are, for Kant, the preconditions of any thought. Man thinks via judgments, so all possible judgments must be listed and the perceptions connected within them put aside, so as to make it possible to examine the moments when *the understanding* is engaged in constructing judgments. universally and necessarily. Thus by listing all the moments, one can deduce from them all of the categories.

The fundamental building blocks of experience, i.e. objective knowledge, are now in place. First there is the sensibility, which supplies the mind with intuitions, and then there is the understanding, which produces judgments of these intuitions and can subsume them under categories. These categories lift the intuitions up out of the subject's current state of consciousness and place them within consciousness in general, producing universally necessary knowledge. For the categories are innate in any rational being, so any intuition thought within a category in one mind will necessarily be subsumed and understood identically in any mind. In other words, *we filter what we see and hear.*

Kant ran into a problem with his theory that the mind plays a part in producing objective knowledge. Intuitions and categories are entirely disparate, so how can they interact? Kant's solution is the schema: a priori principles by which the transcendental imagination connects concepts with intuitions through time. All the principles are temporally bound, for if a concept is purely a priori, as the categories are, then they must apply for all times. Hence there are principles such as substance is that which endures through time, and the cause must always be prior to the effect.

1.6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY ON MIND AND PERCEPTION

Recall that the object itself does not enter the eye, for example, in the act of seeing, but there is a transmission of vibration from the object, with which a person's consciousness comes in contact. This, in turn, becomes a content of the person's consciousness, and it is on account of this the person is said to know the existence of the external object. This perception is caused by the operations of a mind whose existence as a mediator between the Atman within and the object outside is evident from the fact of the synthesis of sensations and of the possibility of the absence of perception at certain times. "Sense-knowledge" is the product of the connection between the mind and the sensory organs. That is why there is no simultaneity of the knowledge of the impressions received through the various sensory organs. People say: '*My mind was elsewhere, I did not see that.*' The impossibility of this simultaneity of knowledge through various sensory organs is an indication of the "existence of the mind." "Between the Atman and the organs of sense a connecting link is necessary. If we do *not* admit the internal organ, there would result perpetual perception or perpetual non-perception, the former when there is a conjunction of the Atman, the senses and the object, the three constituting the causes of perception, and the latter when, even on the conjunction of these three causes, the effect did not follow. But neither is the truth. We have, therefore, to acknowledge the existence of an internal organ on whose "attention and non-attention perception and non-perception take place" "The mind can move in space. It is a changing and differentiating things. It is capable of moving from place to place and assuming the forms of the objects of perception. This going out to an object and taking its shape is actual.
There is nothing static in Nature. Every modification of the root Natural Principle is active and moving. The mind, in particular, is always undergoing conscious and unconscious modifications.

The mind is a radiant, transparent and light substance and can travel like a ray of light outside through a sense-organ. The mind is thus an active force, a form of the general active Power or *Sakti*. Let us take a simple example, you can even fight your intruder who is more powerful than you through your mind or for that matter travel abroad or into outer space through your mind. As the brain, the organ of the mind, is enclosed in an organic envelope, solid and in appearance closed, the imagination has a tendency to picture it as being isolated from the exterior world, though in truth it is in constant contact with it through a subtle and constant exchange of secret activities. *The mind is not something static, passive and merely receptive*. It takes an active part in perception both by reason of its activity and the nature of that activity as caused by its latent tendencies (*Samskaras*). The following well-known illustration from the *Vedanta-paribhasha* gives an account of the nature of perception: 'As water from a tank may flow through a channel into a plot of land and assume its shape (square, triangular or any other form), so the radiant mind (*Taijasa-Antahkarana*) goes out through the eye or any other sense-organ to the place where an object is, and gets transformed into the shape of that object. This modification of the mind-stuff is called a *Vritti*'" In his *Sure Ways of Success in Life* (pp. 94-99) Swami Sivananda gives an analysis of the apparatus of perception in the following manner:

The senses are the gatekeepers of the wonderful factory of the mind. They bring into the mental factory matter for manufacture. Light vibrations, sound vibrations, and the like, are brought inside through these avenues. The sensations are first converted into percepts by the mind, which then presents these percepts to the intellect. The intellect converts these percepts into concepts or ideas. Just as raw sugarcane juice is treated with so many chemicals and passes through various settling tanks, and is packed as pure crystals; just as ordinary clay mixed and treated with plaster of Paris, etc. passes through settling tanks and is made into jugs, jars, plates, cups, etc.; just as crude sand is turned into beautiful glassware of various sorts in a glass factory; so mere light vibrations, sound vibrations, etc. are turned into powerful ideas or concepts of various descriptions in the factory of the mind.

You must remember that the external senses are only instruments in the process of perception. The real auditory, tactile, visual, gustatory and olfactory centres are in the brain and in the astral body. These centres are the real senses which make perception possible. The intellect (*Buddhi*) receives material from the mind and presents them to the *Purusha* or the *Atman* which is behind the screen. The intellect is like the prime minister; it is closer to the *Purusha* than the mind is. As soon as facts are placed by the intellect before the *Purusha*, there flashes out egoism (*Ahamkara*). The intellect receives back the message from the *Purusha*, decides and determines, and transmits it to the mind for the execution of orders. The external organs of action carry out the orders of the master.

The *Antahkarana* (inner psychical instrument) is a broad term which includes *the intellect*, *the ego*, the *memory*, the *subconscious* and the *conscious mind*. The one *Antahkarana* assumes all these names due to its different functions, just as a person is called a judge when he dispenses justice in a law court, a president when he presides over a society or an association, a chairman when he superintends over a meeting, and a storekeeper when he is in charge of goods.

If one can clairvoyantly visualizes the inner working of this mental factory one will be dumbfounded. Just as in the telephone exchange of a big city various messages come from diverse houses and firms to the central station, and the central operator plugs, connects and disconnects the various switches, *so does the mind plug, connect and disconnect sensory*

messages. When one wants to see an object the mind puts a plug into the other four centres, viz. hearing, feeling, tasting and smelling. When one wants to hear something the mind plugs similarly the remaining four centres. *The mind works with a speed which is unimaginable.*

In ordinary persons the mental images are distracted and undefined. Every thought has an image, a form or a shape. A table is a mental image plus an external *something*. Whatever one sees outside has its counterpart in one's mind. The pupil of the eye is a small round construction. The retina is limited in its structure. How is it that the image of a huge mountain seen through such a small aperture is cast in the mind? How does this colossal form enter the tiny hole in the eye? The fact is that the image of the mountain already exists in the mind. Here the significant truth is that the sense-organs are able to cast the image of an extensive scene on the limited mind working in a body on account of the essentially omnipresent and all-comprehensive character of the consciousness that is reflected through the mind. All perception suggests the marvellous working of this immanent consciousness through the instrumentality of the mind, and later through the senses. The real seer and the senser of things is this consciousness which is at the background of the perceiving subject as its existence and essence. The ultimate knower of the world is an absolute being whose presence is established by the nature of knowledge itself. "In order to know the world fully, the knower must be independent of the laws governing the world; else, knowledge complete would be impossible. One whose knowledge is controlled by external phenomena can never have real knowledge of them. The impulse for absolute knowledge guarantees the possibility of such a knowledge. This shows that the knower is superior to the known to such an extent that the known loses its value as being, in the light of the absoluteness of the knower" (*Gita Meditations*: p.IX).

Vedanta Theory of Perception

The Vedanta theory of perception is that the mind comes out through the eye and assumes the shape of the object outside". For all perception, a *Vritti* or a psychosis of the *Antahkarana* (the internal organ) is necessary, since perception is possible only when the universal consciousness is individualized by a limiting adjunct. A *Vritti* is a function of the *Antahkarana* and is really indistinguishable from the latter. The *Pramatrichaitanya* or the consciousness conditioned by the *Antahkarana* is said to flow like a ray of light to the object outside and take the form of the object by pervading it. As a molten metal cast in a mould takes the shape of the mould, or the water that flows into a field takes the shape of the field, or as the space enclosed in a vessel in the house is unified with that enclosed within the house, the mind takes the form of the object which it pervades. This pervasion of the object by the mental *Vritti* is called *Vritti-vyapti*. "The *Antahkarana-vritti* (mode of the internal organ) enters through the opening of the eye, removes *Vishaya-ajnana* (ignorance in regard to the objects), assumes *Vishaya-akara* (the shape and form of the objects it envelops), and presents the objects to our view. The function of the *Vritti* is to cause *Avaranabhanga* (removal of the veil or layer of ignorance that envelops all)

Samkhya Theory of Perception

According to the Samkhya system the stimulus for perception is provided by the existence of a real object outside The senses give a direct apprehension of truly existent objects. The senses afford only an indeterminate perception of the object, a mere immediacy of objectivity, in the form of 'This is an object.' This can be said to be bare abstract perception. Concrete and determinate perception of the nature of 'I know the object' takes place further inside in the

Antahkarana. The mind contemplates on the material supplied by the senses and gives it order and definiteness by the act of synthesis and deliberation on its part. Here arises the definite perception of the object as being of this or not this kind. Even here the process of perception does not come to an end. The *Ahamkara* or the individual ego arrogates to itself this resultant function of the mind and transforms the impersonal perception of the mind into a personal knowledge. This empirical principle of individuality with its natural character of the unity of apperception makes the perception refer to a particular individual. The Buddhi or the intellect decides on the nature of the perception of the ego and determines the course of action to be taken in regard to it. The understanding of the Buddhi is followed by a will or a determination to act. The seeds of one's reaction to the perceived object are sown in the consciousness of the Buddhi. Finally, the Samkhya holds that this perception and volition are experienced by the *Purusha* which is in relation to the Buddhi. It is the Purusha that gives to the Buddhi the intelligence to understand and decide. The ultimate possibility and validity of perception is thus based on the consciousness of the Purusha.

1.7 LET US SUM UP

Our brain is our most precious physical possession. It is the life force that sustains and directs our physical body. It is the storehouse of all the information we have experienced since day one. It is the keeper of our principles, our values and our perception of life. Our mind is the consciousness that originates in the brain which manifests itself in thought, memory, perception, feeling, will, imagination, reasoning, intelligence, and applying knowledge. Our brain is an electro-chemical device, more powerful than any computer yet built by man. Our mind is the mystical result of the brain's physiological activity. Our thought processes, our emotions and in fact, our very view and perception of our life and the world in which we live is determined solely by the operating parameters we have consciously – or sub-consciously – installed in our "mind".

Our mind is programmable. Every stimulus that enters our brain affects to some degree, in some manner, the quantity and quality of programming that is taking place – programming that will influence and affect how we will interpret every event or experience that will happen from that moment forth. The type of programming that occurs is up to us. It is our choice – it is our decision.

Our mind is our servant – or our master. We can consciously modify and direct its programming to benefit us and those around us – or we can, with no effort at all, relinquish all control and sit idly by as our mind works busily to produce fears, anger, doubts, insecurities, worries, misinterpretations, jealousies and all of the other negatives that form the foundation of a life of "quiet desperation". It is our choice…. It is our decision… It is our life…So, arise, awake and try to make the right perceptions in you life to lead a qualitative life!

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UNIT 2 MIND AND DREAMS

Contents

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you will be able to

- Recall and state some quotes on dreams.
- Define dreams.
- Discuss the dynamics of sleep.
- Analyze the relationship between sleep and dreams.
- Describe the dynamics of dreaming.
- Relate the salient contributions of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung in the context of dreaming.
- Explain the role of mind in dreams.
- Recognize the contribution of Aristotle to the study of mind and dreams.
- Interpret the relationship between religious thought and dreams.
- Analyze and compare the interpretations pertaining to the concept of mind and dreams in various religious thoughts.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

To dream is natural; it is a universal experience. All people of all cultures enter into this dream state when they sleep. As sleep, research has shown even animals dream. How we regard the dream, however, varies from culture to culture and from person to person. Humans have always attached great importance to dreams, which have been variously viewed as windows to the sacred, the past and the future, or the world of the dead.). Dream reports range from the very ordinary and realistic to the fantastic and surreal. Dreams have provided creative solutions to intellectual and emotional problems and have offered ideas for artistic pursuits. A type of cognitive synthesis that facilitates conscious insight may occur subconsciously during dreaming. Human thought differs from the mechanical processes involved when computers compute. Emotion colors thought. Indeed dreams and schizophrenia hint at two kinds of thought: a rational process involving the cerebral cortex, and “emotional thoughts” going on in the brain’s old, inner, limbic system. Perhaps the simplest overall definition thought is “active uncertainty.” Each night we switch off conscious, rational thought, and switch on streams of zany mental images. An average person spends 20 years of life asleep, experiencing at least 300,000 dreams. Plainly, sleep and dreams matter to us, though people have survived years with little sleep. But

until recently, scientists had few clues to how sleep works or why. Now we have begun to grasp its mechanisms and its roles. To understand the about dreams, we need to understand the dynamics of sleep first.

2.2 DYNAMICS OF SLEEP AND MEANING OF DREAM

Like consciousness, sleep is an active process of the nervous system. When darkness falls, the eyes indirectly inform a biological clock-the pineal gland deep inside the brain. The pineal gland then yields melatonin-a hormone that affects brain cells which use melatonin - a hormone that affects brain cells which use serotonin. This is a sleep-related chemical transmitter concentrated in the raphe nuclei aligned along the brain –stem behind the reticular-activating system-the part responsible for consciousness. In sleep, sensory input to this last system is reduced and the electrical activity sweeping from it up through the cerebral cortex drops below the level required to keep the individual awake. Yet a sleeping person's brain by no means switches off.What are the stages of sleep? What happens in your brain when you sleep?

Sleep involves repeated cycles of activity, each marked by several stages. In Stage One, the individual relaxes and drifts in and out of sleep. In Stage Two, the eyes start to roll slowly from side to side. The slightest noise may jerk the individual awake. In Stage Three, the body grows still more relaxed, and a loud noise would be needed to rouse the sleeper. Twenty minutes after sleep began, the deep sleep of Stage Four sets in. Then the cycle shifts into reverse: back through Stages Three and Two. Instead of exactly re-experiencing Stage One, the sleeper enters first of several phases of so-called paradoxical or rapid eye-movement sleep(REM for short).In this stage, noradrenalin cells in the pons-the middle section of the brainstem –fire off a battery of signals that spread to nearby cells and then affect the cerebral cortex. According to activation-synthesis theory, the cortex draws on "memory-banks" to help to build a pattern from these cells, and the bizarre result is what we call a dream. Meanwhile, the eyes rapidly shift to and fro beneath closed lids as they scan dream images created in the mind. At the same time signals from the brain paralyze the large muscles, so preventing violent movements of the limbs.

Each sleep cycle lasts some 90 minutes, and most people experience four or five cycles per night. The need for sleep and dreams can be explained in several ways. Deep sleep stimulates growth hormone that heals and repairs body tissues. It is said that REM sleep considerably restores the weary brain. In Freudian psychoanalysis, dreaming (incidentally not all of it confined to REM sleep) expresses repressed sexual desires. More modern thinking favors dreams as harmonizing the sleeper's inner world with his environment; rehearsing genetic patterns of behavior; or helping the mind sort and file the day's experiences.

Dream

Dream is a mental activity associated with the rapid-eye-movement (REM) period of sleep. It is commonly made up of a number of visual images, scenes or thoughts expressed in terms of seeing rather than in those of the other senses or in words. Electroencephalograph studies, measuring the electrical activity of the brain during REM sleep, have shown that young adults dream for 1 1/2 to 2 hours of every 8-hour period of sleep. Infants spend an average of 50% of their sleep in the REM phase (they are believed to dream more often than adults) a figure which decreases steadily with age. During dreams, blood pressure and heart rate increase, and breathing

is quickened, but the body is otherwise immobile. Studies have shown that sleepers deprived of dream-sleep are likely to become irritable and lose coordination skills. Unusually frightening dreams are called nightmares, and daydreams are constructed fantasies that occur while the individual is awake. Studies have demonstrated the existence of lucid dreaming, where the individual is aware that he is dreaming and has a degree of control over his dream.

Pioneering Work on Dreams

Freud, Sigmund, an Austrian psychiatrist, founder of psychoanalysis in his pioneering work The Interpretation of Dreams was one of the first to emphasize dreams as keys to the unconscious. He distinguished the manifest content of dreams –the dream as it is recalled by the individual from the latent content or the meaning of the dream, which Freud saw in terms of wish fulfillment. The most famous theory of the significance of dreams is the psychoanalytic model of Sigmund Freud. Carl Jung Gustav, a Swiss psychiatrist who is the founder of analytical psychology held that held that dreams function to reveal the unconscious mind, anticipate future events, and give expression to neglected areas of the dreamer's personality. Another theory, which PET scan studies appear to support, suggests that dreams are a result of electrical energy that stimulates memories located in various regions of the brain.

Why do we dream?

Life of all of us is changing and moving so fast that it tends to engulf us in its movement. You may have felt many a times that you might fall by the wayside at some point in your life! At the same time, you may also be having a strong faith that someone or something will always help you. Recall that in your mind or dreams, you may have been doing things that you are afraid to do. Say, public speaking. In your mind or dreams you may have seen yourself speaking at a function in your community- being very brave and speaking confidently in front of a huge gathering. You immediately found ways to attract public attention with your power speech. You may have seen yourself as an optimist and a fighter ... and then you found the cute little stuffed dog ... which may be symbolic of your deep inner and childlike feeling that you can trust something, your higher self, god or your friends to help you face the audience. All in all, it can be said that you had a great dream going here, and it can be said that your mind was processing all your little fears about life and how it is going ...and the outcome is great. This is because you are now confident, full of positive energy and thoughts as well and surrounded by loving people and friends! Shall we say that it is nice to dream within limits? It helps you tide over a crisis by providing you solutions probably in your mind. That is why, Rene Descartes, a famous French philosopher has said Desire awakens only those things that are thought possible.

Dream and Sleep

A dream, although temporary in its occurrence, is a factual experience of the dreamer and cannot be considered as false. We all have dreams and this fact cannot be denied, because dreams are a by-product of the sleeping process. But the visions that we see in dreams have nothing to do with the reality of an awakened person. They are just our mind's imaginations. If a dreaming person identifies himself with the dream body and considers the dream to be reality that is certainly an illusion. Similarly a mirage in the desert is a factual occurrence of nature and cannot be stated as false, but to consider the mirage as reality and seeing water in a hallucination is certainly an

illusion. In the same way, this material world is also a temporary effect of nature and cannot be stated as false. But, however, to consider the temporary appearance of nature's manifestation to be the only reality and to misidentify oneself with the by-products of matter is certainly an illusion.

A dream is only real in so far as it is part of the dreamer's consciousness. But the dreamer is not only eminent in his dream creation but he also transcends it. On awakening he can distinguish between reality and the illusion of the dream world. Just as the dream personality and the dream objects lose their appearance of reality when the dreamer wakes up, similarly this material existence, which is compared to a dream, loses its apparent reality when the heavily obscured self wakes up to his spiritual identity. The spirit soul is actually transcendental to the modes of nature and has nothing to do with the temporary appearances of this material world.

2.3 MIND AND DREAMS

We all dream. Every night – as we dim the light of consciousness – we enter the realm of the dream. In this dream state, our imagination runs free with little or no interference from our conscious mind. In the morning, when we wake and return to consciousness, we may bring with us a recollection of the wanderings of our imagination – we remember the dream. The 'visuals' in a dream are usually symbolic or metaphors. But the 'emotions' are usually real, so if you can see how you "felt" in your dream you can then see what your mind is trying to sort out. Aristotle, a Greek born in the Ionian city of Stagira (384-322 B.C.) was one of the first writers to attempt a study of the mind and dreams in a systematic way. Although in his early years Aristotle followed the Platonic belief that the soul and the body were separate entities, he later formulated the non-dualistic idea that the body and soul (soul in Greek thought was ones personal consciousness, personal memories and experiences) were polarities of one thing. In his treatise De Anima, part of his mature writings, he defines the soul as that which animates the body, that which quickens it to life. The soul is that which also directs the process of the body’s growth and survival. So the soul is the blueprint that directs the purpose of the material side of human nature. To quote from Search For The Soul, ‘The oak tree is the purpose that the matter of the acorn serves.’

This concept, without of course detailed knowledge of DNA, is not unlike the present day view of the non dualistic view of body and mind, both linked not only to the blueprint from our genetic material, but also that our being is constantly a dynamic interrelationship between all parts.Aristotle deals with the subtleties of sleep and dreams in three great treatises – *De Somno et Vigilia; De Insomnis; and De Divinatione Per Somnum.* (On Sleep and Dreams – On Sleeping and Waking – On Divination Through Sleep.) The views on dreaming are developed out of Aristotle’s concepts of mind and imagination, and his observation of how people deal with sleeping and waking. For instance, he saw imagination as the result of sensory and subjective perception occurring after the disappearance of the sensed object. Recognising that the human mind can form powerful and realistic ‘afterimages’ of things no longer present , Aristotle carried this insight into the realm of sleep and applied it to dreaming. He added to this the observation that while awake we have the easy ability to distinguish between what is an external object and what is our imagined object. In sleep however this faculty disappears or is almost completely absent. This produces the sense of enormous reality we have in dreams, and the feeling that we are facing actual events and people. It is what Freud called the hallucinatory property of dreams.

Dreams were therefore, in Aristotle's observations, not sent by a god – even animals could be seen to dream – but the product of experiences had while awake, and then used by our imagination during dreaming; or else arising from internal but perhaps subtle sensations such as the symptoms of illness. Because our 'common sense' faculty that usually distinguishes between fact and fancy is absent during sleep, we are thus prone to the amazing fantasies of dreams, beyond correction of our judgement or evaluation. However he does qualify this slightly by making one of the first historical references to the faculty of lucid dreaming, by saying, 'often when one is asleep, there is something in consciousness which declares that what then presents itself is but a dream.' Many authorities quote Aristotle as the first to mention lucidity in dreaming. However, this seems to be part of the mistaken Western sense of superiority. Buddhism, founded in 500 BC, had lucidity as part of its basic goals. Yoga, an even older practice, gave methods to wake up in sleep.

Given here are two actual life experiences of two great people to help you form your own interpretations of the subject being discussed here. Winston Churchill (a British politician and statesman) reported an extraordinary vision experienced during anesthesia. During it he reached a state of mind in which he felt that his awareness encompassed all that existed and was to be known. In this exalted state he was gradually aware there was another horizon forming beyond his present knowledge. Then he broke through to this new realm, gradually reached the point of once more feeling he encompassed it all, only to find another horizon. On going into or emerging from anesthesia some people report the remembrance of dreams that had occurred in the past, or the recurrence of a nightmare which had been previously experienced. In the latter situation the nightmare is usually one which expresses some traumatic past experience, such as an actual battle scene or motor accident. Such experiences during anesthesia possibly represent or suggest a link with a self-regulatory process active in the psyche.

William James (an American psychologist and philosopher), when experimenting with nitrous oxide, reported a similar experience. During it he felt he knew the secret of the universe and all in it. On awakening however all he could recall in detail was the verse – '*Higamus Hogumus* women are monogamous – *Hogumus Higamus,* men are polygamous.' As he was an influential thinker for many years this led to the standpoint that such experiences were of little value. . Modern research tends to call this experience the 'ecstatic state'. Other terms for it are 'cosmic consciousness', vision or revelation.

Different cultures and ages have approached dreams and their interpretation in different ways. But one of the fundamental early ideas concerning what a dream meant has become folk philosophy. It has influenced thinking in regard to the mind and spirit to this day. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is that because many dreams place the dreamer in surroundings different to those in which they sleep, early thinkers were convinced this meant the human awareness or spirit left the body during sleep and travelled to far regions, or perhaps even to other worlds of the spirit. The idea of the person being able to leave the body gave rise to much speculation about the nature of human life. It became a fundamental belief that the mind or consciousness and the body were quite separate, but during life joined together in some way, perhaps like a letter in an envelope, or water within a tree. This view dominated the way personal awareness or consciousness was thought about for millennia, and was undoubtedly influenced by observation of such phenomena as out of body or near death experiences. In many people's mind

this duality is still a prime way of thinking about such phenomena of the mind as out of OBE's (out of body experiences) and NDE's (near death experiences). In fact, even with a much wider base of cultural viewpoints and philosophical and scientific debate and experiment with which to approach such phenomena, they are still not easily explained.

Some of our dreams emerge from the primordial in us, such as ancient psychological and cultural patterns laid down over millennia. Therefore, in our dreams we may meet with a rock, a tree or an animal that can speak to us. We face and have to deal with evil or benign spirits. We talk with our dead parents. We have warning or problem solving dreams. We are told by wise beings what will be the outcome of a situation. We experience landscapes or events that are awful or wonderful. All that has changed over the ages is the explanations given to such dreams, and the personal feelings involved. It may be said that we live our ordinary lives mainly in ignorance of our spiritual nature and this observation can be compared to dreaming people who are in illusion. To understand spiritual reality it is necessary to wake up to the process of self-realization. Briefly, it is our desire and attachment for worldly enjoyment, based on the conviction of the reality of this world, which supports the illusion in our waking life just as it is our conviction of its reality that supports the dream. In the dream our hopes of happiness and fears of destruction will never be realised because they are unreal. Through the process of yoga-meditation and self-realization, we should understand that this is true of the waking world also.

The temporary appearance of this world is not absolutely unreal. It has some reality behind it but we cannot know its true reality while we are desperately clinging to the false appearances of things. The material creations are manifested for some time as perverted reflections of the spiritual world and can be likened to cinemas which display a false reality of shadows and light. They attract people of less intelligent calibre who are attracted by such false appearances. Such foolish prsons have no information of the reality of spiritual life, and they take it for granted that the temporary material manifestation is the all in all.

But more intelligent men with knowledge of self-realization understand the material manifestation to be nothing but the shadow of the Lord's spiritual abode. The Lord's external manifested energy in the form of material existence is only temporary and illusory like the mirage in the desert. In the desert mirage there is no actual water. There is only the appearance of water. Real water is somewhere else. Similarly, the manifested cosmic creation appears as reality. But reality, of which this is but a shadow, is in the spiritual world. The Absolute Truth is in the spiritual sky, not the material world. In the material world everything is temporary and relative truth. That is to say, one truth depends on something else. This cosmic creation results from interaction of the three modes of nature, and the temporary manifestations are so created as to present an illusion of reality to the bewildered mind of the conditioned soul, which appears in so many species of life. In actuality, there is no reality in the manifested world.

What we learn from the above discussion is that we have an innate tendency in our dreams to portray the world around us, even if it is a rock, as having consciousness and intention. Other ways of putting it are that we project meaning onto the world around us, or that we have powerful emotional and thought associations with all that we experience. Of immense importance also is that we create an image of things we sense 'out of the corner of our eye' but cannot or do not have a clear concept of. In our dreams, these obscure perceptions probably

appear as definite images or beings with which or with whom we have a relationship. It is necessary and important in this Unit to discuss the importance and interpretations accorded to dreams by some of the prominent religions of the world to understand the relationship between mind and dreams.

2.4 RELIGION AND DREAMS

Over the centuries, many civilizations around the world have used dreams or rather their interpretation to control the functioning of the community. Dreams and their interpretations were a part of various religions. Various religions have given a lot of thought to this topic. In olden days, a priest of high order interpreted the dreams. However, there is no evidence to prove whether realistic interpretation was given to drams. Let us take some of the discussions and interpretations here.

Hinduism and Dreams

According to Hindu Thought, dreams are real and caused by the Supreme Brahman. The earliest references to dreams are found in Rig Veda which are mystic than symbolic. It is said that dreams are manifestations of evil spirits in this holy book of Hindus. There are verses on dreams in Atharva Veda which speak about *swapna* in two-fold characteristics, namely, the state of sleep whose Lord is Yama and what it (sleep) contains. The second one is about dreams which are in nature of retributive justice done to the dreamer by Lord Varuna, the Lord of Rta – by praying whom one can get the evil dreams transferred to the evil-doers. The word *shakunam* indicates that dreams are speculative. Coming to Upanishads, there are many references to dreams in a number of Upanishads. Not all dreams are prophetic. With an increase in one's morality and Divine consciousness, one would not dream at all. For an individual, the dreams are of true nature, occurring in real life. Most dreams are retributive in nature having an ethical justification.

Jainism And Dreams

A very strong concept of dreams exists in Jainism. Jain religious texts throw light on the importance, types and consequences of dreams. Some dreams may not be fruitful, but some can be fruitful. Some scriptures say that Queen Trishalä had sixteen dreams. Jain philosophy talks about nine causes for the occurrence of dreams in humans. However, of these only three are believed to be fruitful. These are: a) Contact with the spiritual world (gods-goddesses); b) Spiritual acts; and c) Karma-Performance of human deeds. In Jainism, contrary to the views of psychologists like Freud and Fraser, dreams are not just an imaginary expression of ideas and feelings but are an indication of our past experiences and future events.

Christianity and Dreams

In many parts of the English-speaking world, Christianity is known for not valuing dreams. By and large, dreaming disparaged today in Christianity. In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas played a role in the transformation from a dream-loving Christendom to dream-fearing one. Specifically, Koet addressed the assumption with many Christian historians that Saint Jerome is an even earlier naysayer of dreams. According to Koet, St. Jerome may have admonished against

seeing pagan dream interpreters, or even admonished against interpreting “your own” dreams without a proper Christian interpreter. **Biblical Interpretation of Dreams:** The old testament of the Bible reveals God would communicate through dreams and visions. Like other religions of the world, Christianity gives significant importance to biblical dreams. There are mainly two types of dreams - Prophetic dreams and Warning dreams. **Prophetic Dream**s: The prophetic dreams concern with the things of direct relevance to the dreamer. The Bible says anyone could have a prophetic dream from God. The Bible calls the prophetic dreams "dark sayings" and these dreams belong to God (Genesis 40:8). Remember, the only other person who knew about the dream is the God. **Warning Dreams:** Christianity interprets warning dreams as the ones which warns the dreamer. Christianity interprets the dreams concerning the will of God as the warning dreams. The Bible has a verse that talks about God warning people through dreams. The Bible states that God may encourage you through dreams. According to the Bible, multitude of physical or mental business causes dreams. It is also not correct to interpret every dream as messages from God. The sources of dreams or premonitions that you experience are not always clear. In case of bad dreams casing fear or illness, it is best to seek God's help.

Islam And Dreams

The dreams of the Prophets are *wahy* (revelation) for they are protected from the *Shaytaan*. Dreams marked the onset of Revelation (al-Bukhaari, 3; Muslim, 231). Dreams are of three types: *rahmaani* (those that come from Allah), *nafsaani* (psychological, they come from within a person) and *shaytaani* (those that come from the *Shaytaan*). The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: “Dreams are of three types: a dream from Allah, a dream which causes distress and which comes from the *Shaytaan*, and a dream which comes from what a person thinks about when he is awake, and he sees it when he is asleep.” (al-Bukhaari, 6499; Muslim, 4200) Dreams have disturbed many great people, and other dreams came as glad tidings to many others. Slaves of Allah! Dreams have had great importance in people’s lives before and after Islam. Islam and its scholars have followed the prophetic path in dealing with dreams, and have judged dreams according to the *Qur’aan* and the *Sunnah*. They have ruled that true dreams are from Allah, some warn and others bring glad tidings.

Buddhism and Dreams

There exists a special practice called "dream yoga." The techniques of dream yoga are ancient and extensive in Buddhism The dream yoga is a high meditation practice which is performed by the practitioner within the so-called lucid dream state. In the dream state, as well as in the deep meditation state, perception and cognition are united. That is to say, the five sense consciousnesses and the sixth-sense consciousness operate naturally in union in the dream/meditation states of being—implying a natural basis for uniting body/mind and subject/object. A body doesn’t work without a consciousness, and a consciousness doesn’t work without a body. In the dream state and deep meditation state, we also have/are a body. However, the dream body and the body in the deep meditation state, often named the subtle body, are not of coarse physical nature, but are energy bodies, and have therefore the ability to go beyond the ordinary limitations and bondage of the physical body, i.e. beyond space and time fixations. An energy body can be characterized as a unity of the basic energy of our physical body and the basic mental energy of consciousness.

Tantric Tradition on Dreams

In any Tantric meditation, we try to awaken and train an energy body through awakening the energy in the chakras, etc. There is a specific Tantric practice in Tibetan Buddhism where you train the "illusory body." The illusory body is a very subtle energy body, which can be established through deep meditation. Through meditation practice, one can leave the rough physical body, enabling one to use the subtle body without interference. In general, when we try to awaken and train our energy body from the waking state, the physical body constantly interferes. Because the dream state naturally occurs in every sleeping period, the Tantrics therefore make use of the dream state in order to develop and practice use of the subtle body. So in order to be aware of and be able to use the abilities of the dream state, we need to train our dream body and dream consciousness.

However, what the above accounts from various religions tell us is that people different walks of life do seek refuge in the dream world. It is evident that most religions see dreams as a source of salvation and in uniting with a supreme power termed as God by some. Still, the fact that people have an interest in controlling their dreams suggests that they have an interest in learning about consciousness and the way the brain works. Human curiosity about dreams inspires us to confront issues of reality and fabrications of the mind. Even though an individual may not explore lucid dreaming through a spiritual lens like in Buddhism, it inevitably is a way for individuals to escape from reality as they perceive it and explore themselves without any outside stimulation.

2.5 LET US SUM UP

Philosophers have rejected that dreams have any meaning at all and claimed that dreams result from the reactions which take place in the body and reflect the state of mind. Dreams are the reflections of the stress in your life. You might have experienced the phenomenon of your problems getting solved through your dreams. The fact that the dreams of many ancient peoples included confronting gods or demons need not seem strange to us considering our present day dreams which , too, are sometimes about seeing an apparition, a ghost or about an animal talking in one’s dream. It was believed that God talks to people through dreams. During the ancient times, people believed that God communicated to men of God and prophets through dreams. Psychoanalysts maintain that the cause of dream creation lies in the suppressed desires of the dreamer. They argue that an individual cannot create dreams as they like by suppressing desires? Whereas the Vedatins utilize the experiences of the three states viz., waking, dream and deep sleep and then draw their conclusions.

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UNIT 3 MIND AND EMOTIONS

Contents

3.0 OBJECTIVES

Our lives are filled with emotions such as love, happiness, envy, boredom and excitement, and they are central to our identities and our experience of the world. Inthis unit we shall try to understand the concept of emotions, their relationship with mind and brain, and some views of various philosophers on this concept.

At the end of this unit, you will be able to

- state and explain the concept of mind in simple words
- describe and discuss the relationship between brain and mind
- construct that the emotional mind consists of subconscious, unconscious and subconscious components
- describe the functions of various components of the mind and express the relationship with emotions
- express the views of various eminent scholars on the concept of mind

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Arnold Bennett (1867-1931) says, “There can be no knowledge without emotion. We may be aware of truth, yet until we have felt its force, it is not ours. To the cognition of the brain must be added the experience of the soul.” No aspect of our mental life is more important to the quality and meaning of our existence than emotions. Emotions are what make life worth living, or sometimes ending. So it is not surprising that most of the great classical philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume—had recognizable theories of emotion, conceived as responses to certain sorts of events of concern to a subject, triggering bodily changes and typically motivating characteristic behavior. What is surprising is that in much of the twentieth-century philosophers of mind and psychologists tended to neglect them—perhaps because the sheer variety of phenomena covered by the word “emotion” and its closest neighbors tends to discourage tidy theory. In recent years, however, emotions have once again become the focus of vigorous interest in philosophy, as well as in other branches of cognitive science. In view of the proliferation of increasingly fruitful exchanges between researches of different stripes, it is no

longer useful to speak of the philosophy of emotion in isolation from the approaches of other disciplines, particularly psychology, neurology, evolutionary biology, and even economics. While it is quite impossible to do justice to those approaches here, some sidelong glances in their direction will aim to suggest their philosophical importance. Here we begin by outlining some of the ways that philosophers have conceived the place of emotions in the topography of the mind, particularly in their relation to bodily states, to motivation, and to beliefs and desires, as well as some of the ways in which they have envisaged the relation between different emotions. Most emotions have an intentional structure: we shall need to say something about what that means.

Psychology and more recently evolutionary biology have offered a number of theories of emotions, stressing their function in the conduct of life. Philosophers have been especially partial to cognitivist theories, emphasizing analogies either with propositional judgments or with perception. But different theories implicitly posit different ontologies of emotion, and there has been some dispute about what emotions really are, and indeed whether they are any kind of thing at all. Emotions also raise normative questions: about the extent to which they can be said to be rational, or can contribute to rationality. In that regard the question of our knowledge of our own emotions is especially problematic, as it seems they are both the object of our most immediate awareness and the most powerful source of our capacity for self-deception. This results in a particularly ambivalent relation between emotions and morality. This unit begins by trying to explore the relationship between mind and body, mind and brain. Further, it takes you to explore the emotional mind through the analysis of various components of our mind to understand the fine dividing line between emotions and feelings.

3.2 BRAIN AND THE MIND

Understanding the relationship between the brain and the mind — mind-body problem is one of the central issues in the history of philosophy. It is a challenging problem both philosophically and scientifically. There are three major philosophical schools of thought concerning the answer: dualism, materialism, and idealism. Dualism holds that the mind exists independently of the brain; materialism holds that mental phenomena are identical to neuronal phenomena; and idealism holds that only mental phenomena exist.

You may question as to what is the relationship between the physical brain matter and the mind. The relationship physical brain, matter and the mind is known through both direct and indirect scientific evidences. The impact physical alterations to the brain have on the mind, such as with traumatic brain injury and psychoactive drug use helps us to understand the relationship between the two. In addition to the philosophical questions, the relationship between mind and brain involves a number of scientific questions, including understanding the relationship between mental activity and brain activity, the exact mechanisms by which drugs influence cognition, and the neural correlates of consciousness.

Through most of history many philosophers found it inconceivable that cognition could be implemented by a physical substance such as brain tissue (that is neurons and synapses). Philosophers such as Patricia Churchland posit that the drug-mind interaction is indicative of an intimate connection between the brain and the mind, not that the two are the same entity. Descartes, who thought extensively about mind-brain relationships, found it possible to explain reflexes and other simple behaviors in mechanistic terms, although he did not believe that complex thought, and language, in particular, could be explained by reference to the physical brain alone. Philosophy of mind is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind,

mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and their relationship to the physical body. The mind-body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as the central issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body.
Dualism and monism are the two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind-body problem. Dualism is the position that mind and body are in some way separate from each other. It can be traced back to Plato, Aristotle and the Samkhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy, but it was most precisely formulated by René Descartes in the 17th century. Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, whereas Property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance.

3.3 UNDERSTANDING THE MIND

Emotional Mind

When we think of mind, many thoughts flit through our brain. We often wonder as to what is the difference, if any, between emotions and feelings. The question which must have often come to your mind may be what causes emotions and feelings?
Before we go further, it is important to emphasize here that

- Your subconscious mind determines how you respond to things.
- Your unconscious mind determines how you feel about things.
- Feelings communicate subconscious needs to the conscious mind.
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Feelings can be better understood by breaking down the different effects they have on us. The term “feeling” feeling for example, refers to how your emotions make you feel and the physical expression of those emotions. Emotions themselves are generated in your subconscious mind, whilst the physiological changes they cause (the effects they have on your body) originate from the unconscious processes that occur in the brain. Therefore, in order to fully understand your feelings , you first need to have a basic understanding of the conscious, subconscious, and unconscious parts of your mind. So, let’s have a look at these now.

Conscious Mind

The conscious mind is what you are using right now to read this course book. It is also what you think with everyday, and what determines how you perceive yourself and your surrounding environment. Though your conscious mind is actively involved in your day to day existence, remember that the conscious mind is fairly limited in what it can process, as it can only remember only 7-9 pieces of information, or hold one thought, at any given time. Whatever information or thought is being held by the conscious mind during this time, will then be analyzed for the most logical solution right now in the current moment or maybe at a later moment. So for example, if I think to myself “I am Hungry”, my conscious mind will analyze this thought and come up with a solution that will get me something to eat. But it will not think of a way for me to do something else (e.g., get something to drink), unless I start thinking about something to drink. The problem with the conscious mind is that this analysis may often be impaired by the unconscious parts of the mind. One of the most powerful influences are emotions, which can cause a person to react irrationally by dominating and bypassing their

conscious analysis. That is why we often do things we regret when we are feeling very emotional, such as when we feel very angry or very sad.

Subconscious Mind

Unlike the conscious mind which is very limited in its processing in its processing power and storage capacity, the subconscious mind has the ability to store everything that has ever happened to you in your life. But, because this information is stored in your subconscious, you cannot access it through normal means (i.e. by thinking about it). That is why some people undergo hypnosis, as it allows them to get to the root cause of the problem by finding out what is buried in their subconscious. Over time as your subconscious mind begins to fill up with more and more information, it begins to form a model of the type of person you are. This model then determines how you view yourself, other people and the world you live in. Typically, this model is firmly established by the time you reach your teens, although it can still be modified by subsequent life events and experiences.

Unconscious Mind

The unconscious mind is similar to the subconscious, in the sense that you have no conscious awareness or control of it. However, the unconscious is not really a mind but rather a series of processes that occur in the brain which result in the regulation of autonomic bodily functions. For example, breathing, sweating and beating of your heart (autonomic bodily functions) are all a direct result of the unconscious processes that occur in your brain. These keep your body working, without you having to think about it.

Unconscious Feelings

The unconscious part of your brain is also, what makes you feel the way you feel when exposed to a certain stimulus. For example, when you experience fear that emotion is first generated in the subconscious. But the feeling you feel from that emotion, comes from the unconscious part of your brain which causes adrenalin to be released in the body. This adrenalin then causes you to feel the feelings associated with fear, such as an increase in the heart rate, breathing and alertness. When you experience emotions, such as being happy or sad, is largely due to what has been programmed (stored) into your subconscious mind throughout your life. A simple way to demonstrate this can we found with the films we like and dislike. For example, you may like a particular film, but your friend might think it is boring. The emotions that each of you experienced from watching that film were determined by how your subconscious (through its programmed beliefs) perceived that information. So, for example, if you have had a keen interest in space, since you were young, you are likely to find films about outer space much more interesting and entertaining than someone who has no interest in outer space. Likewise, a person who loves comedy films may find them more entertaining and relaxing than a person who is more of a technical buff who may feel bored while watching such a film. However it is important to note that this example takes into account, just one factor, that being, whether you have an interest in space/ comedy or not. In reality, all the information that has been stored in the subconscious will be used to determine how you perceive and therefore react to, any given piece of information.

Subconscious Filters


Negative Thoughts
Negative Feelings


Something outside of you that you react to.
Incoming information compared to all your previous life experiences.
Part of your brain that lets your body run automatically. Causes you to feel by releasing chemicals in the body.
How you react to the stimulus is a sum total of the subconscious and unconscious processes
Subconscious makes conscious mind aware of what is stored in subconscious, via feeling.
Stimulus
Subconscious Filters
Unconscious Processes
Conscious Feeling & Memory
Conscious mind can listen to feeling and satisfy subconscious needs. Or ignore feeling, and leave subconscious unsatisfied.
I seecake
I enjoyed eating cake in the past.
Eating cake makes me feel good.
Seeing cake generates pleasurable feelings in me. I now want to eat this cake.

years) it will trigger your previously stored negative experience you had with that dog when you were five. Associated with that previous experience was fear, and so your unconscious mind caused you to feel fear when you saw the dog. Unless this negative stored subconscious memory is resolved (by you overcoming your fear of dogs), this memory will continue to affect you for the rest of your life. The purpose of you feeling this fear, was your subconscious minds way of telling your conscious mind that you have an unresolved issue stored in your subconscious that you need to overcome. So to sum it all up, your emotions (and the feelings you experience from those emotions) are messages from your subconscious to your conscious mind about things which need your attention.

Let us briefly examine as to how our brain has developed to have a better understanding of the emotions and feelings. Given here is a Triune Brain Model which gives us an idea as to how our brain has developed. The Triune Brain Model is a fascinating theory of how the brain developed and what the different regions of the brain developed for. There are three regions of the brain according to this model. The PRIMITIVE BRAIN which controls the basic human desires; The EMOTIONAL BRAIN which influences how you feel about things; And the THINKING BRAIN which is what you use for making logical decisions.

To have a better understanding of yourself, it is important to understand how and why your brain works the way it does. Once you understand the basic functioning of your brain, you will be able to understand your emotions and feelings. This, in turn, will enable you to be in a much better position to make positive changes to your life rather than being a victim of self-sabotage. Let us briefly look at the brain to have a better understanding of the concept of mind. In animals, the brain, or encephalon (Greek for "in the head"), is the control center of the central nervous system, responsible for thought. In most animals, the brain is located in the head, protected by the skull and close to the primary sensory apparatus of vision, hearing, taste and olfaction. The figure given here gives you an idea of the regions of the brain. You must also take note of this point that all vertebrates have a brain, most invertebrates have either a centralized brain or collections of individual ganglia. Primitive animals such as sponges do not have a brain at all. Brains can be extremely complex. For example, the human brain contains more than 100 billion neurons, each linked to as many as 10,000 others.

3.4 PHILOSOPHERS ON MIND

The concept of mind is understood in many different ways by many different traditions, ranging from panpsychism and animism to traditional and organized religious views, as well as secular and materialist philosophies. Most agree that minds are constituted by conscious experience and intelligent thought. Common attributes of mind include perception, reason, imagination, memory, emotion, attention, free-will and a capacity for communication. A rich set of unconscious processes are also included in many modern characterizations of mind.

Theories of mind and its function are numerous. Earliest recorded speculations are from the likes of Zoroaster, the Buddha, Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient Greek, Indian and, later, Islamic and medieval European philosophers. Pre-modern understandings of the mind, such as the neoplatonic "nous" saw it as an aspect of the soul, in the sense of being both divine and immortal, linking human thinking with the un-changing ordering principle of the cosmos itself.

Which attributes make up the mind is much debated. Some psychologists argue that only the "higher" intellectual functions constitute mind, particularly reason and memory. In this view the emotions—love, hate, fear, joy—are more primitive or subjective in nature and should be seen as different from the mind as such. Others argue that various rational and emotional states cannot be so separated, that they are of the same nature and origin, and should therefore be considered all part of what we call the mind.

In popular usage mind is frequently synonymous with thought: the private conversation with ourselves that we carry on "inside our heads." Thus we "make up our minds," "change our minds" or are "of two minds" about something. One of the key attributes of the mind in this sense is that it is a private sphere to which no one but the owner has access. No one else can "know our mind." They can only interpret what we consciously or unconsciously communicate.

Broadly speaking, mental faculties are the various functions of the mind, or things the mind can "do". Thought is a mental activity which allows human beings to make sense of things in the world, and to represent and interpret them in ways that are significant, or which accord with their needs, attachments, goals, commitments, plans, ends, desires, etc. Thinking involves the symbolic or semantic mediation of ideas or data, as when we form concepts, engage in problem solving, reasoning and making decisions. Words that refer to similar concepts and processes include deliberation, cognition, ideation, discourse and imagination. Thinking is sometimes described as a "higher" cognitive function and the analysis of thinking processes is a part of cognitive psychology. It is also deeply connected with our capacity to make and use tools; to understand cause and effect; to recognize patterns of significance; to comprehend and disclose unique contexts of experience or activity; and to respond to the world in a meaningful way.

Imagination is the activity of generating or evoking novel situations, images, ideas or other *qualia* in the mind. It is a characteristically subjective activity, rather than a direct or passive experience. The term is technically used in psychology for the process of reviving in the mind percepts of objects formerly given in sense perception. Since this use of the term conflicts with that of ordinary language, some psychologists have preferred to describe this process as "imaging" or "imagery" or to speak of it as "reproductive" as opposed to "productive" or "constructive" imagination. Things that are imagined are said to be seen in the "mind's eye". Among the many practical functions of imagination are the ability to project possible futures (or histories), to "see" things from another's perspective, and to change the way something is perceived, including to make decisions to respond to, or enact, what is imagined.
Consciousness in mammals (this includes humans) is an aspect of the mind generally thought to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, sentience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment. It is a subject of much research in philosophy of mind, psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Some philosophers divide consciousness into phenomenal consciousness, which is subjective experience itself, and access consciousness, which refers to the global availability of information to processing systems in the brain. Phenomenal consciousness has many different experienced qualities, often referred to as qualia. Phenomenal consciousness is usually consciousness of something or about something, a property known as intentionality in philosophy of brain and mind.

3.5 EMOTIONS AND PHILOSOPHY

Philosophers interpreted the relationship between emotions and mind differently. Plato in the Republic describes three basic components of the human mind: the reasoning, the desiring, and the emotive mind. For Aristotle, the emotions are not represented as constituting a separate agency or module, but they had even greater importance, particularly in the moral life. Aristotle regarded emotions to be largely due to the effect of learning and felt that it depended on the capacity of the individual to feel the right emotions in the right circumstances. Hume's notorious dictum that reason is and ought to be the slave of passions also placed the emotions at the very center of character and agency. For Spinoza, the emotions are not lodged in a separate body in conflict with the soul, since soul and body are aspects of a single reality; he says that emotions, as affections of the soul, make the difference between the best and the worst lives, as they increase the soul's power to act, or diminish that power. Kant saw emotions as essentially conative phenomena, but grouped them with inclinations enticing the will to act on motives other than that of duty. Hobbe's referred to emotions as assimilated "passions'' attributable to specific appetites or aversions. James-Lange (1884) theory of emotion states that emotions are specifically feelings caused by changes in physiological conditions relating to the autonomic and motor functions. When we perceive we are in danger, for example, this perception sets off a collection of bodily responses, and our awareness of these responses is what constitutes fear. This is essentially the interpretation of emotions in context of psychology. Antonio Damasio's (1999) "feeling theory" states that the capacity for emotions involves a capacity for the brain to monitor the body's past and hypothetical responses, both in autonomic and voluntary systems ,in terms of "somatic markers" .This view does not fully explain the intentional nature of emotion.

3.6 LET US SUM UP

This unit is concluded with the point that most of the classical philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume had recognizable theories of emotion conceived as responses to certain sorts of events of concern to a subject, triggering bodily changes and typically motivating characteristic behaviour. It is also important to emphasize here that in much of the twentieth–century, philosophers of mind and psychologists tended to neglect the subject of emotions. This is because of the sheer variety of phenomena covered by the word "emotion". In recent years, emotions have once again become the focus of vigorous interest in philosophy as also other branches of cognitive science in psychology. You must understand that due to fruitful exchanges between researches of various disciplines, it is no longer to consider philosophy of emotions in isolation from approaches of other disciplines particularly psychology, neurology, evolutionary biology, and even economics.

3.7 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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UNIT 4 MIND AND LANGUAGE

Contents

4.0 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this unit is two fold: firstly, to discuss the different philosophical issues pertaining to the interface of mind and language such as intentionality of mind and language, basic structure and function of mind and language, priority of language and mind, necessity and contingency in language from western perspective; secondly, to analyse debates concerning the relationship of language and consciousness among Grammarian, Mimamsa and Buddhism in Classical Indian tradition.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Ordinarily, when we talk about the meaning and its content that is thought, we attribute content both to expressions of language: linguistic signs, utterances, gestures — and to the mental states of agents: beliefs, intentions, desires, and so forth. Consequently, it is natural to consider that mind and language are closely related; to have contentful thoughts of certain sorts evidently has something to do with language acquisition. In western philosophical tradition, there has been a general consensus that mind and language are intimately related. Plato had considered thought as 'the self talking to itself'. In the middle ages, philosophers have started the debate on the ontological primacy of language *vis à vis* consciousness which was reflected in the discussion on the nature of 'universals and particular'. In the Enlightenment, both rationalists and empiricists have explored the nature of idea and given priorities to thought (consciousness) over language. Language is instrumental in expressing the thought. In his still influential synthesis of rationalism and empiricism, Kant advanced his remarkable idea that concepts of space and time and causality are necessary conditions for the existence of experience of an external world. They pre exist in mind. It seems that Kant also postulated a primacy for the 'faculties of the mind'.

In the twentieth century a new movement started as phenomenology through the work of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. With this phenomenological approach, there was a major shift of debates from mind and body problem to the problem of the structure of experience. Phenomenologists were more interested to explore the structure and nature of consciousness; how consciousness constitutes the object of knowledge and at the same time how consciousness is constituted by the external objects.

Language was, of course, all that 'the linguistic turn' was about, giving rise to 'Analytic Philosophy with Frege, Wittgenstein and the philosophers of the Vienna Circle. The primary objective of their approach is to investigate intricacies and complexities of language as analytical philosophers think that all philosophical problems arise due to misunderstanding of language.

In Indian philosophical tradition, though the relationship between mind and language has been acknowledged yet its conception of mind and language and its approach towards them, is somewhat different from the western tradition. Almost in all Indian philosophical systems mind (*manas*) is considered as instrument that is an internal sense organ (*antahkarana*) for knowledge acquisition. Hence, the concept of mind in Indian tradition being an instrument can be assumed to be devoid of consciousness. Consciousness is seen as having separate ontological status independent of mind. But in this unit our concern is not to discuss the theoretical details pertaining to the Indian concept of mind. Our aim is rather to discuss the role of mind (in whatever form) in relation to language. Keeping this sole objective, we will discuss a broad based notion of mind in general which includes consciousness also. Therefore, the term 'mind' refers to all internal states of consciousness and it is to be noted that 'mind' and 'consciousness' will be used interchangeably hence onwards.

One of the major concerns of the Indian philosophical systems has been the relationship between language and reality. And in response to this there has been an exploration of the relationship between language and consciousness. There are three distinct views: first, for the Grammarian language is the reality second, for the Mimamsa language accounts for the propositional meaning (vakyartha) and finally, in contrast to these two, the Buddhists hold that language is not able to capture the true nature of reality.

4.2 MIND AND LANGUAGE: A WESTERN PERSPECTIVE

In the west, as we have observed that the nature of the mind and language has been one of the primary concerns of philosophical enquiry. And in the last few decades of the last century with the emergence of scientific approach in the area of mind and languages new disciplines such as cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, psycholinguistics, on the one hand and cultural and postmodern approach in the psychology, sociology and cultural studies on the other hand, started debate on the priority of innate capacities of mind over language *vis à vis* language over mind. Despite all the difference in their approaches and treatments, there is an agreement that mind and language are interconnected at the deeper level.

Mind and Language: Inter-Connected

The various mental states such as believing, desiring, hoping, fearing, etc. have propositional attitude for example: Krishna believes that 'Meera loves him'. The content of all the mental state is 'thought' which possess meaning. It should be clear from the above example the content of his belief is 'Meera loves him'. Similarly, sentences of language also contain meanings. Hence, there is a close affinity between thought and language. In addition to mental states one may have different mental acts such as taking decision, making promises, predicting something, requesting something, giving justification and so on. The most important act is that of making rules and following them, which is the basis of language. Language is meant for rule following which may

be arbitrary or conventional. Mind is involved in making of language and language facilitates the mind to evolve further or perform its various mental acts prudently and efficiently.

Our experience of the world is constructed from two basic sources: the data supplied to brain by senses and the symbol of language. Together by representing the world of phenomena these create contents and structure of our consciousness. Any knowledge which an individual acquires about his/her objective world is constructed through the interaction between sensory signals and their symbolization. Although phenomenon impinge on his consciousness such as – heat, light, sound etc. she/he differentiates these phenomenon through the symbols which she/he has for representing them. Objects are therefore, constituted in ones' mind as concepts - as chains of remembered symbols. As one learns to associate symbol with sensation to develop control over symbolic activity, she/he learns to identify features of his/her environment and to project possibilities and hypotheses. Symbolization is the transformation of sense data into meaningful concepts and categories. The rules for the classification and structuring of phenomena are contained in language and language also maintains the conceptual machinery through which experience is interpreted. But these rules range from those which are almost mandatory for everyone in the speech community to those which are matter of social preferences and conventions.

Language is a system of arbitrary as well as conventional symbols which may be spoken or written, iconic or non-iconic. And language has two important aspects: syntactic and semantic. Syntactic means that different words are combined according to syntactical rules in a particular way to make a sentence. The syntactical rules determine whether a particular combination of words qualifies to be correct sentence or not. You may notice a sentence in English language – 'Meera loves Krishna' the sentence consists of three words which are arranged in a specific way. In this connection it is important to notice an important feature of the language that each language though has finite number of words and also finite number of grammatical or syntactical rules yet it enable its speakers to produce infinite number of sentences.

Semantic aspect of language deals with the meaning of words and sentences. Semantic rules provides different procedures whereby a word or a sentence gets its meaning. Though syntax and semantic are different in their nature and yet there is a intricate relationship between two. As often syntactical properties (rules) influence the meaning of a sentence. For example you may see - how two sentences having same words but different structures mean differently. (1) A Lion killed a buffalo. (2) A Buffalo killed a lion. But in some other cases different sentences having same words but different structure mean similarly for example (1). The first Prime Minister of India was Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru (2) Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru was the first Prime Minister of India. The meaning of sentence is determined by the meaning of its constituents and its syntactical structure. Hence, language has a combinatorial properties of syntax and semantic which provide productivity to language. Productivity of any language means infinite combinations of its discrete finite units (symbols) to mean infinite situations. It is this productivity that distinguishes human language from the communicating system of other lower species.

Mind and Language: Intentionality

Both mind and language have intentionality which prepares the ground for their being about the world or word - directedness. Intentionality means directedness- about-ness or of-ness. It is the distinguishing feature of mind that differentiates mental phenomena from physical phenomena. In fact both (mind and language) exhibit directedness, about-ness or of-ness of world in terms of thought and expressions. Intentionality is associated with meaning in the sense that all that language and mind have as contents are meaningful.

Intentionality is the essential feature of consciousness. Mental states like thinking, imagining, believing etc. involve intentional structure in which they are represented. As intentionality shares an intrinsic relationship with consciousness, resultantly it discloses the intentional relationship of mind with various types of experience. Thinking and experiencing are not two different forms of intentional activity in the sense that these activities are characterised by intentionality. The Content (that is thought) of mental state represents something beyond mental states. Similarly experience of representation unfolds the intentionality involved in the content of representation. The content of representation and experiencing the content are one and the same thing as both share the same form of intentionality. This unifying feature of intentionality shows that mind is not a discrete phenomenon. Rather, it is a unifying principle of thought and experience directed to something beyond itself.

Language has intentional structure because content of symbolic expression [like thought] is meaning embedded. Intentionality account for meaning into language because without it linguistic sign can not be taken as meaningful expressions. As, Searl rightly pointed out that mere syntax of language is not enough. His 'Chinese Room Experiment' clearly shows that even if a machine can operate symbols according to rules but it fail to understand the meaning of symbols as it is not capable of having intentionality. Hence, intentionality is a semantic feature of language and mind and it has to be given a normative status.

All the naturalists who have fascination for scientific explanation of mind try to naturalize intentionality. They locate intentionality in a causal frame work of nature rather than locating it in the domain of conscious experience. The causal frame work denies the intrinsic relationship of mind and intentionality thus mind can be reduced to brain and become epiphenomena. On the contrary, intentional realists hold that the intentional mental phenomena are real in addition to natural process of brain and we can not reduce the former into the later. No science can explain intentional experience in causal framework.

Check your progress I
Note: Use the space provided for your answers.
1) Discuss the relationship of mind and language?

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2) What do you understand by intentional feature of mind and language?

Language and Mind: Which is Prior?

There has been a intense debate among philosophers whether mind is prior to language or language is prior to mind but this remains true that each mental act (thinking) necessarily involves language. Those who take extreme position that thought is independent of language even believe that at least language is necessary for communicating thought. For Frege thought is objective and ahistorical. Thought exist in the platonic realm which is neither physical nor is mental. Natural laws and mathematical truths (for example- 'the Pythagorean Theorem') exist independent of mind they exist even if nobody knows them. Still, Frege asserts that language is necessary for understanding thought. Thought is inherently structured and this structure is isomorphic to the structure of a formal language. Maintaining autonomy of thought, Frege holds that thought is language-dependent.

Recent developments in cognitive science such as representational theory of mind and computational theory of mind have been centred on the innate capacities of mind/ brain to process information. These theories put forward a mechanical interpretation of mind. Accordingly, mind is viewed as computer whose primary function is to manipulate symbols on the basis of specific rules. Mind like computer functions with its software programme (memory, formal language etc.) and hardware devise (brain). And mind is related to brain the way computer programmers are related to the hardware. Mind is not identifiable with or reducible to brain for the reason that programmes (computer operations) are not identifiable with or reducible to the hardware on which they function. The mental operations take place only if human mind/ brain have some innate structure of language or grammar.

In this regard Fodor's hypothesis of language of thought is very important. According to Foder, cognitive structure of the human mind is rooted in a language of thought which is a system of cognitive functions and symbols known as Mentalese. Fodor claims that intentional states of mind have determinate contents whereas natural language does not. There are sentences which are ambiguous for example 'Mohan run after Hari with a stick may mean Mohan with stick or Hari with stick. That is why, Fodor holds that language of thought is different and prior to natural language.

Wittgenstein and Davidson have taken a clear stand that thought without language is impossible. The crux of their ideas is that to have a thought means to have a concept of thought and to have a concept of thought means one must have mastery of language by participating in linguistic community. To explain this Wittgenstein use his idea of 'Language Game' which like any other game, is rule governed activity. It involves the ability to use sign following rules of a language. And obeying rule is possible only by being a member of a linguistic community. This linguistic community is important for rule following in view of the fact that there must be public criteria for whether an individual is following the rule in a proper way or not. Accordingly, it denies the possibility of private language (internal thought) that contains name for sensations in which these names are used quite independently of the behaviour and bodily states of user of the language. Denying the possibility of any internal thought independent of language Wittgenstein clearly remarks: 'when I think in language there are not meaning going through my mind in addition to the verbal expression: language is itself the vehicle of thought'. Meaning is determined not by interpretation, an accompaniment of sign (internal thought) but by the way a person is disposed to use or respond the sign.

But one may raise objection that mere utterance of words is different from utterance with understanding (thought) of words and consequently, understanding involves something more that happens inside mind than merely utterance of words. In response to this objection Wittgenstein makes it clear that no any additional thought process needs to take place in mind when one expresses a thought in words other than production of words. In fact what Wittgenstein points out in his 'Language Game Thesis', is that speaking a language means engaging in certain modes of behaviour that shows a variety of language skills and abilities. To speak a language means to engage in what Wittgenstein calls 'Form of Life'. In case some one utters a grammatically correct sentence without understanding we could not make a sense out of this because his behaviour and his engagement with the contextual situation are radically unexpected and different from a person who speaks with understanding. Hence understanding presupposes language skill. But this language skill does not require any additional mental process.

4.3 NECESSITY OF UNIVERSAL STRUCTURE IN LANGUAGE

We came to know that language is rule governed system of symbols. And these rules provide regularity and stability in language. But there has been long debate whether these rules are rooted in universal structure of language or contingent system of language developed in a human community. Those who argue for some universal structure of language think that language is embedded in a system of necessary rules and basic structure of language account for the universal grammatical rules. This view is advanced by Frege, Fodor and Chomsky in different ways.

For Frege thought is objective and ahistorical. Thought does not take birth out of psychological process rather in the psychological process one gets related to thought. It has a mind independent existence. For example the Pythagorean Theorem exists independent of our mind; even if nobody knows it remains exist. Thoughts have necessary and space-time transcendent existence. Relations (such as inconsistency, entailment etc.) embedded in thoughts are logical and therefore mind independent. In response to the question: Is language necessary for grasping thought or it is merely contingent tool? Frege views that though thought is mind independent yet understanding language is necessary for understanding thought. Hence, thought is language dependent but both are not identical.

Fodor puts forward his computational theory of mind (CTM) to explain how intentional states of mind get its content (thought). The computational theory of mind can be understood in the background of Representational theory of mind (RTM). According to Representational theory of mind intentional states are relations to mental representation. For example believing – 'Rahul is courageous' involves the belief related to mental representation that has meaning- 'Rahul is courageous'. Fodors's computational theory holds that the intentional states are computational relations to mental representations and mental processes. Intentional states involve the manipulation of mental representation. And mental representation has a linguistic structure. That is to mean that thought takes place within mental language what Fodor calls 'Language of Thought' (LOTH). He thinks that 'LOTH' has syntactical and semantic rules similar to natural language like English. 'LOTH' also has finite number of symbols and syntactical rules used for purpose of combining words to form sentences.

One may ask for the justification of postulating 'LOTH' prior to natural language? To answer this Foder holds that due to linguistic or semantic reason we have to postulate language of thought. His semantic argument for language of Thought as follows: one cannot learn language unless one has language which is innate. He further views that learning a natural language involves the process of acquiring knowledge of the meaning of the words of that language. Foder thinks that learning is essentially an activity consisting of constructing and confirming hypothesis that represent the meaning of the words the target language. And to construct a hypothesis the language learner must have representational system because without this she/he is unable to form any hypothesis concerning the meaning of words in natural language. It means that language learning must be inseparably related to the representational system of conceptual mechanism that 'LOTH' provides. Fodor explains that the hypotheses take the form of bi-conditional matching between predicate of language of thought and predicated of target natural language. For example learning of the word 'table' in English language involves constructing and confirming a hypothesis of the following form:

[Table (X)] is true (in English) if and only if G (X)

Here G is a predicate of 'LOTH'. A language learner learns this word "table" on account of the fact that she/he adopts the correct truth rule showing table has same extension with G. As a language learner already possesses G by virtue of the fact that it is a predicate of 'LOTH'. Resultantly,She/ he understands the meaning of 'table'. Fodor's formulation of a hypothesis does not aim at to determine what objects in the word correspondence to the English world 'table' but it explicitly directed to specify which representation in the 'LOTH' can be associated with the particular word 'table'.

Chomsky also restates the fact that language has universal structure of grammar which is genetically embedded in the mind/brain. Language is characterized as compositional in the sense that it is constructed as well as comprehended by a conscious mind with minimal effort. It also controls as well as supervises the entire process of communication. It is however not revealed and manifested on the surface level of grammar but it lies embedded in the deep structure of grammar. According to Chomsky language is a mirror of mind in a deep and significant sense. It is a product of human intelligence created anew in each individual by operations that lies far beyond the reach of will or consciousness.

He further explains that all the natural languages have to follow innate rules of the universal Grammar. He defines universal grammar as the system of principles, conditions and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages not merely by accident but by necessity of course biological, not-logical, necessity. Chomsky considers universal grammar as a transformational generative grammar. This kind of grammar is primarily concerned with what Chomsky calls the creative aspect of language that is the speaker ability to produce new sentences which is immediately understood by other speakers. In this regard, transformational generative grammar can be understood as the mental representation of human being. It is a theory of mental state underlying the production and comprehension of utterance. It is a system of rules that a speaker has unconsciously internalized. It has no existence apart from mental representation as Chomsky holds that the properties of grammar must be those that are given to it by the innate mental processes of the organism that have invented it, and that invents it anew with each succeeding generation. Thus grammar is generative since it projects the creative aspect

of language. It is transformational since it generates only grammatical sentences by applying few rules.

4.4 CONTENGENCY OF STRUCTURE IN LANGUAGE

A number of social thinkers leaning towards cultural relativism, postmodernism and anti-foundationalism believe that language has no necessity of any innate (grammatical) structure that account for so called regularity. For an instance Rotry thinks that language is a contingent system of symbols which is accidently developed in the human community. The rules and linguistic conventions are evolved according to the needs of human community. Hence, it is the only human community which accounts for evolution of language in the particular historical and cultural context. There is no any '*apriori* necessity' of universal structure in language. As a result language does not have any fixed and universal rules.

An individual's symbolic experience, the symbols available to him and his social reality, are very much influenced by his/her location in society and the interaction which takes place between himself and his or her immediate others. Every individual inhabits a social world in which his life appears as reasonably meaningful to him. We are born into families, we have friends, teachers, colleagues and acquaintances. All of these peoples – and many others in varying degree of importance and intimacy, are members of our social world. Some of these individuals are important in shaping our lives. The social psychologist George Herbert Mead called them 'significant others'. They provide us with our ways of perceiving and defining the world. The knowledge which is external to the individual is then mediated to him through actions of others. During the first stage of socialization these people will often be in physical presence. Through their many interactions they design for him appropriate ways in which he can experience his social world.

The relationship between language and social order has been extensively explored by C. Wright Mill. He argues that people are socially and historically located in certain cultural frames. In all societies there are established schemes of interpretation and description which people use to explain and make sense of the world around them. These frames of reference are grounded in the historical social activity of that society and are confirmed in the continuing operation of its major institutions. According to Mill Words carry meanings by virtue of dominant interpretations placed upon them by social behaviour. Interpretation or meanings springs from the habitual modes of behaviour which pivot upon symbol. Language socially built and maintained embodies implicit exhortations and social evaluations. By acquiring the categories of language we acquire the structured 'ways' of a group, and along with language the value implicates of those ways. Our behaviour and perception, our logic and thought, come within the control of the system of language. Along with language we acquire a set of social norms and values. A vocabulary is not merely a string of words; immanent within it are societal textures institutional and political coordinates.

Check Your Progress II
Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) What is your stand on the debate whether mind is prior to language or language is prior to mind? Justify your stand with arguments.

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2) What do you understand by innate structure of language?

---3)

Discuss the view - Language is a contingent system of symbols which accidently develops in the human community.

4.5 MIND AND LANGUAGE: INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

The nature of consciousness has been one of the prime concerns of philosophy in ancient India. And in the process of exploring nature of consciousness Indian intellectuals have taken into account the role of language as how language functions not only to manifest different states of consciousness but also to constitute consciousness. All the classical systems have been constantly responding to questions such as what is the nature of consciousness? What is language? What is the relationship between language and reality? Does language represent reality or construct it out? In this context it is pertinent to address – since all the discourse is constituted in language, how to approach these discourses (texts). This involves the issue of the relationship between language and consciousness.

Broadly, all the philosophical systems have reflected on the above questions but, specifically, debates on language, consciousness and cognition have been centred among three systems of philosophy: Grammarians, Mimamsa and Buddhism. These systems have been constantly debating issues concerning ontic status of language, linguistic denotation, referential reality, eternity or non eternity of words, relation between a word and the world.

Grammarian's System : Theory Of Essential Word (*Sphotavada*)

Sabda has two aspects: *sphota* (to manifest) and *dhvani* (to sound). According to Panini former is permanent element in the word and the latter is the actualised and ephemeral element and an attribute to the former. The *sphota* (potency to manifest) may be single letter or fixed pattern of letters but it remains constant and not affected by the peculiarities of the individual speakers. Its linguistic value (semantic) is the same, although it is pronounced by different speakers. *Dhvani* involves utterances with individual particularities. These two aspects of a word (*sabda*) correspond to '*prakra dhvani'* and '*vaikrta dhvani'* of later Grammarians. Bharthari points out that a word has double power; it reveals the form of expression as well as its content. Language is in fact similar to consciousness in the sense that consciousness reveals itself as well as other things, so also every word has the power of referring to itself as well as to external things symbolised by it. Buddhists also accept double power of a word to express their own identity as well as the things symbolized by them but according to Buddhism this character is cognised only when they become subject of conventional relation, and not at the time of perception. As at the

time of perception of the sound of the words it is only the sound that is known, the expressive power does not belong to sound at that time.

The central point of the above discussion is that word has a potency to manifest/ signify something. Consequently, the debate emerges – whether this potency is inherent or constructed. In the west the same debate occurs as whether a linguistic sign and its meaning, is natural or conventional.

The Grammarians hold that the relationship between word and meaning is given (*nitya*) mental, positive and objective. The word refers to fourfold entities: substance (*dravya*: cowness), quality (*guna*: white), activity (*kriya*: walking) and universal (*jati* cowhood / *gotva*). Reflecting on the nature of *spohta*, Brathari explains it is given (*nitya*), timeless, invariant, part-less (*akhand*) and non sequential (*akarma*). It is that entity which reveals the meaning. It is abstract level of sound and meaning both. Bharthari visualizes three aspects of language: *vaikrta dhvani*, *prakrta dhvani* and *sphota*. *Vaikrta dhvani* (phonetic aspect of language) is the actual sound spoken by speaker and heard by listener. It includes all the individual variation in intonation, tempo, pitch etc. *Prakrta dhvani* is normative phonological pattern. All the non-linguistic speaker variations are excluded at this aspect of language. But still it has the time sequences. *Sphota* is considered to be invariant, sequence -less, integral linguistic entity which is the unit of meaning. It is made manifest by *prakrta dhvani*.

Bhartrhari explains how at different stage of vak, his notion of *Sphota* functions. Barthari visualises three stage of *vak*: *pasyanti, madhyama* and *vikhari*. At the level of *pasyanti sphota* exists as an undifferentiated and non sequential entity. *Sphota* and its meaning, lie dormant in the potential form. And it is initiated by the desire of speaker to communicate. At the *madhyama* level it functions as abstract meaning and abstract form. *Sphota* and meaning are still one but speaker perceives them as distinct. All the linguistic elements are present in the latent form here. The speaker is also able to recognise the articulated speech as distinct and separate from *sphota*. At the *vaikhari* level actual speech sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by listener.

Mimamsa: Theory Of Meaning (*Vakyarthavada)*

The Mimamsa theory of meaning accounts for the propositional meaning hence this is designated as *vakyarthavada*. For Mimamsa word is sacred and eternal as it is not produced or created. Words are considered to be denotative of themselves. Words are only expressed or manifested. Firstly, *Jaimini* has given definition of sentence: 'A group of words serving a single purpose forms a sentence if on analysis of the separate words are found to have *akamsa'* (*Mimamsa sutra* II.I.46). But in the next sutra where he lays down the principle of syntactical split (*vakyabheda*), the term *akamsa* or syntactic expectancy among words is accepted as an essential condition for a sentence. He states – 'when the sentence are independent of one another [each sentence having no requirement or expectation of words outside itself to complete its meaning] they should be treated as distinct sentences'. *Akamsa* can be understood as a desire on the part of listener to know the other words or their meaning to complete a sense of sentence. On account of *akamsa* a word is not being able to convey complete sense in absence of another word. Despite this primary condition of mutual expectancy of words [*akamsa*] there are three other conditions: *yogyata, samnidhi* and *tatparya*. *Yogyata* can be understood as the logical compatibility or consistency of the words in a sentence for mutual association. It is on account of *yogyata* in

sentence that meaning of sentence is not contradicted by experience. For example in the sentence he wets it with water there is *yogyata* or consistency of meaning since wetting is generally done with liquid like water. But sentence like he wets with fire has no *yogyata* resultantly there is incompatibility between wetting and fire.

Samnidhi means a condition of sentence because of that words in the sentence are proximate in time. If words are uttered at long intervals, sentence would be broken and it will not produce any knowledge. Kumarila Bhatta explains *samnidhi* as - continuous moving about the words or their meaning in the mind [*buddhau viparivrttih*].

Tatparya is basically explained by later Naiyayikas and Mimamsakas. According to later Naiyayikas *tatparya* is the meaning intended by the speaker. For example in a sentence the village is on Ganges [*gangayam ghosah*] it is the intention of the speaker that gives the meaning 'the bank of the Gangas' to the word 'Ganga' and if the intention of speaker has been otherwise, the word 'village' could mean 'fish'. In Mimamsa School, there are two different theories concerning the nature of sentential meaning namely '*anvitabhidhanavada'* propound by Prabhakara and '*abhihitanvayavada'* advocated by Kumarilabhatta.

Prabhakara: *Anvitabhidhanavada*

Anvitabhidhanavada means mutually associated meaning (*anvita*) is communicated [*abhidhana*] by the word. The words have their meaning by the mutual relationship in sentence. Hence words do not have their meaning independent of sentence.

Prabhakara in fact puts emphasis on the natural method of learning the meaning of a word whereby a child always learns meaning of a particular word in relation to other words in sentence. A child learns meaning of a word by observing the usage and activity of elders. A child observes that when a person (x) utters 'bring the cow' to another person (y). Then (y) brings the cow. As a result, a child observes both utterance and action. At this stage a child learns the whole of statement and whole of what is signified (meaning). Later the child in another episode observes when (x) utters to (y) bring the horse, (y) brings the horse. By comparing the two sentence and its usages, a child understands the term 'bring' common to the two, must mean command 'to bring' and 'cow' and 'horse' refer the two different animals. Therefore, by psychological process of exclusion and inclusion a child got the idea of individual words and their meanings. Accordingly, the sentence has a unitary meaning of its own while words which are its constituents have meaning only as they are related to this unitary sentence meaning. Thus in the utterance 'bring the cow' the word 'cow' means not the isolated concept of 'cowness' but cow as associated with action of bringing similarly, the word 'bring' means 'the action of bringing in relation to cow'. In fact the words give their own meaning and their syntactic relation to the other words in the sentence, so that the sentence meaning is directly conveyed by the words themselves.

Kumarila Bhatta : *Abhihitanvayavada*

According to *abhihitanvayavada* words which constitute a sentence express their own individual meaning which are isolated and discrete. These individual meanings relate themselves in accordance with the three syntactic requirements: *akamsa*, *sanidhi* and *yogyata*. Therefore, sentence is nothing but an aggregation of word meaning. In sentence first, we understand the

individual word meaning then we put together these meanings according to three syntactic factors and then arrive at the meaning of the sentence. Kumarila clearly states – 'The meaning of the word having expressed by each word, independently of one another it is solely from the connection among these word meanings that there follows the cognition of the meaning of the sentence'.

Buddhism: Theory of Meaning (*Apohavada)*

The Buddhist theory of meaning is known as *apohavada* (differentiation) which asserts that a word denotes what the object is not. Buddhists logicians being non essentialist oppose all the categories of reality like class, universal, inherence etc. therefore, for them words (language] do not capture the objective reality in its true sense. Meaning is negative in character and words have no direct reference to objective reality. On the issue of the relationship between word (*sabda*) and sense (*artha*), Buddhists assert that it is mere conventional, there is no any natural relationship because words do not have objective, eternal status. Indeed words are nothing just conceptual images which are purely subjective construction of the mind (*vikalapa*) resultantly, there can be no real connection between words and the external objects. Dignaga explains that the meaning of a word is the negation of all its counter correlates [*anyapoha*] for example the word 'cow' does not mean the actual animal [object] with tail, horns etc. it only means only the exclusion of all objects that are not cow. According to Dignaga a word cannot denote the momentary particular [*svalaksana*] which is the ultimately real. Indeed meaning of a word is a conceptual construction and not an objective fact (*svalaksana*). A word can not signify a unique particular as it is momentary entity and cease to exist in next moment. Even if verbal relation is established between a word and particular momentary instant then it can not signify any other particular instant. Consequently language can not function for example a word 'cow' would refer only a particular cow in particular time (t-1] not any other cow even same cow at next moment-[t-2].

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. Critically examine the Grammarian theory of essential words (*sphotavada*).

---

2. What do you understand by Miamsakas view on conditions for sentence such as *akamsa, yogyata, samnidhi* and *tatparya*?

---

3. How does Buddhist theory of meaning response to Grammarian and Mimamsakas?

4.6 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have tried to analyse the relationship of mind and language from western and Indian perspective. We came to know that mind and language are intimately inter-connected.

Mind is involved in making of language and language facilitates the mind to evolve further or perform its various mental acts prudently and efficiently. There has been intense debate among thinkers whether mind is prior to language or language is prior to mind. Mentalists especially Fodor and Chomsky argue that there is innate structure of language in mind which is prior to natural language. And it accounts for regularity and stability in language by providing universal rules of grammar. But Wittgenstein and Davidson hold that thought without language is impossible. Their basic argument is that to have a thought means to have a concept of thought and to have a concept of thought means one must have mastery of language by participating in a linguistic community.

Further, postmodernist and contextualists especially Rorty argues that language has no any innate (grammatical) structure that account for so called regularity. In fact language is a contingent system of symbols which accidently develops in the human community. Indian philosophical tradition explored the relationship between language and reality. And in response to this these Indian philosophical systems have explicate the relationship between language and consciousness. There are three distinct views in this regard: For Grammarian language is the reality, and for Mimamsa, language accounts for the propositional meaning (*vakyartha*). But the Buddhists being momentarists (*anityavadi*) hold that language is not able to capture the true nature of reality it is merely mental images (*kalpana*).

4.7 KEY WORDS

Intentionality: refers to directedness or about-ness.ess. It is distinguishing feature of mental states that differentiates mental phenomena from physical phenomena.
Language of Thought: is a hypothesis that mental representation has linguistic structure and thought takes place within a mental language (that is language of thought).
Apriori: typically, connotes a kind of knowledge or justification that does not depend on evidence, or warrant from sensory experience.
Ahistorical: means that which is unconcerned with historical development or tradition and culture.
Contingent: refers to an event or a thing which may or may not happen or exist as it is depend on something else.

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Philosophy of Mind

Block 4

OPERATIONS OF THE MIND AND ITS DESTINY

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BLOCK INTRODUCTION

The brain is a massively interconnected aggregate of numerous brain cells. The subconscious processes massive amount of data flowing through the network of the brain. The basic building block of information processing is a 'relation' or 'connection'. The operations of the mind are remembering, understanding and willing. Memory is about mind. Remembering is, thus, about both mind and body. In this unit, are therefore, discussed philosophies pertaining to mind-body in context of remembering as remembering has a very intricate relationship with mind (memory) and mind with body. Contemporary philosophical discussion of memory is continuous with the development of theories in the cognitive and social sciences: attention to these interdisciplinary fields of memory studies is driving renewed work on the topic. Many problems about memory require us to cross-philosophical traditions and sub disciplines, touching on phenomenology, philosophy of psychology, epistemology, social theory, and ethics at once. Willing is the act of volition. Volition is the power or act of making decisions about an agent's own actions. A decision is the causing by a system of events which were not physically determined from outside the system but rather were at least somewhat contingent on the internals of the system (or agent), and which were not predictable except perhaps by modeling the internals of the system. "Survival of mind" or immortality is one of the most ancient concepts posed by human civilization. Almost all humans, in their thought and conviction, are oriented towards immortality or life after death.

Unit 1 defines remembering and analyzes the mind-body problem deliberated upon by various philosophers to arrive at the role of memory in remembering. The unit enables the students to recognize the relationship between memory and remembering, to summarize the views of Western and Indian philosophers on mind-body and correlate them with remembering and to formulate your own views on remembering based on the knowledge arrived at from this unit and various other sources.

Unit 2 gives general picture of philosophers' view on understanding. Philosophical positions of John Locke and Ludwig Wittgenstein on understanding in the human mind are briefly discussed in this unit. Philosophers debated about the limits of understanding- for instance, how could we know either that there is something or not for every beyond our grasp. Firstly we speak in detail about what do they say about understanding after explaining about the general theory of understanding.

Unit 3 initiates the students to the concept of will (volition) from a philosophy of mind perspective. It gives a definition of 'will,' and discusses the relationship between volition and freedom (free will). In this unit after having studied volitional from Scholastic perspective, we tried to study it from a deterministic (or materialistic) perspective of philosophy of mind. It must be noted that there are other non-materialistic positions in philosophy of mind, for which volition appears.

Unit 4 analyzes different views of philosophers on the survival of mind after death, which is also immortality. The immortality of the human soul, from a philosophical viewpoint, can be established from the immateriality or spirituality of certain fundamental operations in human. If the operations of knowing, willing, and remembering are spiritual, the corresponding faculties –

intellect, will, and memory – from which these operations proceed should also be spiritual. The spiritual is simple.

UNIT 1 REMEMBERING

Contents

1.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, it is expected that you will be able to

- define remembering
- recognize the relationship between memory and remembering
- analyze how brain accomplishes the task of remembering
- list and describe the factors involved in remembering
- infer that remembering is intricately related to memory
- discuss and construct the relationship between past experiences and remembering
- summarize the role of memory in remembering
- analyze the mind-body problem deliberated upon by various philosophers to arrive at the role of memory in remembering
- summarize the views of Western and Indian philosophers on mind-body and correlate them with remembering.
- formulate your own views on remembering based on the knowledge arrived at from this unit and various other sources

1.1 INTRODUCTION

You must have heard people often saying that this child is good at remembering whatever is taught in the class. Sometimes, you may also have heard that this child is very poor at remembering whatever is taught in the class. What actually do we mean by the former sentence needs pondering upon? It perhaps gives the impression to most people that the child learns with ease or remembers for quite long time whatever is learnt or can recall easily something that has been learnt. In other words, when we talk of remembering by a person, we mean that the person has a "good memory." What exactly does a "good memory" mean needs analysis. It means that we may be referring to either or all of these things: learning, retaining, recalling, recognizing. Remembering is about memory.

If 'forgetting' is the process of moving information from the conscious mind to the subconscious, the reverse process of moving relevant information from the subconscious to the conscious mind is 'remembering'. For the 'higher level' conscious mind to function properly, it is important for it to have relevant, contextual data. The task of providing such data belongs to the realm of the subconscious mind. Memory is about mind. When we talk of mind, we need to think of body

also. Remembering is, thus, about both mind and body. In this unit, are therefore, discussed philosophies pertaining to mind-body in context of remembering as remembering has a very intricate relationship with mind(memory) and mind with body.

How does the subconscious accomplish this task? The brain is a massively interconnected aggregate of numerous brain cells. The subconscious processes massive amount of data flowing through the network of the brain. The basic building block of information processing is a 'relation' or 'connection'. Relations/connections form 'threads' and 'flows' which keep the sorting processes of the brain/consciousness in check. (If we were to disproportionately exaggerate such a thread and remove it from its context/flow, we could create a 'conditioned process' or 'memory'.) Clarity is achieved by letting the twin aspects of 'perspective' and 'context' fall back into each other. At this point, the 'higher level' conscious mind is empty/full. From this starting point we can once again break the symmetry; by choice, let a 'memory' and 'context' emerge from the subconscious - and we set the ' higher mind' in motion. If your 'identity' is well constructed and in good balance with other aspects of yourself, 'remembering' is a process which emerges naturally by the very defining of the 'identity'.

1.2 NATURE OF MEMORY

All of us understand what memory as a layperson is. Let us now examine some of the definitions given by professionals from the field of psychology. Woodsworth says that "Memory consists in remembering what has previously been learned." He regards memory as involving learning, retention, recall and recognition of objects, events or things. Let us not be too preoccupied in giving any formal definition to memory. Let us think of memory to be consisting of the collection of previous experiences as thy occurred. It can be expressed as a complex process involving the establishment of dispositions, their retentions, and the recalling of experiences that have left the dispositions behind them. It is, thus, easier to understand memory by noting down the factors which are involved in the memory process. The next section deals precisely with the factors involved.

It can be concluded from the above that there are four main factors involved in memory. These are: Learning, Retention, Recall, and Recognition. Each one of these factors is equally important. Let us understand how by pondering on each of these factors one by one. Any event or experience or activity is first learned. Then, it is retained in the mind in some form or the other. The third factor in the memory is recall, that is, any future occasion when the event is brought to the mind. And, the final factor is when it is recognized to be the same experience which is learned again or retained for future recall. This can be understood by a very simple day to day example. You have been introduced to this person on an earlier occasion. When you meet this person on the way some day again and recognize that person's name, you have lived to all the four processes of memory. The name of this person has been learnt by you and then retained by you. At the time of meeting this person, you have recalled this person's name and in recalling, you have recognized that this is the name of a particular person whom you have met earlier.

Leaning: It broadly means a modification of behaviour through experience to produce temporary or permanent changes in a person. This modification in behaviour happens in an individual's activity in a given situation due to practice in attempts to achieve certain goals or maybe to solve some problems. Thus, learning may be for conscious purposes to attain a certain goal or it may be for biological and social adjustment.

Retention: Memory depends to a great extent on retention. After you have learnt a thing, it is retained in the mind. The retention powers vary from individual to individual. Retention, to an

extent, depends upon how you have trained your mind to remember things and events. Retention depends upon a person's mind, health, interest, thinking capacity and reasoning ability. It is said that any event or what you have learnt causes a physiological change in your brain leaving on it an imprint which are termed as memory traces. Memory trace is also referred to as "*neurogram*" or an "*engram*". Of these, *Engram* is probably the most general term used to represent the neural basis of retention.

Recall: Recall is the mental revival of those experiences which have been learned. It is dependent on retention. It is an act of remembering the memory traces. If you have learnt the thing well and retained properly, it will be recalled relatively easily. Sometimes, we find that an idea or concept which we may have deeply retained, we fail to recall it at a suitable time like in an examination hall. One of the likely factors to which this can be attributed is emotional tension. Your recall of an event of a thing may be spontaneous or deliberate. When you are thinking without effort, it is spontaneous recall, but it is deliberate recall when you consciously strive to recall something as in an examination hall while answering the questions in the question paper. Recall depends largely on association of ideas. For example, when we say Taj Mahal, immediately we may also recall that it is made of marble. Thus, marble has also becomes associated with this monument. You must understand that remembering does not necessarily imply recollecting, recollecting always implies remembering, and actualized memory follows (upon the successful act of recollecting).

Recognition: Recognition is the act of knowing the object or the thing which has been retained previously. In recognition, there is awareness that the object or thing that was previously known is being known again. Recognition is usually in the shape of a certain or vague feeling of familiarity when you come across the object or thing again. The feeling of familiarity is basic to recognition and plays an essential part in all acts of recognizing. You must also understand this that the act of recognition is much more than the feeling of familiarity. It is not complete till the object or thing that is recognized is definitely placed in our past experience.

1.3 MEMORY AND REMEMBERING

Now, let us now connect the above with remembering. Here is given a simple example to connect the relationship between memory and remembering. Imagine that you are reading at 4pm and you suddenly remember that you have a pressing appointment at 5pm. The thought simply pops into your mind, and completely surprises you. What's curious about this example is that the process of remembering was carried out without your intending it to happen. The point to be noted here is that you did not do the remembering as your conscious mind was focusing on reading and understanding the text. It was the subconscious mind which did the remembering, and then forced the results of its processing into the input-tray for consciousness. As you were reading, your subconscious mind informed the conscious mind that it had just carried out a remembering process and that the result of the process is the content that you have a pressing appointment at 4pm. Your consciousness then completely reroutes itself and starts to focus on the process of getting to the appointment on time.

This example illustrates that there are many mental processes being carried out below the surface of consciousness. We usually think that remembering is something we consciously do. In a way this could be analytically true if we simply defined remembering as requiring our consciousness to be involved. But if we didn't define remembering in this way, then we get the interesting idea that crucially important mental activities like remembering can happen below the surface of consciousness. Often, the results of these subconscious processes are never even introduced into

consciousness, and directly influence the behavior of the body without our conscious awareness. But sometimes the end-products of the subconscious mental processes are loaded into consciousness and our conscious mind becomes aware of the content and is now able to start performing conscious operations on the content. These operations often involve the arrangement of the content into a mini psychological sequences (this is often causal, involving reasons), which then has top-down effects on the entire behavior of the system. For example, the narration of the subconscious remembering process about the appointment enables the conscious rumination of behavior possibilities and allows for a shortcut in the decision making process through the higher-order linguistic categorization of the appointment in terms of simpler, more abstract categorical structures and schemas like “5:00pm”, “get documents”, “find bus/metro pass”, “get in the bus/metro”, “take blue line ”, “third floor,” etc.

These abstract categorical structures allow for the construction of a mental narrative-schema through which consciousness acts and is able to influence the world. We become capable of consciously thinking thoughts like “Discussion Meeting! My appointment is at 5pm; I better get ready now and take the bus/metro so I can make it on time.” Thoughts like these provide decision-making shortcuts and start a chain-reaction of reciprocal information exchange between the conscious and subconscious systems. The tight functional loops between these systems give rise to complex and fluid human behaviors, such as scrambling to get ready and reach the metro/bus station to be in time for the pressing official appointment.

As regards the question, therefore, what memory or remembering is; it has now been shown that it is the state of a presentation, related as a likeness to that of which it is a presentation; and as to the question of which of the faculties within us memory is a function, (it has been shown) that it is a function of the primary faculty of Sense-perception, i.e. of that faculty whereby we perceive time.

Correlate this statement with the example given above to understand it better. ‘Remembering’ labels a diverse set of cognitive capacities by which we retain information and reconstruct past experiences, usually for present purposes. Remembering is, therefore, one of the most important ways by which our histories animate our current actions and experiences. Remembering has very much to do with memory. For whenever one exercises the faculty of remembering, they must say within themselves, 'I formerly heard (or otherwise perceived) this,' or 'I formerly had this thought'.

Memory is, therefore, neither Perception nor Conception, but a state or affection of one of these, conditioned by lapse of time. You must understand this that there is no such thing as memory of the present while present, for the present is object only of perception, and the future, of expectation, but the object of memory is the past. All memory, therefore, implies a time elapsed; consequently only those animals which perceive time remember, and the organ whereby they perceive time is also that whereby they remember. Whenever one actually remembers having seen or heard, or learned, something, he includes in this act (as we have already observed above) the consciousness of 'formerly'; and the distinction of 'former' and 'latter' is a distinction in time.

Most notably, the human ability to conjure up long-gone but specific episodes of our lives is both familiar and puzzling, and is a key aspect of personal identity. Memory seems to be a source of knowledge. We remember experiences and events which are not happening now, so memory differs from perception. We remember events which really happened, so memory is unlike pure imagination. Yet, in practice, there can be close interactions between remembering, perceiving, and imagining. Remembering is often suffused with emotion, and is closely involved in both

extended affective states such as love and grief, and socially significant practices such as promising and commemorating. It is essential for reasoning and decision-making, both individual and collective. It is connected in obscure ways with dreaming. Some memories are shaped by language, others by imagery. Much of our moral and social life depends on the peculiar ways in which we are embedded in time. Memory sometimes goes wrong in mundane and minor, or in dramatic and disastrous ways.

Memory also varies with age of an individual. Both very young and very old persons are defective in memory; they are in a state of flux, the former because of their growth, the latter, owing to their decay with age. In like manner, both those who are too quick and those who are too slow have bad memories. The former are too soft, the latter too hard (in the texture of their receiving organs), so that in the case of the former the presented image (though imprinted) does not remain for a considerable time , while on the latter it is not imprinted at all. Hence, as a result remembering gets affected in all the cases given here.

1.4 REMEMBERING AND PAST EXPERIENCES

One of the paradoxes of life is that while we are exploring our past experiences, the exploration of a certain past experience becomes our present experience. Exploration of our present experience of exploring our past experience brings on parallaxes, as we remember ourselves remembering the same experience on multiple occasions. You will remember noticing how strange this feeling is, especially that of you remembering some experience, of recognizing that you had remembered that same experience maybe last month or a week back or even four days ago. Recall how that remembering had felt then, and recognizing that now once again, you were remembering that same experience (perhaps of being an even younger child), and realizing both that that earlier memory of that experience was still and perhaps always will be there to be remembered, and that your remembering of your multiple remembering selves and the experiences of remembering that experience would accumulate. You will notice that though you may remember those experiences, however vividly; you could not revisit in person any of the remembered experiences of remembering, yet they would accumulate around the remembered experience. Just ponder on this point. Has this happened to you many a times?

This is a problem probably for all us most times - the difficulty of being in the moment when the moment is often one of being in another moment. It seems that that is what philosophy and psychology are really trying to address -in attempting expressions, examinations, and explanations of experience, through thinking about thinking about living as thinking. The Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela have used the word-the term ‘cognition’ to reflect our experience of our experience. Let us take the example from Biology – the process of metabolism to understand this concept. Our view of metabolism is skewed, because we so often start with the experienced existence of the entity as an entity, and then ask what it needs to ingest to be healthy, in terms of nutrition, as though foods were like fuel for a car, a substance consumed by the car quite separately from the car’s own substance maintenance. Grown entities (as everything not technically made technically, for want of a better term) consume environments that become those entities. In fact, the entities emerge in their substance and substantiveness from the environment that is around and become them, like a dust devil or a tornado or a hurricane or mould or rot or fungi, all differently experienced forms of continually

changing combinations of what we call elements and energies. Existentially experienced entities are environmental events, environments events, experiences, and exisistents.

1.5 ROLE OF MEMORY IN REMEMBERING: PHILOSOPHERS' VIEWS

Although an understanding of memory is likely to be important in making sense of the continuity of the self, of the relation between mind and body, and of our experience of time, it has often been curiously neglected by philosophers. Contemporary philosophical discussion of memory is continuous with the development of theories in the cognitive and social sciences: attention to these interdisciplinary fields of memory studies is driving renewed work on the topic. Many problems about memory require us to cross philosophical traditions and sub disciplines, touching on phenomenology, philosophy of psychology, epistemology, social theory, and ethics at once.

David Hume

David Hume, a Scottish philosopher had tried to formulate the laws governing the succession of our thoughts in order to understand the concept of memory. However, he was not very successful in arriving at any complete theory of the mind. Newton had shown that the entire material world was governed by the same mechanical laws. Hume's great project was to base the study of man and society on similar universal principles. Like most philosophers of his time, Hume conceived of thought as a flow of mental images. Seeing a tree, imagining a tree, or remembering a tree, were all thought to consist of our having a mental image, more vivid for the seen tree, less vivid for the imagined or remembered tree. A sentence like 'The Earth is round' would have a certain type of mental image as its meaning, and believing that the Earth is round necessarily involved a vivid mental image of that type. This theory also explained why certain beliefs were logically impossible. For example, a four-sided triangle was logically impossible (and a three-sided triangle logically necessary) because we could not form a mental image of a triangle that did not have three sides. (Try it.) Hume's disturbing insight from this way of thinking about thinking was that all our factual and moral beliefs can therefore only be justified in terms of the psychological laws that govern the succession of images in our minds.

Consider perhaps Hume's most famous argument, which begins with the question, 'What justification do we have for our factual beliefs?' By 'factual beliefs', Hume meant those beliefs that we can imagine (that is, form a mental image of) and as a result of these images say are either true or false, occurring or not occurring. For example, when we see two billiard balls collide on a table, we believe that the impact of the first ball will cause the second to move in a particular direction. This belief is 'factual' because we can also imagine the second ball not moving at all, or returning in the direction from which the first ball came, or vanishing in a puff of smoke. Since we can imagine any of these things, they are all logically possible. Therefore, Hume concluded, there is nothing in the motion of the first ball from which we can logically infer the motion of the second. That we have an accurate belief as to how the second ball will move is not based on any logical deduction from the movement of the first, but from our past experience of seeing billiard balls collide.

But, Hume persists, what is our justification for drawing conclusions from experience? Only our belief that the future will be like the past. But this too is a factual belief. We can imagine that the future will not be like the past – for example, that tomorrow billiard balls will vanish upon being hit by other billiard balls. So our belief that the future will resemble the past is itself not based on any process of deductive reasoning, but solely on experience. So how is experience itself justified?

To justify anything, you give reasons. And you justify those reasons by giving still other reasons. This implies three possible structures for any chain of justification:
(1) Reasons go on forever, without repeating.
(2) Reasons go in a circle – that is, eventually a reason is repeated.
(3) The chain stops, with a final reason.
Structures (1) and (2) would plainly provide unsatisfactory justifications, which leaves structure (3). But if a chain of justification is to stop in a satisfying way, the last reason given must not require further justification. And since we can imagine the contrary of a factual belief, a factual belief cannot be a final reason. So a factual belief that the present is like the past cannot be the final justifying reason for any conclusions about the world.
For Hume, our beliefs about the motions of colliding billiard balls and other law-like natural behaviors are formed by the psychological principle of 'habit'. Our minds are so constructed that having experienced a particular motion of one ball, constantly followed by a particular motion of a second, we form the image of the second motion whenever we are presented with the image of the first. The more frequent and invariant the past conjunction of motions, the more vivid our present image of the second motion will be upon being presented with the first, and this vivid image is our belief that the second ball will move in a particular way. There is no decision to believe that the motion of the second ball will follow from the motion of the first. Rather, the belief is forced on us by the associational laws of thought.
Hume thus replaces moral explanations in terms of wants, with psychological laws that, like the principles of Newtonian mechanics, are not framed in terms of wants. The images forced upon us which constitute our most basic factual beliefs cannot be justified by reason, nor can they be escaped from. So rather than our controlling our own thoughts, Hume argues that our thoughts are controlled by unthinking forces. We are not the captains of our mental journey, merely passengers. Hume's vantage-point is always that of a psychologist attempting to explain human behavior.
According to Hume, just as our reasoning's concerning matters of fact rest on a principle of association of ideas, there can be no 'ultimate' justification for our moral beliefs, beyond psychological laws. Hume and other philosophers like Macnabb have not dealt with the concept of memory due to limitations in their own thinking as can be seen from the description given in the earlier paragraph.
Now, we may question as to why is memory so hard to understand?

The answer, in part, is that the term labels a great variety of phenomena. I remember how to play chess and how to drive a car; I remember the date of Gandhiji's death; I remember playing in the rain as a child; I remember the taste and the pleasure of this morning's tea; I remember to feed the dog every morning. "Many very different things happen when we remember," says Wittgenstein, 1974. Some philosophers take this heterogeneity as reason to be wary of any attempt to explain memory (Malcolm 1977, Deutscher 1989). All the above experiences denote subjective memory experience which need not be neglected or obliterated by careful theorizing. This is to say that an explanatory framework which omitted the phenomenological and interpersonal diversity of memory would fail on its own terms.

Bertrand Russell

Bertrand Russell says that initially he had alluded to Hume's thinking "all our simple ideas in first appearance are derived from simple expressions which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent." As per Russell, it is difficult to say whether this principle is liable to exceptions or not. He says that though it is the broad measure truth, it would be more correct to say that ideas approximately represent impressions. Russell raises the following questions: Why do we believe, that images are, sometimes or always, approximately or exactly, copies of sensations? What sort of evidence do we have of this? And what sort of evidence is logically possible? The difficulty of this question arises through the fact that the sensation which an image is supposed to copy is in the past when the image exists and therefore can be known only by memory. He further says that memory of past sensations seems only possible by means of present images. How, then, are we to find any way of comparing the present image with past sensation? This problem is acute in that both cannot be brought together in one experience for comparison. To deal with this problem, he suggests that one needs to have a theory of memory. In this way, the whole status of images as "copies" is bound up is bound up with the analysis of memory. In investigating memory-beliefs, there are certain points that need to be borne in mind. In the first place, everything constituting a memory belief is happening now, not in that past time to which the belief is said to refer. It is not logically necessary to the existence of a memory-belief that the event remembered should have occurred, or even that the past should have existed at all. According to Russell, the non-existence of past is logically tenable and that he is merely saying this to be able to .analyze what happens when we remember. Russell concludes his observations on memory-beliefs by saying that the act of remembering is present, though its object is past. The process of remembering consists of calling up images with a feeling of belief so as to distinguish between memory-images and mere imagination –images. Sometimes, words may come out without the intermediary of images but in all cases, according to Russell equally the feeling of belief is essential.

René Descartes

Let us observe what Descartes says about mind to understand memory and remembering. René Descartes, a French mathematician, scientist, and philosopher is considered the father of modern philosophy. He is best known for the philosophical statement "*cogito ergo sum"* This is an interesting statement which reflects that he had a methodical doubt of all knowledge about which it is possible to be deceived, including knowledge based on authority, and also on the senses. He argued that the real source of scientific knowledge lay in the mind and not in the senses. In other words, he aimed to provide a sound basis for scientific method. He aim was to show that science and religion could be compatible. According to him this was possible by splitting the world up into two different types of substances: mind and body. Science will be completely true of body, extended matter; religious truths will deal with the soul or mind was his view. Now, it is for you to ponder whether mind and body are separable entities? Should we do away with the role that senses play in developing our memory and facilitate the process of remembering? Think! Think! Think!

Ryle

According to Ryle (a British philosopher), the classical theory of mind, as represented by Cartesian rationalism, asserts that there is a basic distinction between mind and matter. The classical theory attempts to analyze the relation between "mind" and "body" as if they were terms of the same logical category. This confusion of logical categories may be seen in other theories of the relation between mind and matter. For example, the idealist theory of mind attempts to

reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, while the materialist theory of mind attempts to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality. Ryle rejects Descartes' theory of the relation between mind and body on the grounds that it approaches the investigation of mental processes as if they could be isolated from physical processes. According to Ryle, mental processes are merely intelligent acts. There are no mental processes distinct from intelligent acts. The operations of the mind are not merely represented by intelligent acts; he says that they are the same as those intelligent acts. Thus, acts of learning, remembering, imagining, knowing, or willing are not merely clues to hidden mental processes or to complex sequences of intellectual operations; they are the way in which those mental processes or intellectual operations are defined. Logical propositions are not merely clues to modes of reasoning; they are those modes of reasoning.

The rationalist theory that the will is a faculty within the mind, and that volitions are mental processes that the human body transforms into physical acts, is therefore a misconception. This theory mistakenly assumes that mental acts are distinct from physical acts and that there is a mental world distinct from the physical world. This theory of the separability of mind and body is described by Ryle as "the dogma of the ghost in the machine." He explains that there is no hidden entity called "the mind" inside a mechanical apparatus called "the body." The workings of the mind are not an independent mechanism that governs the workings of the body. The workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body; they may rather be described as a way of explaining the actions of the body.

Cartesian theory holds that mental acts determine physical acts, and that volitional acts of the body must be caused by volitional acts of the mind. This theory is "the myth of the ghost in the machine." There is no contradiction between saying that a given action is governed by physical laws and that it is governed by principles of reasoning. The motives of observable actions are not hidden mental processes; they are propensities or dispositions that explain why these behaviors occur. Thus, it may be said that the mind consists of various abilities or dispositions that explain such behaviors as learning, remembering, knowing, feeling, or willing. However, as personal abilities or dispositions are not the same as mental processes or events it can be conclusively said that to refer to abilities or dispositions as if they are mental occurrences is a basic mistake. The nature of a person's motives may be defined by the actions and reactions of that person in various circumstances or situations. The nature of a person's motives in a particular situation may not necessarily be determined by any hidden mental processes or intellectual acts within that person. Motives may be revealed or explained by a person's behavior in a situation.

Ryle criticizes the theory that the mind is a place where mental images are apprehended, perceived, or remembered. Sensations, thoughts, and feelings do not belong to a mental world distinct from the physical world. Knowledge, memory, imagination, and other abilities or dispositions do not reside "within" the mind as if the mind were a space in which these dispositions could be situated or located. Furthermore, dispositions are not the same as behavioral actions; actions may, however, be explained by dispositions. Dispositions are neither visible nor hidden, because they are not in the same logical category as behavioral actions. Dispositions are not mental processes or intellectual acts; they are propensities that explain various modes of behavior. Perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and feelings may be understood as observable behaviors that have various modes of production.

Ryle admits that his approach to the theory of mind is behaviorist in being opposed to the theory that there are hidden mental processes that are distinct from observable behaviors. His approach is based on the view that actions such as thinking, remembering, feeling, and willing are revealed

by modes of behavior or by dispositions to modes of behavior. At the same time, however, he criticizes both Cartesian theory and behaviorist theory for being overly mechanistic. While Cartesian theory may insist that hidden mental events produce the behavioral responses of the conscious individual, behaviorism may insist that stimulus-response mechanisms produce the behavioral responses of the conscious individual. Ryle concludes that both Cartesian theory and behaviorist theory may be too rigid and mechanistic to provide us with an adequate understanding of the concept of mind.

1.6 LET US SUM UP

It is evident from the above discussion that most Western philosophers have dwelt on the psychology aspects of the Mind. Most of them are Dualistic philosophers in that they believe that mind and body are separate entities. As a result of this, not much thought has been devoted to memory which has a intricate relationship with remembering.

1.7 KEY WORDS

Ghost in the machine: Descartes' description of mind in the body.
Remembering: It is one of the most important ways by which our histories animate our current actions and experiences. Remembering has very much to do with memory.
Memory: It is neither Perception nor Conception, but a state or affection of one of these, conditioned by lapse of time.

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UNIT 2 UNDERSTANDING

Contents

2.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit gives general picture of philosophers' view on understanding. Philosophical positions of John Locke and Ludwig Wittgenstein on understanding in the human mind are briefly discussed in this unit.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

"Understanding arises, first of all, from the interests of practical life where people are dependent on communicating with each other. They must make themselves mutually understood. The one must know what the other wants. Thus, first of all, the elementary forms of understanding arise." Said Dilthey.

We see people often claim that they understand cars, or a certain persons, or computers. Even more they claim not to understand the same sorts of things. Now the question to be asked is that what is understanding. Is it a process? Is it this understanding which makes man unique? In recent time Philosophers debated about the limits of understanding- for instance, how could we know either that there is something or not for every beyond our grasp. Keeping this in the mind I would try to explain in this chapter the general theory of understanding. In philosophy one cannot have the same view. Each differs in their view. Here we are presenting John Locke and Ludwig Wittgenstein two great philosophers who understand the 'Understanding' in different ways. Let me enter in detail about what do they say about understanding after explaining about the general theory of understanding.

2.2 MEANING OF 'UNDERSTANDING'

A common use of the verb 'to understand' is in the context of understanding a language. In this sense it is the concern of linguists and not of the normal speakers of the language. However, these normal speakers are also said to understand the language. Now what is the different

between these two understanding, is there first of all any difference? To the extend there is, but it is close enough that the use of the same word for both things is understandable, and not unreasonable. One understands the language when he understands the meaning of the word and grammatical construction. When the individual words and grammatical construction are under consideration, the situation is much more all-or- nothing: a failure to cope with all the nuances of a word is grounds for attributing a lack of understanding of that word. Thus one understands 'the dog is red' when, as a result of reading or hearing that sentence, he can construct a model of a red dog. A word is understood if the model so constructed responds appropriately to it: a grammatical construction is understood if the model is constructed according to that construction. From this one can conclude that understanding dependent on mental models. At the same it is worth noting that, on this model, the ability to understand a language and the ability to speak it are separate, and could have radically different levels in the same person. For example, I understand German does not mean quite the same as I can speak German. The word 'understand' carries with it the idea of something passive and the word 'can' carries with the idea of something active. In other words to understand a language, one must be able to go from the words to the model: to speak it, one must be able to go in the other direction, if the links between words and models are governed by something like mutors, there will have to be separate mutors for the two functions, and thus it would be possible to understand a language very well, but not be able to speak it at all. It seems that the reverse state should also be possible, but perhaps the ways in which we can learn languages rule it out.

2.3 JOHN LOCKE'S ORIGIN OF IDEAS

John Locke in his essay on human understanding he deals with many issues but his main concern was on knowledge and the capacity of the 'human understanding' to acquire it. In explaining first he enquires into the Origin of Ideas, notion, or whatever else one may call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them; then 'to show, what knowledge the Understanding hath by those Ideas; and finally to 'make some enquiry into the nature and Grounds of faith, or opinion.

On the first part of *his Essay Concerning 'Human Understanding'*, we can see how Locke devoted the Book I in refuting the principles of innate ideas that says, there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its vey first being, and brings into the world with it. All agree, he points out, that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to basic mathematical propositions and fundamental proposition such as 'what is, is'. These are not found in the thoughts of children. Why then call them 'implicitly innate'? it is to be noted, rejecting any innateness of knowledge would mean that what God gave us was not the knowledge that is necessary and useful, but rather the means to acquire it (In this he resembles Berkeley and Hume, and differs from Descartes and Leibniz.) So, at birth, the human mind is a sort of blank slate on which experience writes. In Book II Locke claims that ideas are the materials of knowledge and all ideas come from experience. The term 'idea,' Locke tells us "…stands for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding or mind, when a man thinks." Locke does not identify idea with perceiving. Descartes had distinguished two senses of the word "idea": according to one of these an idea is an act of thinking, according to the other it is the

object of such an act. And it is true that much of Locke's understanding of idea- along with his basic decision to make ideas central to his philosophy.

What does it mean to say that an idea is an object of thinking or thought? The first thing to note is that it belongs to the nature of thinking to be directed towards something, to have a subject matter or target. There is no such thing as merely thinking- thinking, period- without thinking something, thinking of or about something. And the same holds for perceiving, and for all of the other more specific operations of the understanding, Locke uses the word "object" to refer to this required target or subject matter: the object of a thought is that which the thought is of or about. When Locke says all or knowledge derives from 'experience', he also puts gloss immediately on this which is very important for three reasons. First, he makes it clear that there are two sources of experience, sensation (external), and what he calls 'reflection; (internal), which provides the mind with ideas of its own operations, such as perception, thinking and doubting. Second, because the derivation of an idea from experience is not seen as always a simple mater (on the model of deriving the idea of green from seeing green things), in that it will be necessary to take 'a full survey' of our ideas, including 'their several modes, combinations, and relations', or as they are 'with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding'; and, third, because, from the outset, the existence of external objects is apparently taken for granted. Ideas of sensible qualities, such as that of yellow, are thus introduced as those conveyed into the mind 'from external objects'.

2.4 SIMPLE AND COMPLEX IDEAS

One basis for the charge that Locke's use of the word "idea" is ambiguous is that he applies it to entities of different kinds. He himself makes a number of divisions within the class of ideas: between simple and complex, particular and general, concrete and abstract, adequate and inadequate, and so forth. But the items so divided are sill all ideas, in one and the same sense to the word: several species in a genus not only does not entails several senses in the term for the genus, it entails the contrary. A more substantial point is that Locke uses the one term "idea" indifferently to refer to things that his predecessors had called by different names. Here i would like to consider the more stressed point of simple and complex.

The ideas which sensation gives "enter by the senses simple and unmixed"; they stand in need of the activity of mind to bind them into the complex unities required for knowledge. This would include the ideas of "perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing and all the different acting of our minds". Sensation and reflection are each modes or forms or experiences for Locke and the two together exhausts it, so that any idea we have from experience must flow from one or the other of these two "fountain". On the other hand, Locke lists several ideas that he says are simple and yet certainly are not ideas either of sensible qualities or of mental operations: those of 'pleasure, or delight,... pain or uneasiness. Power, existence, unity," to which list he later adds "the idea of Succession". He says these convey themselves into the Mind, by all the ways (both) of Sensation and Reflection". They do so because they always "join themselves to," or "are suggested... by," the ideas we do have by sensation and reflection. Finally he holds that every simple idea that is present in a mind has its source in experience.

The complex ideas of substance, modes, and relations are all the product of the combining and abstracting activity of mind operating upon simple ideas, which have been given, without any connection, by sensation or reflection. So in the process of creating new complex ideas, the mind is no longer merely passive. Instead it actively exerts itself, operating upon the ideas it has to

make the new ones. Furthermore, its action is voluntary, and the products thereof may be quite out of line with any pre-existent reality, external-sensible or mental-operational: ideas of fantastic voyages and fabulous monsters. Locke's account of knowledge thus has two sides. On the one side, all the material of knowledge is traced to the simple idea. On the other side, the processes which transform this crude material into knowledge are activities of mind which themselves cannot be reduced to ideas.

2.5 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCE

According to Locke objects have within themselves certain objective 'primary qualities' such as solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number, which are capable of producing 'sensations or perception', that is, 'ideas', in our minds. Secondary qualities such as odours, tastes, colours and sounds, which produce ideas or perceptions in our minds even though the qualities have no exact counterpart in the object. They do not belong to or constitute bodies, except as powers to produce these perceptions in us. The idea of primary qualities presupposes that there must be a something, a 'substance', which is solid and is moving. We do not experience 'substance' itself but we do experience the primary qualities or 'accidents' that cluster together in groups around a 'supposed but unknown' support or substratum which is generally called the substance, the 'idea' of substance lies beyond experience. It is obtained by abstraction, that is, by a separating of some 'ideas' from other 'idea' that accompany them; or rather , it is a 'supposition' of we 'know not what' as a support of qualities that appear to clump together around an invisible substratum. It is not perceived but it is inferred.

A Thing cannot both Be and not to Be

If proposition is to be innate, the ideas which are its component elements must be innate; but in fact no such ideas are innate; therefore, the proposition itself cannot be innate. E.g., the maxims ''whatever is, is' or ''A thing cannot both be and not to be,' although undoubtedly true, are highly abstract and far beyond the comprehension of a child of several years, let alone a new born infant what could be possible reason for supposing that the human infant knows or accepts the truth of these maxims, when the ideas involved are far beyond anything that it is capable of? The chief argument for innate principle, viz., that such principles command a universal consent, Locke immediately counters with two objections. First, even if it were true that any principle did receive universal consent, this would not prove them innate. Simply because there are great parts of mankind to whom such maxims are not known.

Locke maintained his view that a man could not formulate or understand the proposition that white is black until he had learned the meaning of the words white and black, unless he had seen white objects. In advance of seeing white he could not formulate any proposition about white. Once he has by experience learned what it is to be white, to be black, and to be different. And this is what is self-evident for Locke. If by universal consent to a proposition is meant consent of all who understand the proposition, and if some propositions which are not innate command universal consent (in this limited sense), it follows that universal consent is not a sufficient condition of the proposition assented to being innate.

Secondly, Locke maintains that, if universal consent is used in an unlimited sense, no proposition does command consent. Taking what he pejoratively calls" those magnified principles of demonstration "whatever is, is and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate; Locke replies these propositions are so far from having a universal consent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not

so much known. For it is impossible to through life without ever hearing either of them, and children and idiots having not the least apprehension thought of them.

To conclude, Locke says 'we can have knowledge no further than we can have ideas'. Knowledge, there is nothing more than 'the perception of the connection of the agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas'.

2.6 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S ACCOUNT OF UNDERSTANDING

It is generally believed that understanding, like thinking, is a mental process. Wittgenstein's approach to sensation and mental process is a bit complicated. According to him, we have to study the language in which certain phenomena are spoken about, but not the phenomena themselves. As regards human tendency, Wittgenstein holds: "where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should like to say, is a spirit." The reason for such a tendency is that we normally deal with physical objects in a simple manner. The paradigmatic interpretation of any real thing is that it is a physical thing. But, whenever we come across things that are not physical such as minds, sensations and so on, we tend to make negative bodies without any solidity and substantiality. Also, we attribute properties to them that can be attributed to physical bodies and later change the properties in order to say that they are applied only to those things that are not substantial.

Normally we consider meaning something as a mental act. What sort of mental act is it? A person may be deeply engrossed in some work and inadvertently he may hurt somebody's feelings by saying something offhandedly. Later on he says that he did not mean it. What goes on in a person's mind when he says something and means it but does not go on when he says something and does not mean it? We say eating and drinking are bodily activities. Similarly we tend to say meaning something is mental activity. It is like a bodily activity but of a different kind. This is the same old assimilationist mistake.

How does the philosophical problem about mental process and states and about behaviourism arise? The first step is the one that altogether escape notice. We talk about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometimes perhaps we shall know more about them we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better.

The point Wittgenstein tries to drive home is that saying something and meaning it is not at all like saying something and scratching or saying something and sitting down. What could possibly go on in one's own mind that would count as meaning it? The search for what goes on in one's mind when he says that 'I mean it' is a useless search, for to mean something, is not a mental process. If to mean something is mental process occurring privately in one's mind like a thought, an emphasis, an image, then it is private to oneself. Under these circumstances one cannot know when someone was meaning something and when he was not. If it is private to one self, then it cannot be shared by others. But we know what one means someone says that he means it.

Therefore, it cannot be a mental process. Normally we know that someone means what he says. How is it possible? One way of knowing it is through his behaviour. Whether one is serious in what he says or not is determined by the context of the situations and people's actions that ordinarily guide us. Suppose someone tells that I love to visit Mysore because I like the palace. This is to concentrate on one thing rather than on another. Similarly, to mean this but not that is a matter of concentrating one's attention here rather than there. But Wittgenstein does not accept this. According to him, one's concentration is not a publicly observable act. Therefore to mean

something cannot be a mental process. Wittgenstein presents some counter examples to the thesis that to mean something is to concentrate on something. He writes: “Imagine someone simulating pain, and then saying “it’ll get better soon.” Can’t someone say he means the pain? And yet he is not concentrating his attention on any pain. And what about when I finally say “it’s stopped now”? The above cases show that in the first case pain is counterfeited and in the second case there is no pain for it has ceased. In both these cases there was no pain on which one can concentrate one’s attention. However one can say that the speaker meant pain he spoke. Therefore, to mean something does not mean to concentrate on something. In a similar fashion when someone says that “I mean this piece called the ‘king’, not this particular bit of wood I am pointing to.” But how could anyone concentrate on the piece as king without concentrating on it as block of wood, marble, plastic, or ivory? And if one is able to do that, then one is not concentrating when one means it. Similar is the case of understanding.

2.7 KINDS OF UNDERSTANDING

Two different senses of the word understanding can therefore be distinguished which mirror the ‘essential’ and ‘inessential’ use of pictures just described. These two different senses ‘internal’ and ‘external’ understanding respectively.

Internal Understanding

Wittgenstein notion of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other will be called internal, to register the fact, as Ridely says, ‘that what is grasped in it is, because “expressed only by these words in these positions”, understood as internal to this particular arrangement of words’

External Understanding

Whereas understanding the sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same will be called external to mark the fact that what is grasped in it is, because “something common to different sentences”, not understood as internal to any one specific formulation’. Taken together, these two senses comprise the concept of understanding which can therefore be said to consist of both a paraphrasable and a non-paraphrasable aspect.

According to Ludwig Wittgenstein the notion of understanding which is a correlate of meaning. It has been assumed as a truism that ‘understanding is a mental state or experience or process’. Wittgenstein has severely criticized this view. The thesis, which takes ‘understanding’ to be a mental state or experience or process, can be divided into two sub-thesis.

(i) Understanding as a conscious state or process

(ii) Understanding as a non-conscious mental state or process, e.g. brain process

2.8 UNDERSTANDING AS A CONSCIOUS STATE (EXPERIENCE) OR PROCESS

Understanding, Wittgenstein holds, is not a state or process. The logic (grammar) of understanding and that of mental states, experiences and processes is totally different. The two belong to two different language-games as their grammar of is different. Their meaning and employment cannot be the same.

Understanding as a State (experience)

There are certain experiential states which accompany when something is meant or understood. Wittgenstein does not deny this. What he repudiates is the view that meaning and understanding consists in being conscious of these experiential states, e.g. the view that meaning consists in being conscious of a picture or an image. (This is central to the empiricist's conception of meaning and understanding). The reason, Wittgenstein argues is that our investigation is logical or conceptual rather than being empirical or psychological. The coming of an image or a picture before one's mind, or being in a certain conscious state, may be psychologically relevant. This has nothing to do with the logical/ conceptual status of meaning and understanding.

The image or picture, which accompanies when something is meant or understood, cannot by itself determine that it is to be taken in the same connotation in future as well. However, it is characteristic of conceptual investigation that it must be used in the same connotation in all its occurrences whether in the present, past or future.

What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. (PI 140) What comes before one's mind could well be a symptom of understanding? It could in no way be treated as a criterion of understanding without the risk of committing absurdity. There is a logical gap between 'an image that comes before mind' and 'understanding'. The conceptual maps of the two are different. This could be judged from the fact that temporal predicates are applied on them differently. Experiences and states of consciousness take place in "time". So is the case with understanding and meaning. But here the similarities end. States of consciousness continue or stop. They are characterized as strong or weak etc. Such predicates cannot be applied to meaning and understanding.

Understanding as a Process

A process comprises of a sequence of events which are linked together exhibiting both change and unity. Change in successive stages, unity as a whole in the purpose it serves. Events are internally joined together in a process. A certain sequence of the occurrence of events is necessary in defining a process. Any change in the internal relation will change the process. Again, the sequence of events that constitute a certain process must be independently given. It is only by seeing the sequence of events that we judge whether a certain process is going on or it has stopped, it is fast or slow, etc. The case of understanding is different. Change, unity and the sequence of events are characteristic of processes. They are not, however, characteristic of understanding. It makes perfectly good sense to talk about the sequence of events that constitute a certain process but it is senseless to ask about the sequence of events that allegedly constitute understanding. We say of processes that it is going to finish in ten minutes but not of understanding that it is going to finish in ten minutes. Again, had understanding been a process, the successive stages constituting it must have been independently given. There is no such series of events independently given which constitute understanding. Finally, temporal predicates do not have the same application in the case of understanding as is the case with processes. To say that understanding is going on at a rapid pace is non-sensical whereas to say that a certain process is going on at a rapid pace is perfectly all right. As the application of the two is different, therefore, Wittgenstein concludes that understanding is not a process.

2.9 UNDERSTANDING AS A NON-CONSCIOUS STATE OR PROCESS

With the rise of science in the 20th century there is a strong tendency to construe understanding as a non-conscious physical process occurring in brain and nervous system. This means that an increase in our knowledge of chemistry and chemical processes in the brain would further our knowledge of human understanding. Human understanding, it is implied, is nothing more than the sum of processes occurring in the brain. A little thought on the matter will bring to light the fact that understanding is taken here to be causally connected to the physicochemical processes of the brain. A causal process could be of a great interest but it can never define what understanding is. There is a big gap between causal investigation and conceptual investigation. The former needs empirical data whereas the latter demands grammatical rules or the rules for the use language. Moreover, the empirical data with which a causal investigation is done stands in need of a theory or hypothesis grounded in our conceptual schemes. This means that the grammatical rules or language is a pre-requisite for a conceptual investigation. In other words conceptual investigation is logically prior to empirical/ causal investigation. Causal connection, therefore, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for understanding. The following example will help us understand this point.

Let us take the example of a movie we see on screen. We know that the motion pictures we see on the screen are caused by the rotation of motionless pictures at the back. Now this knowledge of causal connection depends on our knowledge of waves and optics. This knowledge constitutes our background. (We know how difficult was it to convince that what we see through telescope is reliable until Kepler formulated the laws of optics.) Again, the crucial point is that in order to appreciate a movie or know the meaning of a feature film one needs not know this causal connection. It belongs to grammar or the 'form of life'. We need not know what process is going on in someone's head in order to appreciate the work of art. Wittgenstein hints to the same in the following remarks in Zettel:

No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. I mean this: if I talk or write there is, I assume a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the system continue further in the direction of the centre? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? The case would be like the following certain kinds of plants multiply by seed so that a seed always produces a plant of the same kind as that from which it was produced but nothing in the seed corresponds to the plant which comes from it; so that it is impossible to infer the properties or structure of the plant from those of the seed that comes out of it, this can only be done from the history of the seed. So an organism might come into being even out of something quite amorphous, as it were causelessly; and there is no reason why this should not really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and writing. It is thus perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena cannot be investigated psychologically, because psychologically nothing corresponds to them.

I saw this man year ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I remember his name. And why does there have to be a cause of this remembering in my nervous system? Why must something or other, whatever it may be, be stored up there is any form? Why must a trace have been left behind? Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concept of causality then it is high time it was upset. (Z 610)

Wittgenstein's View of Understanding

Wittgenstein concludes that understanding is not an experience, state or process (conscious or unconscious). These states and processes have duration while understanding lacks duration. True, certain states or processes accompany when one understands something, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient condition of understanding. Understanding belongs to another logical category. "*He understands" must have more in it than the formula occurs to him. And equally, more than any of those more or less characteristic accompaniments or manifestations of understanding.* (PI 152)

In order to get clear about "understanding", we must inquire into the meaning of related terms (as they are used in language). *The grammar of the word "Knows" is evidently closely related to that of "can", "is able to". But also closely related to that of "understands".* (PI 150)

Understanding is closely related to ability (or to mastery of a technique). Abilities and skills are always acquired. The ability to play chess is to 'know how' the game is played. Knowing how here indicates that there is a certain way of doing or using something. There is regularity in practice which is called habit or custom. This regularity is the regularity in 'actions'. The regularity in action is to be seen in ways of living or forms of life. There is nothing hidden as far as way of living is concerned. What is given in the final analysis is a description how an activity is carried out. Language, for Wittgenstein, is interwoven with action. The regularity in action is what is known as the 'rules' of language/action. Since, rules constitute language-games, therefore, understanding a language-game involves an understanding of the rules that constitute it.

Understanding, as we have seen, is a mastery of a technique or ability. Meaning is the content of understanding. Since understanding consists in knowing how, therefore, its content is given by the description of this knowing how. The description of this knowing how is the explanation of meaning.

To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique. (PI 199) "Understanding is effected by explanation; but also by training," says Wittgenstein.

2.10 LET US SUM UP

We have presented views on understanding by two different philosophers. Locke and Wittgenstein talk about sensations and mental acts. Locke considers understanding as mental process but Wittgenstein refuses to call understanding a mental process. To Wittgenstein It may be true that some mental process may accompany our understanding, but that does not indicate that our understanding consists in having that process. There are sensations and mental processes and they are non-physical and non-behaviouristic ones. What is interesting to note here is that Wittgenstein discusses sensations and mental acts at length without committing himself to the notion of consciousness anywhere in his writings.

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UNIT 3 WILLING

Contents

3.0 OBJECTIVES

- To initiate the students to the concept of will (volition) from a philosophy of mind perspective.
- To impress upon them the complex issues connected with the simple notion of will.
- To attempt to give a definition of "will."
- To see the relationship between volition and freedom (free will)

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Willing is the act of volition. Volition is the power or act of making decisions about an agent's own actions. A decision is the causing by a system of events which were not physically determined from outside the system but rather were at least somewhat contingent on the internals of the system (or agent), and which were not predictable except perhaps by modelling the internals of the system. Some the question we can ask is: Do minds have strong free will, or can their decisions in principle be inferred from sufficient knowledge of prior circumstances? In this unit we first study volition from scholastic perspective and then take it up from the perspective of philosophy of mind.

3.2 VOLITION AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

In scholastic philosophy, the will and intellect are the two spiritual faculties. The will seeks the good, while the intellect seeks the truth. Normally the will is presented by the choice of limited goods by the intellect. Then the will makes a choice ("freedom of choice") corresponding to the world of limited opportunities and choices.

Since we are made for the unlimited good, when anything is presented (rightly or wrongly!) to the will by the intellect as the unlimited good, we would be powerless to resist or reject it. But so long as something – as should all the objects of our experience – be presented to the will by the intellect as a limited good, then the will is under no compulsion to reach out for it. We are free only in the face of what is perceived by us as limited goodness.

The will always strives or seeks after something under the appearance of good. Even that which is morally or physically evil (sin or pain) is consciously sought by the will (more accurately, by

us through the will) because of something in it which is perceived as good (pleasure and comfort, health and virtue). In the case of drunkard or drug addict, s/he perceives the drink or the heroin as the absolute good and so s/he cannot resist it. Thus, s/he is not morally guilty for indulging her/himself in these, nor even (in all probability) for the felony s/he commits to have access to them. We do not send such people to jail but for medical or psychiatric treatment. The addict is not guilty, here and now, for this particular act of indulgence for, as we have seen, s/he is not really free to check her/himself. But s/he is "culpable in cause": s/he is guilty of having caused this sorry state of affairs to finally take possession of her/him. Frequent indulgence has slowly befuddled her/his brain so that her/his intellect has slowly come to be "brain-washed" into seeing drugs/drinks as the absolute good!

The possession by the will of the good constitutes happiness. But the will is not a cognitive or knowing faculty. It cannot know whether something is good for it or not. That is the job of the intellect which, on the other hand, is incapable of reaching out for the good seen. That is the role of the will. The independence of the intellect and the will is usually brought out by saying that the former is lame and the latter is blind. Remember the fable of how the blind person and the lame person formed an alliance of collaboration, the blind carrying the lame on her/his shoulders and the lame person directing her/his friend. That is a pretty good picture of how the intellect and the will work (Desbruslais 1997).

3.3 THE WILL TO LOVE

Thus human beings' identity as a volitional and intellectual agent comes to its fullest meaning when one loves. Then one fulfills oneself by dying to himself and going out of oneself into the world of value and persons. This could lead to a resolution of the problem of egoism or altruism. Thus, to repeat, self-fulfillment is achieved only in self-divestment (or self-emptying).

When one loves, one affirms the very values for which one is striving with his whole humanity: the fullness of knowledge, of love and of communion. When one loves, one testifies to one's own identify and one's demand to transcend oneself, to possess oneself, to give oneself away. This is the root of human dignity, uniqueness and irreplaceability. Only I can give myself to another.

What makes me "want" to love is the dynamism of personhood and unconditional drive to know and give (or want to give). I am prompted by the presence of the other persons and the horizon of values which I see in them, in which I partake and which not one of them, nor all of them can exhaust. Personhood thus drives me outside of myself towards the fuller realization of and union with the other. So when one loves, we may claim, that one sees the absolute value of person in the beloved, and it is one's own participation in personhood which induces one to affirm the value of the other. This leads certainly to the affirmation of the larger horizon of the whole universe. This "planetary" awareness of love is affirmed by Teilhard de Chardin (1961): "If [human beings] on earth, all over the earth, are ever to love one another, it is not enough for them to recognize in one another the elements of a single something; they must also, be developing a "planetary" consciousness, become aware of the fact that without loss of their individual identities, they are becoming a single somebody. For there is no total love - and this is writ large in the gospel - save that which is in and of the personal."

Human beings in our animality, in our contingency, in our need for self-validation, often think what "must be done" is to appropriate, to saturate themselves with things and people added on to

themselves. However because of our unique (transcending) human nature, such attempts will only serve to intensity the real drive further, rather than still it.

To sum up, we can follow the observation of Kavanaugh (1971) on an integrated human approach to love: "On deeper questioning, human beings realize that their identity actually entails a demand to know themselves, to possess themselves, and transcend themselves in an act of free self-gift. Sexuality, if it is to be integrated with personality, must be a symbol of such a free gift and only then can sexuality have human significance. Experientially, if we truly love, we are brought out of ourselves in a response to the other and the world of values to which the other - in his personhood signifies."

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) Which are the two spiritual faculties in scholasticism?

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2) How is love related to volition?

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3.4 HUMANS AS RATIONAL AND VOLITIONAL

The traditional scholastic definition of the person as a "whole, distinct, subsistent of a rational nature" makes sense here. This is how scholastics in general, and Thomists in particular, define the person. But let us take a brief glance at how this definition evolved.

Etymologically, the word "person" comes from the Latin *per-sona* (literally, one through which sounds are made), a mask. The Greek equivalent was *prospon*. In the classical days of Latin and Greek drama, the characters, instead of make-up, wore type masks, called personae. Thus there was the mask of the old man, the hero, the heroine, the villain and so on. In course of time, the word was applied to the character depicted by the one who wore the mask. Eventually it was referred to the actor or actress.

It was Boethius, the 6th century Christian philosopher and forerunner of scholasticism, who gave us the definition of person as "an individual substance of a rational nature." Aquinas slightly revised this and put it down as "distinct subsistence of a rational nature." The reason why he sought to link up person with subsistence, rather than substance, was because he wanted to use the related (but not identical) concepts of substance and person to throw light on the mystery of the Trinity, Christian God. (Desbruslais 1997).

Aquinas stressed the role of reason or the intellect in personhood, giving pride of place to that spiritual faculty in the Scholastic perspective. Hence the "intellectualism of St. Thomas". However, other scholastics, notably his mentor and co-Dominican, St. Albert (revered as "the Great") preferred to underscore the priority of the will in all things: he is called a "voluntarist" or a "volitionist". Not that there is any real contradiction in their views. The one emphasises the initially perfective act of the person (the intellect), the other the completive dimension of personhood (love, the act of the will). If Aquinas sees the beatific vision as primarily an act of the intellect and Albert as essentially an act of the will, they are reminding us of the scholastic adage that they both uphold, "The will follows the intellect." Aquinas is underscoring the

spiritual faculty that leads and Albert is pointing out that the one that follows bringing full flowering to the activity initiated by the former. After all, you can't love someone whom you don't know, but, in a personal relationship, knowledge is fundamentally a drive which is meant to end in love.

Modern thinkers more inclined to go along with St. Albert than St. Thomas and define the person as a being capable of loving and of being loved. Of course, such a person would have to be an intellectual agent – that is implied by the very definition itself, for there can be no love of what is totally unknown (hence, a person must be capable of knowing): the will and its acts follow the intellect. Inasmuch as the will is blind, there must be a precedent intellectual act to stir it to action. They would rather put the emphasis on loving, rather than knowledge as the latter approach is more consonant with Greek thinking and the former is more in keeping with the biblical viewpoint. If Aristotle defined God as *neoesis noeseos* (literally, "thought thinking about itself"), St. John called God love. Thought is essentially an inward movement (drawing things into oneself and making things what one is). Hence the traditional synonym for God as the Absolute (literally, the one cut off from), the unrelated. To call God love is an extremely radical, revolutionary idea: love, by definition is just the opposite of the absolute, unrelated, self-withdrawn reality.

By its very nature, love is turned to others, is related, is a movement away from self. Thus a person is fully a person not when he or she is cogitating in isolation and making things one with itself through the intellect, but when, Godlike, he/she is reaching out to others, entering into their lives and beings through love. This is what the incarnation is all about and we human persons would do well to remember that. Our perfection is not in withdrawal (Desbruslais 1997). If we wish to be God like, we have to be outgoing, community persons and not cold "Absolutes", unmoved and locked up in ourselves! Maybe Aquinas ' approach is not really opposed to all this but it is far easier to misunderstand this way and end up in precisely that conception of the person!

3.5. VOLITION AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

The Russian-American philosopher Ayn Rand asks: "I know what I want, and that something which knows how to want: Isn't that life itself?" Contemporary philosophy of mind and theory of volition are still living under deep shadow of Cartesian and non-Cartesian mind-body dichotomy (Fainberg 2007). The text book description of this fallacy runs as: "According to some, minds are spiritual entities that temporarily reside in bodies, entering at birth and departing on death, others reject the concept of mind, claiming that minds are just brains." (Join Heil cited in Fainberg 2007).

And an artistic description of the same runs as: "They have cut man in two, setting one half against the other. They have taught him that his body and his consciousness are two enemies engaged in deadly conflict, two antagonists of opposite natures, contradictory claims, incompatible needs, that to benefit one is to injure the other, that his soul belongs to supernatural realm, but his body is an evil prison..."(Ayn Rand, Atlas shrugged,1957).

Volition: Preliminary Investigation

In seeking to understand "willing" from the philosophy of mind perspective, it seems sensible to begin with an analysis of common usage of volition. Here, it is especially appropriate because whether or not an artificial system is perceived as being volitional will depend upon whether the system's behavior is at least consistent with this usage. Webster's New World Dictionary gives three definitions for 'volition'. The most relevant for our purposes is: "the power or faculty of using the will." The most relevant definition of 'will' in the same dictionary is: "the power of making a reasoned choice or decision or of controlling one's own actions." (Chadderdon 2010)

Considering these definitions, we can notice some important aspects of what is delineated as volition. It is a property possessed by some entities in the world: the property of being able to make a choice, i.e., a choice on some action the entity might engage in. This action might be an overt action, like locomotion, orienting sense organs, or emitting a social call; or a covert action, such as shifting attentional focus to color rather than shape features, revising a previous evaluation of a particular object encountered in the environment, or mentally selecting a future overt action out of a set of behavioral candidates.

A further component of the definition of 'will', "reasoned choice", suggests that there is some internal mental representation of reasons which may be thought of as values or goals. With this common usage in mind, our task in this section will be to iteratively develop a suitable definition for the concept of volition, and specify an ontology for operationalizing it. Many definitions can and have been proposed which are generally consistent with common usage, but are either too permissive or restrictive, depending on individual tastes. Conceiving volition as a scale allows both the permissive and restrictive usages to be accommodated into one concept consistent with common usage. The remainder of this section, after underlying metaphysical assumptions behind volition, discusses the ontological status, i.e., the "reality", of volition. Then we try to develop a definition of the will (Chadderdon 2010). This will give a taste of how philosophers of mind go about their work.

Metaphysical Assumptions

The approach in this section of the unit assumes a functionalist materialist answer to the mind/body problem (Churchland, 1996). For most Artificial Intelligence researchers, this is unproblematic, for the hope of successfully reproducing human intelligence (or volition) in machines rests on the idea that if a physical system is organized in a sufficiently isomorphic way to natural intelligent systems, it will exhibit "real" human thought, not just a clever simulation thereof. Another relevant metaphysical question is the relationship of volition to determinism. A compatibilist position holds that there is a concept of volition, or "free will", which can exist in a deterministic universe, and which meets all of the concerns we care about (Dennett 1984).

The term 'volition' seems preferable to "free will", however, because discussions of free will carry a lot of historical metaphysical baggage and "free will" is easily construed as meaning agent-causation which is the doctrine that we are "prime movers unmoved", that "In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen." (Chadderdon 2010). Such a view does not encourage inquiry into causal mechanisms of free choice, and it leads to unrealistic ideas of what freedom must mean. 'Volition' is a more metaphysically neutral term, so it will be used here instead of "free will".

Now we try to provide at least a plausible story for how a naturalistic, causal, indeterministic system might lead to choosing behaviors. Either deterministic or indeterministic causal mechanisms could be developed for the various levels of volition. Deterministic and probabilistic approaches to implementation both seem viable theoretically, though implementation may favor that indeterministic approaches be approximated with chaotic pseudo-randomness (Chadderdon 2010).

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) Give a relevant dictionary definition of will.

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2) Can deterministic mechanisms be developed for levels of volition?

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Ontological Status of Volition and a Preliminary Formulation

There is much debate in the philosophy of mind literature on whether propositional attitudes – i.e., "folk psychological" constructs such as desires, intentions, and beliefs—really exist or whether they are vacuous concepts such as phlogiston or ether were in chemistry and physics. This is relevant to our discussion of volition because volition is closely related to intentions and to desires. If intentions and desires do not have real ontological status, then neither does volition which can be thought of as a faculty that operates on intentions and desires.

In Dennett's writings (Dennett2003), he uses the example of "Game of Life" to illustrate the ontological status of volition and to demonstrate how volition might be possible in a deterministic universe. Briefly, the laws of a cellular automaton may be entirely deterministic, but if you construct a sufficiently complex Game of Life configuration, such that the gliders, blinkers, etc., implemented a Turing machine programmed to play a game of chess, then the system would exhibit intentions, i.e., by choosing the next chess moves.

We would not be able to detect the goal-orientedness of the system by looking at the cellular automata rules, nor by watching individual gliders, etc. It is only by assuming what Dennett calls an intentional stance towards the system, that one could perceive that it is, in fact, a teleological system. Similarly, in biology a teleological approach to the study of an animal's behavior would involve opting an intentional stance, since it is too difficult to derive an organism's goal-directedness from phenomena at the molecular or cellular level. Thus, volition can be said to have real ontological existence even though it may not be apparent by looking at the cellular functions of an organism (Chadderdon 2010).

We can say that volition in the chess game software system is real precisely because the system engages in choosing behavior. Volition is an emergent collective property that describes dynamics at a macro-level of existence, i.e., the level of an organism engaged in behavior and decision-making. In this view, volition can be viewed as nothing more than executing one

behavior rather than another in a situation according to some goal (implicit or explicit). What makes the behavior a choice rather than merely a regular, fixed consequence is that in similar states of the environment, the organism may well engage in a different behavior.

This formulation effectively captures the notion of volition as synonymous with 'autonomy', i.e., self-directed action, because differential behavior in the face of similar environmental conditions implies that some difference of internal 'self' state was necessary to account for the difference in behavior. This internal state is effectively 'owned' by the agent/system which is consistent with the intuition of a volitional system having a degree of "ultimate responsibility" (Chadderdon 2010) for its acts.

At this point, it may seem that we've arrived at a good operational definition of volition: "The capability of exhibiting a different behavior in a sufficiently similar environmental context".

Volition as Adaptive Decision Making

At its most basic level, volition amounts to the property of being a self-directed actor in the world, possessing some ongoing autonomous behavior, where 'autonomous' means that the behavior of the system is best explained by internal rather than external factors (e.g. a clock's change of display, as opposed to a rock's rolling down a hill). But this seems too permissive a criterion; it eliminates rocks and other inert objects, but allows clocks, plants, and even conceivably bodies of water to be counted as possessing volition. At the most refined level, volition means not only basic autonomy, but also having the ability to use internal verbalization to ponder questions and plan courses of action in advance and to deliberate on whether particular choices are likely to lead to positive or negative outcomes before committing to a particular action. Surely this criterion is also limited (Chadderdon 2010).

Even non-primate mammals which lack language may still exercise some kind of nonverbal deliberation process when, for example, foraging, or finding their way back to their lairs. A case for volition could be made even for insects with their largely reflex-driven behavior. Therefore, it seems that volition may be better conceived as a graded property (like "tall" or "bald") rather than as a dichotomous Boolean property (e.g. "has eyes"). Lacking volition entirely are inert objects like rocks and cups and spoons. There are also entities that spontaneously enact some sort of behaviors like clocks and rivers and suns, but cannot be said to possess goals, so they may be eliminated as well. On the low end of volitional endowment are some artifacts like thermostats and heat-seeking missiles that do appear to exhibit some (implicitly) goal-seeking behavior. On the high end are beings such as humans that plan and make predictions and use language and cultural artifacts as aids in directing decision-making processes before committing to an action. In between is the whole animal kingdom and some of mankind's more cunning technological creations. Consideration of volition as falling along a scale may permit a better systematic understanding of the concept and, additionally, might allow us to gauge the degree to which artificial and natural organisms possess volition (Chadderdon 2010).

In this discussion, we note that common usage suggests that volition involves the ability to choose actions based on values or goals. Another way of stating this is to say that volition entails the capacity for adaptive decision-making. Decision-making implies that differences in the

environment and one's internal state (e.g. degree of hunger or fatigue) select behavior. Adaptive decision-making implies selection of behaviors that are conducive to meeting goals which will either be those of approach or of avoidance.3 In natural systems, goal-seeking behavior (e.g. finding food and mates, and escaping from predators) is important for the survival and propagation of the organism; this explains how goals may be said to have evolved in natural organisms. We now have a useful, naturalistic general definition of our concept: Volition is the capacity for adaptive decision-making (Chadderdon 2010)

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An increase in the capacity for adaptive decision-making, then, would mean that the system would effectively control more of the processes for choosing one behavior vs. the other possible behaviors, and as a result of the increased flexibility, the adaptivity, i.e., the effectiveness, of its behaviors would probably increase when the organism was in a complex, dynamic environment. Volition is greater in organisms to the extent that:

1) their behavior is guided more by learned experience as opposed to "hardwired" reflexes,
2) their controlling mechanisms emerge more through a development process asopposed to being fixed at the beginning of their existence, and
3) their controlling mechanismscan be more regularly reflected upon and self-modified.

As volition increases, systems can be observed to have behavior differentiated on increasingly subtle variances in the environment and internal state, and their behavioral choices also become more frequently effective in meeting their goals, both learned and innate. (Chadderdon 2010).

3.6 VOLITION AND FREE WILL

Volition is closely connected with free will. Free will is either of the doctrines that human choices are a) determined internally rather than externally (volitional free will) or b) not pre-determined at all (indeterminate free will). Determinism is incompatible with indeterminate free will, but is compatible with volitional free will if agents have internal state, i.e., the agents can influences their actions. Since most effects seem caused rather than uncaused, and since the complexity of minds makes them hard to predict, minds appear to have at least weak free will (if not strong free will). Weak free will is sufficient for assigning ethical responsibility to decision-making systems even in the face of complete determinism. This is how materialists explain free will. Anti-materialists, on the other hand, posit an immaterial will that is free from both deterministic causality and random a-causality. The immaterial will is not subject to causes and so it is free. The actions of an immaterial will could be said to be caused by its own internal causal processes, but the same can be said of material minds.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1) Is volition real in chess game system?

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2) Give a good operational definition of volition?

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3.7 LET US SUM UP

In this unit after having studied volitional from Scholastic perspective, we tried to study it from a deterministic (or materialistic) perspective of philosophy of mind. It must be noted that there are other non-materialistic positions in philosophy of mind, for which volition appears easily.

3.8 KEYWORDS

Folk psychology: Folk psychology (also known as common sense psychology, naïve psychology or vernacular psychology) is the set of assumptions, constructs, and convictions that makes up the everyday language in which people discuss human psychology

Persona: Latin, meaning: actor's mask, part, role / character, personality.

Prospon: Prosopon in Greek is the face or the self-manifestation of an individual that can be extended by means of other things

Voluntarism: The doctrine that the will is a fundamental or dominant factor in the individual or the universe.

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UNIT 4 SURVIVAL OF MIND AFTER DEATH

Contents

4.0 OBJECTIVES

"Survival of mind" or immortality is one of the most ancient concepts posed by human civilization. The earliest peoples believed in some sort of survival after death. In this Unit, after a brief examination of some of the relevant theories on survival of mind or immortality, we proceed to survey a few of the prominent classical philosophical views on the issue before arriving at an affirmative conclusion of survival of mind or immortality. The Unit consists of the following main sections:

- Some Important Theories on Survival of Mind or Immortality
- Survival of Mind in Western Philosophy
- Survival of Mind in Indian Philosophy

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Ancient Indian philosophy embraced the divine nature of the soul and its survival through rebirth, a state not considered desirable either when compared with *moksha* or liberation. For Plato, whose thought has exerted a continuous influence on the West, the soul is considered to be the essential person and the body the vehicle of the soul. Survival is understood in terms of the immortality of the soul. In Hebrew thought we find a different picture developing, based on the psychosomatic unity of the person as soul and body combined. Survival after death becomes the prelude to the resurrection of the body. For St Paul it is clearly a spiritual body. Many modern scientists embrace a materialistic account of the human being, asserting that the mind or consciousness is a by-product of brain processes. Proponents of this model tend to ignore evidence that might call their materialistic presuppositions into question.

4.2 SOME IMPORTANT THEORIES ON SURVIVAL OF MIND

Dualism: Dualism maintains that at death a person continues to exist as a wholly immaterial substance, as pure consciousness or mind. There are two versions of dualism: Substance Dualism and Property Dualism. Substance Dualism claims that there are two kinds of substances: physical and mental. Property Dualism claims that there are only physical substances, some of

which have mental properties. Hence, according to the substance dualist the brain is a physical substance with physical properties, and the mind or soul is a mental substance that has mental properties. The property dualist says that the brain is a physical substance with physical and mental properties.

Epiphenomenalism: If we suppose that the physical and the mental are distinct, this does open up the prospects for disembodied survival. At any rate, it refutes a main objection against disembodied survival. However, disembodied survival requires more than both dualism and substance dualism. After all, one might agree that the brain and the mind are distinct, but one might say that the mind nonetheless depends on the brain for its functioning, and in that case, disembodied survival would not be possible. The epiphenomenalist says that while brain states and mental states are distinct, the brain is the cause of mental states, but mental states exert no causal influence on brain states. At a certain point in its complex physical processes, the brain is able to generate consciousness, but this is a one-way causal relation.

Dualistic Interactionism: The dualistic interactionist maintains that in addition to physical states causing mental states, mental states also cause physical states. Dualistic interactionists may be substance or property dualists, but some property dualists are epiphenomenalists.

Weakly Disembodied Survival: Given that weakly disembodied survival is logically consistent with the human person continuing to exist in some physical form without a conventional body or brain, weakly disembodied survival does not entail a denial of physicalism. Hence, even if physicalism were true, it would not rule out some form of disembodied survival.

Astral Body: An astral body is considered material, has shape, position and the characteristics of the physical body as well as the mind of its own. In principle, the astral body is detectable but in practice it is usually too difficult to detect. The astral body is supposed to be an exact duplicate of the physical body and it experiences all that happens to the physical body in its lifetime despite its lack of substance. One might argue that the astral body is like a shadow. The shadow behaves just as the object does. If the object is hit by an arrow, its shadow is hit by the shadow of the arrow. Why then does the astral body not die when the physical body dies? If someone died with an arrow through the heart, the astral heart must have been similarly injured. And if one tries to argue that the astral body is not an exact duplicate of the physical body, then the identity of the spirit with the dead person has been lost.

4.3 SURVIVAL OF MIND IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

The earliest Greek philosophers, especially Plato, often made immortality or survival of mind a theme of their discourses. Every philosopher and each major religion has explored its range. ‘Immortality’ or survival of mind, for them, means endless life.

For **Plato,** the soul is a spiritual principle distinct from the body. At the conclusion of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates prays: “O dear Pan and all the other gods of this place, grant that I may be beautiful inside. Let all my external possessions be in friendly harmony with what is within. May I consider the wise man rich. As for gold, let me have as much as a moderate man could bear and carry with him.” In this psychological dualism, which corresponds to Plato’s metaphysical

dualism, we see the pre-eminence of soul over body. This being so, the soul is superior to the body and must rule the body. The *Timaeus* understands the soul as the only existing thing, which possesses intelligence and is invisible. The *Phaedo* teaches that the soul is not a mere epiphenomenon of the body. It cannot be a mere harmony of the body. If the soul were a mere harmony of the body, it would follow that one soul could be more of a soul than another, which is an absurdity.

Although Plato asserts an essential distinction between soul and body, he is quite aware of the influence of the body on the soul. In the *Republic*, Plato argues that true education requires physical training. In the *Timaeus*, he admits the evil influence of bad physical training and evil bodily habits on the soul. For most of the ills of the soul are caused by a defective constitution inherited from the parents and a faulty education. "No one is willingly bad; the bad man becomes so because of some faulty habit of body and unenlightened upbringing, and these are unwelcome afflictions that come to any man against his will." Even if Plato speaks on occasion as though the soul merely dwelt in the body, he does not deny all interaction of soul and body on one another.

Both the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* teach a tripartite nature of the soul: rational part, spirited part and appetitive part. The word 'part' (meros) is used in a metaphorical sense. He regarded the three parts as forms or functions or principles of action, and not as parts in the material sense. Rational part (*logistikon*) distinguishes human from other animals. It is immortal and akin to the divine. The spirited part (*thumoeides*) is the nobler (more akin to moral courage) and is the natural ally of reason. Of course, it is also found in animals. The appetitive part (*epithumeitikon*) refers to bodily desires. The *Timaeus* locates the rational part in the head, the spirited part in the breast, and the appetitive part below the midriff. Plato declared that only the rational part of the soul, which is simple, is immortal. But in the Myths, it is implied that the soul survives in its totality, at least that it preserves memory in the state of separation from the body.

Plato introduced the tripartite nature of the soul mainly owing to the evident fact of the conflict within the soul. In the Phaedrus, the rational part is likened to a charioteer, and the spirited and appetitive elements to two horses. The one horse (spirited part) is good and the other horse (appetitive part) is bad. While the good horse is easily driven according to the directions of the charioteer, the bad horse is unruly and tends to obey the voice of sensual passion so that it must be restrained by the whip. To conclude: The tendency to regard the three principles of action as principles of one unitary soul and the tendency to regard them as separable parts remain unreconciled in Plato.

Plato's main interest is evidently the ethical interest of insisting on the right of the rational part (charioteer) to rule. While the rational part of the soul is said to be made by the Demiurge out of the same ingredients as the World-Soul, the mortal parts of the soul (also body) are made by the celestial gods. This is a mythical expression of the fact that the rational element of the soul is the highest and is born to rule because it is more akin to the divine. It has a natural affinity with the invisible and intelligible world which it is able to contemplate. But the other elements of the soul are bound up essentially with the body and have no direct part in rational activity by which one beholds the world of Forms.

The following are Plato's arguments for immortality: First, in the *Phaedo* Socrates argues that contraries are produced from contraries. Life and death are contraries. Death is produced from life. We must, therefore, conclude that life is produced from death. The second argument is from the *apriori* factor in knowledge. Humans have knowledge of standards and absolute norms. But these standards and absolutes do not exist in sense-world. Hence, humans must have beheld them in a state of pre-existence. The third argument is from the spirituality of the soul. Visible things are complex and subject to dissolution and death. The soul can survey the invisible and unchanging forms. By coming into contact with forms, the soul shows itself to be more like forms than it is to visible and material things, which are mortal. Moreover, from the fact that the soul is naturally destined to rule the body, it appears to be more like the divine than the mortal. The soul is 'divine,' which for the Greeks means immortality. The fourth argument is that a spiritual principle cannot wear itself out. The existence of forms is admitted. Now, the presence of one form will not admit of the presence of a contrary form, nor will a thing that is what it is by virtue of its participation in one form admit of the simultaneous presence of a contrary form. If fire is 'warm,' it will not admit of the opposite predicate 'cold' simultaneously. Soul is what it is by virtue of its participation in the form of life. Therefore, it will not admit of the presence of the contrary form, 'death.' When death approaches, the soul must either perish or withdraw. That it does not perish is assumed. It cannot also withdraw itself due to weariness. For a spiritual principle cannot wear itself out. Fifthly, a thing cannot be destroyed or perish except through some evil that is inherent in it. The evils of the soul are unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, and ignorance. But these do not destroy the soul; for a thoroughly unjust person may live as long or longer than a just person. So if the soul is not destroyed by its own internal corruption, it cannot be destroyed by any external evil. Sixthly, a thing which moves another and is moved by another may cease to live as it may cease to be moved. The soul is a self-moving principle which is uncreated. What is uncreated cannot be destroyed. Hence, the soul can in no way be destroyed. It is immortal.

For **Aristotle**, soul (*psyche*) is the principle of life. It is the entelechy (*entelekeia*) of a natural body endowed with the capacity of life (*De Anima* B I, 412 a 27-b 4). It is the act of the body. The body is for the soul. The body is matter to the soul and the soul is form to the body. The soul is thus the realization of the body and is inseparable from it. The soul is the cause of the body: as source of movement, as final cause, as the real substance (i.e., formal cause) of animating bodies.

There are different forms of soul. The lowest form of soul is the vegetative soul which exercises assimilation and reproduction. These functions are fundamental in all living things. Animals possess the sensitive soul, the higher form of soul, which exercises the three powers of sense-perception, desire, and local motion. Humans possess rational soul (*nous*) which unites in itself the powers of the lower souls. The *nous* is the power of both scientific thought and deliberation. While scientific thought aims at truth for its own sake, deliberation aims at truth for practical purposes. All the powers of the soul, except nous, are inseparable from the body and perishable. However, nous pre-exists before the body and is immortal. The nous requires a potential principle on which it may imprint forms. Here, Aristotle makes the distinction between *nous poietikos* (active intellect) and *nous patheitikos* (passive intellect). The active intellect abstracts forms from the images (*phantasmata*), which, when received in the passive intellect, are actual concepts. Only the active intellect is immortal. What Aristotle says in the *De Anima* is as follows:

"This latter intellect (nous) is separate, unaffected and unmixed, being in substance activity. For in all cases that which acts is superior to that which is affected, and the principle to its matter. And while knowledge in the actualized state is identical with the fact known, knowledge in the state of potentiality, though temporally prior in the individual case, does not in general even have temporal priority. Nor is it the case that the intellect is now thinking, now not. It is, further, in its separate state that the intellect is just that which it is, and it is this alone that is immortal and eternal, though we have no memory, as the separate intellect is unaffected, while the intellect that is affected is perishable, and in any case thinks nothing without the other."

According to **Augustine**, human is constituted of body and soul. The soul is a substance in its own right. Human is a rational soul using a mortal and earthly body (> Platonic conception). Sensation is an activity of the soul using the body as an instrument rather than an activity of the total psycho-physical organism. The soul is superior to and better than the body. "For, every living creature or animal consists of both soul and body. Of these two components, the soul, assuredly, is superior to the body. Even when vicious and weak, the soul is, without doubt, better than the healthiest and strongest body, since it is higher by nature and, even though blemished by vice, is better than the body, just as gold, even when dirty, is worth more than silver or lead, however pure." Being superior to the body, the soul cannot be acted on by the body. The soul perceives the changes in the body due to an external stimulus. Although the soul animates the body, it is an immaterial principle. Its immateriality and substantiality assure it of immortality. The soul is immortal because it apprehends indestructible truth which shows that it is itself indestructible.

Human soul, holds **Bonaventure**, is created by God out of nothing. It is the image of God and on this count its production can be effected only by God who is that Principle which has life and perpetuity of itself. God creates the entire soul, and not merely the rational faculty. There is only one soul in human endowed with rational and sensitive faculties. It is also the form of the body. It is an existent, living, intelligent form endowed with freedom. It is present in every part of the body. It is a spiritual substance composed of both spiritual form and spiritual matter. This doctrine may seem to contradict the admitted simplicity of the human soul. But Bonaventure points out that 'simplicity' has various meanings and degrees. 'Simplicity' may refer to absence of quantitative parts (which the soul enjoys), or it may refer to absence of constitutive parts (which the soul does not enjoy). The main point is that the soul can subsist by itself. In fact, it is the presence of a material principle to which a form is united is what makes possible subsisting in the full sense of the term. Being partly passive and mutable, it must have in it spiritual matter. The doctrine of the hylomorphic composition of the human soul is thus calculated to ensure its power of subsistence apart from the body. The hylomorphic composition naturally facilitates the proof of its immortality. But Bonaventure's favourite proof for immortality is the one drawn from the consideration of the ultimate purpose of the soul which seeks for perfect happiness. But no one can be perfectly happy if one is afraid of losing what one possesses. Now, the soul has a natural desire for perfect happiness. Therefore, it must be naturally immortal. This proof presupposes the existence of God, the source of perfect happiness. In a similar way, he argues from the nature of the soul as the image of God. Since the soul has been created for happiness, which consists in the possession of the supreme Good, it must be capable of possessing God

(*capax Dei*) and so must be made in his image. But soul would not be the image of God if it were mortal. Hence it must be immortal.

Thomas Aquinas rejected the Platonic-Augustinian view of the relation of soul to body and adopted the Aristotelian view of the soul as form of the body. In this way, Aquinas emphasized the closeness of the union between the two. There is only one substantial form in human, the rational soul. This substantial form directly informs prime matter and is the cause of all human activities on the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual levels. Sensation is an act not of the soul using a body, but of the composite. We have no innate ideas and the mind depends on sense-experience for its knowledge. The soul is incorruptible because it is a subsistent form intrinsically independent of the body and extrinsically dependent on it since the mind needs the body for its activity not as its cause but as condition. Besides, a form, for Aquinas, is corrupted in three ways only: through the action of its contrary, through the corruption of its subject, and through the failure of its cause. But the human soul cannot be corrupted in any of these ways.

Again, a form is corrupted by three things only: the action of its contrary, the corruption of its subject, the failure of its cause; by the action of a contrary, as when heat is destroyed by the action of cold; by the corruption of its subject, as when the power of sight is destroyed through the destruction of the eye; by the failure of its cause, as when the air's illumination fails through the failure of its cause, the sun, to be present. But the human soul cannot be corrupted by the action of a contrary, for nothing is contrary to it; since, through the possible intellect, it is cognizant and receptive of all contraries. Nor can the human soul be destroyed through the corruption of its subject, for we have already shown that it is a form independent of the body in its being. Nor, again, can the soul be destroyed through the failure of its cause, since it can have no cause except an eternal one.... Therefore, in no way can the human soul be corrupted (St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book II, Ch. 79, Art.10).

The subsistent human soul is spiritual because it is capable of knowing the natures of all bodies. If it were material, it would be determined to a specific object without being capable of self-reflection, as, for instance, the sense of vision is determined to the perception of colour. For these and other reasons, it follows that every human soul must be immaterial (spiritual), and thus immortal. Secondly, the soul has a natural desire for immortality. The natural desire (*desiderium naturale*) implanted by God cannot be in vain. When Aquinas proves the immortality of the soul, he is naturally referring to personal immortality. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain the diversity of ideas and intellectual operations in different humans if they have only one intellect.

4.4 SURVIVAL OF MIND IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The Upanisads and the Bhagavad Gita: The Kausitaki Upanisad (KU 4,20) states that the soul fills the body right to the tips of the nails and hairs just as a sheath. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad (BU 5,6,1) and the Katha (Katha 1,2,20) describe the soul as the size of a rice or barely grain. The Katha also describes it as the size of a thumb (Katha 2,2,12), and the Chandogya as the size of a "span" (CU 5,18,1). The Maitri Upanisad (MaiU 6,38) describes the soul as all these sizes – grain of rice, a thumb and a span. What is important in this apparent contradiction among

metaphors is the philosophical content, and the usefulness of metaphors for the progressive realization of atman. The apparent contradiction is the best indicator that what is intended is to show that Self and Self-consciousness are not subject matters within any spatial, temporal and causal framework. It is the attempt to translate the metaphysical (a-spatial, a-temporal and a-causal), immortal soul to these metaphors that create the apparent contradictions. The key to understanding the Upanisadic metaphysics of death is that death is no termination. Death denotes one phase in a seemingly unending series of transitions that have as their underlying ground and ultimate outcome, immortality. The Kathopanisad (Katha 1,2,18-19) states that the atman is neither born nor dead. The soul is not killed with the killing of the body. The Bhagavad Gita says that death is merely like a change of clothes. One body is put off and another, newer one is put on (Gita 2,19). This is a necessary information given to the hesitant Arjuna by Krsna to encourage him to fight and establish justice in the world. It is true all will die, but all will return again.

Carvakas: According to Carvakas, the existence of consciousness is proved by perception. But consciousness is not the quality of any unperceived spiritual entity. It is the quality of living body composed of the material elements. It is the by-product of matter. Since there is no soul apart from body, there is also no possibility of immortality. All questions concerning previous life, after-life, rebirth, etc. becomes meaningless.

Jainism: A soul (*jiva*) is a conscious substance. Consciousness, which is present in the soul, is its essence. Of course, the nature and degree of consciousness may vary. Souls are arranged in a continuous series according to the degrees of consciousness. The perfect souls, that have overcome all karmas and attained omniscience, are at the top of the scale and the most imperfect souls, which inhabit the bodies of earth, water, fire, air or vegetation, are at the lowest end of the scale. Life and consciousness appear to be absent in the most imperfect souls. But even here consciousness is present in a hidden manner, in a dormant form owing to the overpowering influence of karma. The souls having two to five senses, like worms, ants, bees and men, lie midway between these two extremes. The soul is eternal, yet undergoes change of states. Its existence is directly proved by its consciousness of itself. Though it is eternal, it is not infinite since it is co-extensive with the body. Consciousness is present only in the body, in every part of it and thus occupies space. The soul's occupying space means its presence in different parts of space and not filling a part of it like a material body. No two material bodies can be present in the same space at the same time, but two or more souls can be present at the same place just as two or more lights can illumine the same area.

Immortality consists in the liberation of the soul from the bondage of matter, from the bondage of passions. The passions which cause bondage are anger, pride, illusion and greed. The presence of these passions in the soul makes matter-particles stick to it. Liberation is attained by stopping the influx of new matter into the soul as well as by complete elimination (*nirjara*) of the matter with which the soul has become already mingled. The passions or cravings of the soul lead to the association of the soul with matter. Passions ultimately spring from our ignorance about the real nature of our souls. Liberation from matter or passions is attained through right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct. Right faith is the attitude of respect (*sradha*) towards truth. In some this faith may be inborn and spontaneous while in others it may be acquired. Right knowledge is the 'detailed cognition of the real nature of the ego and non-ego, and is free from

doubt, error and uncertainty.' The existence of certain innate tendencies (*karmas*) stands in the way of correct knowledge. For the attainment of perfect knowledge, which results in absolute omniscience, the removal of these karmas is required. Right conduct means refraining from what is harmful and doing what is beneficial. Good conduct helps the self to get rid of the karmas that lead to bondage and suffering.

Buddhism: In Buddhism, the conception of a soul is replaced by that of an unbroken stream of consciousness. The present state of consciousness inherits its characteristics from the past, from the previous ones. The past in a way continues in the present through its effect. Buddha repeatedly exhorts his disciples to give up the false view about the self. The people who suffer from the illusion of the self are like those falling in love with the most beautiful maiden who has never existed. There is, thus, no immortality of soul too. However, there is rebirth, which is not transmigration (migration of the same soul into another body), but the causation of the next life by the present. There is no immortal soul, but a series of 'immortal' (unbroken) causations in which 'everything is dependent on something else, and that thing in turn does not perish without leaving some effect, called dependent origination' (*pratityasamutpada*).

Nyaya: The Nyaya school understands immortality in terms of liberation (*mukti*). Liberation is a state of negation of all pain and suffering in which the soul is released from all the bonds of its connection with the body and the senses. It is soul's final deliverance from pain and attainment of eternal bliss. To attain liberation one must acquire a true knowledge of the self and all other objects of experience, knowing the self as distinct from the body and undergoing no more birth in this world. The cessation of birth means the end of one's connection with the body and consequently of all pain and suffering.

Vaiseshika: The soul is an eternal (immortal) and all-pervading substance which is the principle of consciousness. There are two kinds of souls: individual soul (*jivatma*) and supreme soul (*paramatma*). The latter is the one creator of the world and the former is internally or mentally perceived, which is not one but many. *Manas* is the internal sense of the individual soul. *Manas* is atomic and partless, and cannot be perceived. It is the organ through which soul attends to objects.

Samkhya: The self (*purusa*) is different from the body and the senses, the *manas* and the intellect. It is a conscious spirit which is always the subject of knowledge. It is not a substance with consciousness as its attribute, but it is the pure consciousness. Consciousness is the very essence of the self. There are numerous selves, which are eternal (immortal) and intelligent subjects of knowledge. Self is distinct from *prakrti*, which is the one, eternal (immortal) and non-intelligent ground of the objects of knowledge, including *manas*, intellect and ego.

Liberation or absolute freedom from all pain and suffering is possible through right knowledge of reality (*tattvajnana*). Our sufferings are due to our ignorance of laws of life and nature. Reality is a plurality of selves and the world of objects presented to them. The self is pure consciousness free from the limitations of space, time and causality. The self is distinct from ego and mind. It is the transcendent subject whose very essence is pure consciousness, freedom, eternity and immortality. It is eternal and immortal because it is not produced by any cause and cannot be destroyed in any way. Immortality and eternal life are not to be regarded as future

possibilities, but as a reality which is beyond space and time, beyond mind and body, and therefore, essentially free, eternal and immortal. This kind of liberation is called *jivanmukti* (liberation of the soul while living in this body).

Yoga: Yoga system regards the individual self (*jiva*) as the free spirit associated with the gross body and more closely related to a subtle body constituted by the senses, the *manas*, the ego and the intellect. The self is pure consciousness free from the limitations of the body and the fluctuations of the mind (*citta*). Although the self undergoes no change, yet because of its reflection in the changing states of *citta*, the self appears to be subject to changes, in the same way as the moon appears to be moving when we see it reflected in the moving waters. When the waves of the empirical consciousness die down, the self realizes itself as distinct from the mind-body complex, as free immortal and self-shining intelligence.

Mimamsa: For this school, the soul is an eternal, infinite substance which is related to a real body in a real world and it is immortal. Its immortality enables it to reap the consequences of its action performed here. Consciousness is not the essence of the soul, but an adventitious quality. In dreamless sleep and in the state of liberation, the soul has no consciousness. There are as many souls as there are individuals. Although the souls are subject to bondage, they can also obtain liberation from it.

Advaita Vedanta of Sankara: Sankara accepts the identity of soul and God. Human is only apparently composed of body and soul. But the body, in fact, is merely an illusory appearance. The reality that remains is the soul which is nothing other than God. Hence, the soul is as immortal and eternal as God is. The great saying, 'That thou art,' means that there is an unqualified identity between the soul, that underlies the apparently finite human, and God. Being identical with God, the soul is in reality what God really is. It is the supreme Brahman. The soul appears as limited, because of its association with body which is a product of ignorance. Owing to ignorance, the soul erroneously associates itself with body, and thus is in bondage. When ignorance is removed, one realizes that one is identical with Brahman, '*Aham Brahmasmi*.' This is the moment of liberation from bondage. The liberated soul never again identifies itself with body.

Visistadvaita of Ramanuja: Human has a real body and a soul. The body is finite, material, and a part of God. The soul is eternal, infinite and immortal. The soul is so subtle that it can penetrate into every unconscious material substance. Consciousness is an eternal quality of the soul which remains so under all conditions. The bondage of the soul to body is due to its karma. Being embodied, its consciousness is limited by the conditions of the body it possesses. Though the soul is infinitely small, it illumines every part of the body in which it is. It identifies itself with the body. Liberation is to be attained through both work and knowledge (devotion). Real knowledge is a steady, constant remembrance of God through meditation (*dhyana*), prayer (*upasana*), and devotion (*bhakti*). Intense remembrance of God (devotion) ultimately matures into an immediate knowledge of God. Liberation cannot be attained simply by human efforts. God helps the devotee to attain perfect knowledge by removing obstacles. The liberated soul does not become identical with God, but becomes similar to God. The liberated soul attains unity with God.

4.5 LET US SUM UP

Almost all humans, in their thought and conviction, are oriented towards immortality or life after death. The immortality of the human soul, from a philosophical viewpoint, can be established from the immateriality or spirituality of certain fundamental operations in human. For, 'as the operation is so the being is'. The fundamental operations are: knowing, willing and remembering; these are immaterial or spiritual in themselves. As they are spiritual in themselves, they are intrinsically independent of matter and extrinsically dependent on matter or material conditions. It means that the human cannot know or will or remember without body or material conditions. Yet, the material conditions cannot cause any of these operations independently. If the operations of knowing, willing, and remembering are spiritual, the corresponding faculties – intellect, will, and memory – from which these operations proceed should also be spiritual. Although these faculties have their own distinct functions, they are not separate or apart from each other as they are coordinated by a coordinating principle, namely, soul which must also be spiritual as the spiritual cannot originate from what is material, but only from the spiritual. The spiritual is simple. The simple is not composed. What is not composed cannot be decomposed. What cannot be decomposed cannot die, since death is basically decomposition. What is not subject to death, therefore, is immortal. Hence, human mind or soul is immortal, i.e., survives death.

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